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ABSTRACT
Markets have been the most successful method of identifying value of goods and services.
Both large and small scale markets have gradually been moving into the Internet domain,
with increasingly large numbers of diverse participants. In this dissertation, we consider sev-
eral problems pertaining to equilibria in networked marketplaces under different application
scenarios and market sizes. We approach the question of pricing and market design from two
perspectives. On the one hand, we desire to understand how self-interested market partici-
pants would set prices and respond to prices resulting in certain allocations. On the other
hand, we wish to evaluate how best to allocate resources so as to attain efficient equilibria.
There might be a gap between these viewpoints, and characterizing this gap is desirable.
Our technical approaches follow the number of market participants, and the nature of
trades happening in the market. In our first problem, we consider a market of providing
communication services at the level of providing Internet transit. Here, the transit Internet
Service Provider (ISP) must determine billing volumes and set prices for its customers who
are firms that are content providers, sinks, or subsidiary ISPs. Demand from these customers
is variable, and they have different impacts on the resources that the transit ISP needs to
provision. Using measured data from several networks, we design a fair and flexible billing
scheme that correctly identifies the impact of each customer on the amount of provisioning
needed.
While the customer set in the first problem is finite, many marketplaces deal with a very
large number of agents that each have ephemeral lifetimes. Here, agents arrive, participate in
the market for some time, and then vanish. We consider two such markets in such a regime.
The first is one of apps on mobile devices that compete against each other for cellular data
service, while the second is on service marketplaces wherein many providers compete with
each other for jobs that consider both prices and provider reputations while making choices
ii
between them. Our goal is to show that a Mean Field Game can be used to accurately
approximate these systems, determine how prices are set, and characterize the nature of
equilibria in such markets.
Finally, we consider efficiency metrics in large scale resource sharing networks in which
bilateral exchange of resources is the norm. In particular, we consider peer-to-peer (P2P)
file sharing under which peers obtain chunks of a file from each other. Here, contrary to
the intuition that chunks must be shared whenever one peer has one of value to another, we
show that a measure of suppression is needed to utilize resources efficiently. In particular, we
propose a simple and stable algorithm entitled Mode suppression that attains near optimal
file sharing times by disallowing the sharing of the most frequent chunks in the system.
iii
DEDICATION
To my wife and parents
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Srinivas Shakkottai for his
continuous guidance and motivation throughout my PhD studies. It would not have been
possible to complete this work without his help. I would like to thank my main collaborators,
Dr. Amogh Dhamdhere, Dr. Vijay Subramanian and Dr. Parimal Parag for their invaluable
guidance and feedback. Their ideas gave me direction whenever I was lost. Finally, I would
like to thank my committee members for their constructive feedback and the many concepts
that I learned from their courses.
v
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES
Contributors
This work was supported by a dissertation committee consisting of Professors Srinivas
Shakkottai, P. R. Kumar and Jean-Francois Chamberland of the Department of Electrical
Engineering and Professor Natarajan Gautam of the Department of Industrial Engineering.
The analyses depicted in Chapter 3 was conducted in part by Vinod Ramaswamy and
Mayank Manjrekar of the Department of Electrical Engineering.
All other work conducted for the dissertation was completed by the student indepen-
dently.
Funding Sources
Graduate study was supported by a Research Assistantship from Texas A&M University.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
DEDICATION .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
1. INTRODUCTION .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. ISP TRANSIT BILLING .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1 SWITCH dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.2 IXP dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Longitudinal Study of 95th Percentile billing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.1 Calculation of 95th percentile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2 Classification of networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.3 95th percentile to average ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.4 Skewness of the traffic distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Fairness of 95th Percentile Billing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1 Shapley Value Percentile Billing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2 Overlap rank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.3 Provision ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.4 Towards a new billing mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Measuring Billing Volumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 Optimization Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.7 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3. A MEAN FIELD GAME APPROACH TO QOE-AWARE CELLULAR SCHEDUL-
ING .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
vii
3.1.1 Mean Field Games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.2 Overview of Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Mean Field Game Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.1 Auction System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2.2 Queueing System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.3 Mean Field Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.4 Agent’s decision problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.5 Invariant distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.6 Mean field equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Properties of Optimal Bid Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4 Existence of MFE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5 MFE Existence: Proof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5.1 Continuity of the map F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5.2 F(P) contained in a compact subset of P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6 Approximation Results: PBE and MFE .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.7 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.8 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4. MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIA OF PRICING AND WORK-QUALITY SELEC-
TION GAMES IN INTERNET MARKETPLACES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1.1 Mean Field Games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.2 Main Contributions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2 Mean Field Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.1 State Space of Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.2 State Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2.3 Bid, Payment and Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2.4 Effective Bid and Customer Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3 State Dynamics and MFE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.1 Agent’s Decision Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.3.2 Invariant Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.3 Mean Field Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4 Existence of Optimal Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Properties of Optimal Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.6 Existence of Mean Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6.1 General Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6.2 Continuity of the map F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6.3 Continuity of FA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6.4 Compactness of Range Space FS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.7 Non-Uniform Prior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.8 Numerical Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.8.1 Determining z from Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.8.2 Large Particle Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.8.3 Strategic ηc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
viii
4.9 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5. PROVABLE STABLE POLICIES IN P2P FILE SHARING.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1.1 Related Work on Stable Algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.1.2 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.2.1 Contact Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2.2 State space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2.3 State transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Mode Suppression policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3.1 Stability Region of Mode Suppression Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.4 Threshold Mode Suppression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.1 Rate Transition Matrix (Q) of TMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4.2 Stability of TMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.5 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.5.1 Stability of Mode Suppression Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5.2 Missing Piece Syndrome in Random Chunk Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5.3 Chunk Frequency Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.5.4 Sojourn times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.6 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .118
APPENDIX A. PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.2 Proofs from Section 3.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.2.1 Proofs Pertaining to Section 3.5-A: Step 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.2.2 Proofs Pertaining to Section 3.5-A: Step 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.2.3 Proofs Pertaining to Section 3.5-A: Step 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.2.4 Proofs Pertaining to Section 3.5-B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
APPENDIX B. PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
B.1 Proofs from Section 4.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
B.1.1 Details of proof of Lemma 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
B.1.2 Existence of optimal policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
B.1.3 Details of Proof of Theorem 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B.2 Proofs from Section 4.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
B.2.1 Details of Proof of Lemma 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
B.2.2 Details of Proof of Lemma 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
B.2.3 Details of Proof of Lemma 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
ix
B.2.4 Details of Proof of Lemma 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B.3 Proofs from Section 4.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.3.1 Details of Proof of Lemma 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.3.2 Details of Proof of Lemma 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
B.3.3 Details of Proof of Lemma 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.3.4 Details of Proof of Lemma 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.3.5 Details of Proof of Lemma 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
B.3.6 Details of Proof of Lemma 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
B.4 Proofs from Section 4.7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B.4.1 Details of Proof of Lemma 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
APPENDIX C. PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
C.1 Auxiliary Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
C.2 Proof of Theorem 17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
C.2.1 Choosing Parameters: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
x
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
2.1 Mean 95th Percentile to average ratio for different network types in the SWITCH
dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Mean 95th Percentile to average ratio for IXPs, using different network clas-
sifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Mean skewness for different network types in the SWITCH dataset. Heavy-
outbound networks have a higher skewness, especially in the last 4 years. . . . . . . 11
2.4 Mean skewness for networks in the IXP dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 Shapley value percentiles: SWITCH dataset (Mar 2012) and IXP dataset
(SIX, Aug 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6 Overlap rank vs 95th Percentile rank for IXP dataset (Aug 2013) and one
month of SWITCH dataset (Jan 2012). A large fraction of networks lie far
from the diagonal, meaning they have a large billing volume but little overlap
with the provider’s peaks, or vice versa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.7 Inverse Provision Ratio order vs Average traffic order of SVPs and OWPs for
February 2012 SWITCH data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.8 Distribution of percentage of orders preserved and Box and Whisker plot of
difference in ranks for four years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.9 Percentage of amount of billing volume reduction with E = 5% elasticity. The
x-axis denote the index of the customers and y-axis denote the percentage
reduction achieved by moving 5% of traffic to off-peak periods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.10 Percentage of amount of billing volume reduction with E = 15% elasticity.
The x-axis denote the index of the customers and y-axis denote the percentage
reduction achieved by moving 5% of traffic to off-peak periods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 The game consists of an auction part (blue/dark tiles) and a queue dynamics
part (beige/light tiles). The system is at MFE if the distribution of the bid
X is equal to the assumed bid distribution ρ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Convergence to MFE bid distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 MFE queue length distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
xi
3.4 MFE optimal bid function.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1 The effect of reputation on sale price. Reputation is classified as “high” (=1)
or “low” (=0). We consider four conditions of phones: fair, good, mint and
new. Comparing phones of the same condition (shown in the same color), we
observe a markup of about $50 for a high reputation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Mean Field Model: Parameters related to the mechanism are shown in blue,
while the state transition parameters are shown in red. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3 Value Function variation with queue size and reputation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4 Variation of type with queue size, reputation and quality.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Optimal effective bid variation with queue size and reputation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.6 ηc chosen at different states. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.7 ηc distribution with time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 Number of peers in the system when m = 5, U = 1 and µ = 1. Random
becomes unstable in some cases, whereas MS and DMS are always stable. . . . . . 109
5.2 Evolution of peers and chunk frequencies under the random chunk selection
policy. One of the chunks becomes a “missing chunk” (red/starred line). . . . . . . . 111
5.3 Chunk frequency evolution in a system with m = 5 chunks under different
policies when starting from the state of a “missing-chunk” ( whose frequency
is indicated by a red/dashed line). Rarest-first is clearly unstable, since it
cannot recover, whereas the other protocols manage to bring the chunk back
into peer circulation and stabilize the system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4 Mean mixing sojourn times of policies for different values of m. Distributed
mode suppression has the best performance in all cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5 Mean stationary sojourn times of policies for different values of m. Distributed
mode suppression has the best performance in all cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
xii
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
4.1 Value of z¯κ for different products. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1 Comparison of global chunk distribution based policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
xiii
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of different kinds of markets operating
over a range of timescales and catering to a variety of resources and services. The efficient
functioning of these markets depends on the properties of the mechanisms that determine
how users interact, and what kind of equilibria are attained. However, analyzing the impact
of policies and equilibrium achieved in these markets is a challenging task, especially when
the number of users or agents are large. In this thesis, we analyze mechanism design and
equilibrium properties of four different markets, each with an increasing numbers of users.
The first problem we look at is the Internet transit service provider market, in which
large transit providers such as AT&T and Level 3, provide transit services to level 2 cus-
tomers. The 95th percentile method for calculating a customer’s billable transit volume
has been the industry standard used by such transit providers for over a decade due to its
simplicity. Here, the average amount of bandwidth used is computed for every 5 minutes
for the entire month and then the 95th Percentile of all these entries is considered as the
bandwidth utilization of that ISP. In this chapter, we evaluate the 95th Percentile pricing
mechanism from the perspective of transit providers, using a decade of traffic statistics from
a European transit provider, SWITCH, and more recent traffic statistics from 3 Internet
Exchange Points (IXPs). We find that over time, heavy-inbound and heavy-hitter networks
are able to achieve a lower 95th-to-average ratio than heavy-inbound and moderate-hitter
networks, possibly due to their ability to better manage their traffic profile. We also show
that 95th Percentile does not reflect a customer’s contribution to the provider’s peak load.
We discuss how a fair allocation of costs could potentially be achieved based on determining
each network’s Shapley value – a concept from cooperative game theory. However, comput-
ing the Shapley value has exponential complexity. We then propose a new transit billing
optimization framework that is fair, flexible and computationally inexpensive. Our approach
is based on the Provision Ratio, a metric that estimates the contribution of a customer to the
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provider’s peak traffic and acts as a proxy for the Shapley value. The proposed mechanism
can be framed as convex optimization problem, and has fairness properties similar to the
optimal (in terms of fairness) Shapley value allocation, with a much smaller computational
complexity.
The second problem we deal with is the auction-based packet-scheduling in cellular net-
works. We study auction-theoretic scheduling in this setting using the idea of a mean field
equilibrium (MFE). Here, agents model their opponents through an assumed distribution
over their action spaces, and play the best response action against this distribution. We say
that the system is at MFE if this best response action turns out to be a sample drawn from
the assumed distribution. In our setting, the agents are smart phone apps that generate
packets that require, have costs associated with packet queueing delay, and bid against each
other for service from base stations. The users of the apps spend a geometrically distributed
amount of time on each app, and then move on to another. We show that in a system in
which we conduct a second-price auction at each base station and schedule the winner at
each time, there exists an MFE that will schedule the user with highest value at each time.
We further show that the scheme can be interpreted as a longest-queue-first type policy. The
result suggests that auctions can implicitly attain the same desirable results as queue-length
based scheduling. We also present results on the convergence between a system with a finite
number of agents to a mean field case as the number of agents become large. Finally, we
show simulation results illustrating the simplicity of computation of the MFE in our setting.
Our next problem deals with price setting in Internet marketplaces, which have become
a popular way of selling goods and services. Examples include current e-commerce systems
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, Hackers list, and Swappa, which specialize in different
niches. We model such an Internet marketplace using a set of servers that choose prices
for performing jobs. Each server has a queue of unfinished jobs, and is penalized for delay
by the market maker via a holding cost. Each server is allowed to choose the work-quality
when performing a job, with a job done at a higher work-quality than its inherent value
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incurring a cost and jobs truthfully report the “quality” with which they were completed.
The best estimate of quality based on these reports is the “reputation” of the server. A
server bases its pricing decision on the distribution of its competitors prices and reputations.
An entering job chooses the best server based on a combination of price and reputation. We
seek to understand how prices would be determined in such a marketplace using the idea of
the mean filed equilibrium. We show the existence of an MFE and characterize the impact of
reputation in allowing servers to declare higher prices than their competitors. We illustrate
our results by a numerical study of the system via simulation with parameters chosen from
data gathered from existing Internet marketplaces.
Our final problem is on analyzing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, whose ability to scale
throughput up in proportion to the arrival rate of peers has recently been shown to be
crucially dependent on the chunk sharing policy employed. Some policies can result in low
frequencies of a particular chunk, known as the missing chunk syndrome, which can dra-
matically reduce throughput and lead to instability of the system. For instance, commonly
used policies that nominally “boost” the sharing of infrequent chunks such as the well-known
rarest-first algorithm have been shown to be unstable. Recent efforts have largely focused
on the careful design of boosting policies to mitigate this issue. We take a complementary
viewpoint, and instead consider a policy that simply prevents the sharing of the most fre-
quent chunk(s). Following terminology from statistics wherein the most frequent value in a
data set is called the mode, we refer to this policy as mode suppression. We prove the stabil-
ity of this algorithm using Lyapunov techniques. We also design a distributed version that
suppresses the mode via an estimate obtained by sampling three randomly selected peers.
We show numerically that both algorithms perform well at minimizing total download times,
with distributed mode suppression outperforming all others that we tested against.
3
2. ISP TRANSIT BILLING
2.1 Introduction
Transit providers are an important piece of the Internet ecosystem, providing customers
with access to the rest of the Internet. But the future role of transit providers is uncertain,
given continuously falling transit prices and increased propensity for networks to interconnect
directly (peering) [42, 14], essentially routing around traditional transit providers. These
business risks increase the pressure on transit providers to optimize their transit billing
schemes to remain competitive.
There are two components to today’s Internet transit billing scheme: the volume of traffic
for which a customer network is billed (the billing volume), and a function that computes
price based on this volume. The industry standard for determining the billing volume is the
95th percentile method [44, 15]: a transit provider measures the utilization of a customer link
in 5-minute bins throughout a month, and then computes the 95th Percentile of these values
as the billing volume. The 95th Percentile method has three attractive properties: it is simple
to implement; it uses data that the provider typically already collects; and it approximates
the load a customer imposes on the provider’s network while forgiving a few anomalous
traffic bursts. An important aspect of the second billing component (the pricing function)
is that providers generally offer volume discounts, such that the per-bit price decreases as
billing volume increases [42].
In this chapter, we first visit the 95th Percentile billing scheme from the perspective of a
provider, to investigate whether this scheme approximately achieves its intended objective
of providing an easy-to-compute approximation of a customer’s traffic load to the provider.
We first use 10 years of historical data from SWITCH, a Swiss research/academic network,
and more recent data from 3 Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) to investigate how the 95th
Percentile of a customer’s traffic relates to: (1) its total traffic volume, (2) its nature as a
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predominantly inbound/outbound customer, and (3) its behavior as a heavy vs. moderate
hitter. Second, we study the fairness of the 95th percentile scheme, and define a new
metric called the provision ratio to investigate the relationship between the 95th Percentile
of customer and the contribution of that customer to the provider’s traffic load.
Analysis of these data sets reveals evidence that over the years the customers with a
predominantly outbound traffic profile are able to maintain a lower 95th-to-average ratio
than predominantly inbound customers, meaning that they have a lower billing volume for
the same amount of traffic sent. Furthermore, the 95th-percentile pricing mechanism is
unfair, because for many customers the 95th Percentile may not reflect their cost burden to
the provider, as there is little overlap between the customer’s peak and the overall (provider)
peak traffic. Our results motivate the need to look for alternatives to the 95th Percentile
billing method that can better approximate a customer’s cost burden to the provider without
adding too much additional measurement or computational overhead.
We then present a framework for determining the billing volume for each customer in a
manner that is fair, computationally inexpensive, and flexibly allows the provider to pro-
vide incentives (discounts) to certain customers. While solutions such as the Shapley value
method exist to assign billing volumes to customers in a fair manner, they are computation-
ally too expensive to implement at scale without approximations. Further, those methods
are not flexible enough to accommodate all the constraints of transit providers, e.g., restrict-
ing billing percentiles to a certain range or offering incentives to certain classes of customers.
Our billing framework is based on a new metric called the Provision Ratio, which reflects a
customer’s contribution to the provider’s peak traffic load. By assigning billing volumes per-
customer, providers can exercise fine-grained control over their billing and provide discounts
to customers that contribute minimally to the provider’s peak traffic. The transit provider
can use such incentives as a means for attracting new customers.
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2.2 Datasets
2.2.1 SWITCH dataset
Our first dataset comes from SWITCH, a Swiss Research/Academic network which pro-
vides Internet connectivity to major universities and organizations in Switzerland. Currently,
SWITCH connects about 50 research and education sites, acting as a transit provider for
traffic that originates or is destined to those networks. SWITCH also provides connectivity
to the public Internet via commercial providers, and hosts content caches of two large con-
tent providers. For traffic billing, SWITCH measures the utilization of each border router
interface in both inbound and outbound directions in 5-minute intervals. To present a longi-
tudinal analysis, we use historical datasets from SWITCH from January 2003 to December
2012.
2.2.2 IXP dataset
The second dataset consists of traffic statistics published by 2 Internet Exchange Points
(IXPs) – Budapest Internet Exchange (BIX), and Interlan Internet Exchange (ILAN) These
IXPs publish MRTG graphs with 5-minute utilization (inbound and outbound) for each
network connected to the public peering fabric of the IXP. We collected these graphs every
day for 8 months from August 2013 to March 2014 for BIX and 5 months for ILAN and used
Optical Character Recognition tools [10] to parse them. BIX had 62 networks connected to its
public peering fabric, while SIX and ILAN had 48 and 55 networks, respectively. Networks
connect to IXPs to create (settlement-free) peering connections with other participating
networks, and so the traffic statistics we see at an IXP are for a connected network’s peering
traffic1. Castro et al. [10] showed that transit traffic and peering traffic have similar diurnal
patterns and peak-to-valley ratios; in fact, the transit traffic for a network can be well-
approximated as a multiplicative factor of the peering traffic. In our analysis we consider
the IXP as proxy for a transit provider, and the networks connected to it as its customers.
1While not explicitly disallowed, transit sale over the shared IXP fabric is rare [43]
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2.3 Longitudinal Study of 95th Percentile billing
We first describe two common methods of computing the 95th Percentile traffic volume,
and how the two methods can treat customers differently. We then classify networks based
on two criteria: (i) major direction of traffic (inbound, outbound, and balanced); and (ii)
volume of traffic (heavy-hitter and moderate-hitter), and present a longitudinal view of the
traffic properties of these network types.
2.3.1 Calculation of 95th percentile
Although 95th Percentile billing is the industry standard, there are two common imple-
mentations and several possible variations. The first method measures the inbound and
outbound traffic in every 5 minutes over the month, calculates the 95th percentile for each
direction, and uses the maximum of these two values. Most transit provider references to
computing the 95th Percentile use this method, e.g., [18, 4], so we use it in our subsequent
analysis. The second method records the maximum of inbound and outbound traffic in each
five minute interval, and calculates the 95th Percentile value from the resulting data set.
This second method seems to be less common although we found a few transit providers
that bill using this method [1, 12]. The second method will yield a value greater than or
equal to the first method, and the results will differ significantly for customers with balanced
traffic profiles, but with inbound peaks occurring at different times from outbound peaks.
We computed the 95th Percentile for each network in the SWITCH dataset over 10 years.
We found that the median ratio of the 95th Percentile value for each network, computed
using these two methods is close to 1, but the widest difference induces a 20% higher transit
bill using the second method.
2.3.2 Classification of networks
Direction of Traffic: We divide networks into three categories based on the dominant
direction of traffic. For each network, we measure the traffic that terminates within that
network (inbound) and traffic that originates from that network (outbound). If the inbound
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traffic of the network is more than twice the outbound traffic we classify it as heavy-inbound,
and if the outbound traffic is more than twice the inbound traffic we classify the network
as heavy-outbound. Networks that do not satisfy either condition are classified as balanced.
Typically, content providers are heavy-outbound, while eyeball providers are heavy-inbound.
Volume of Traffic: We next classify networks based on the volume of traffic they gener-
ate/consume over a month into heavy-hitter and moderate-hitter networks. To define the two
classes we evaluated the traffic contribution by the top 20% of networks in each month of the
SWITCH and IXP datasets. The top 20% of networks consistently contributed between 80
and 90% of total traffic in the SWITCH dataset, and 75% of total traffic in the IXP dataset.
Based on this observation, we classify the top 20% of networks in each month as heavy-hitter
networks and the rest as moderate-hitter networks.
2.3.3 95th percentile to average ratio
For each customer network, we first evaluate the 95th Percentile to average traffic ratio;
the average reflects the total volume of traffic, whereas the 95th Percentile value gives an
idea of the peak, and is also the traffic volume for which the customer is billed. If the
two significantly differ, it suggests that the customer is paying primarily for its burstiness.
Figure 2.1 shows the mean of the 95th Percentile to average traffic ratio over time for networks
in the SWITCH dataset classified by traffic direction and traffic volume.
First, we observe that the 95th Percentile to average ratio has been fairly stable over the
years for each type of network, despite the dramatic changes in overall inter-domain traffic
patterns that have occurred during the same time. In the last 4 years, the mean ratio for
heavy-outbound networks is between 2 and 3, while the mean for heavy-inbound networks
is between 3.25 and 4. For balanced networks, the ratio is less than 3.25. Hence, heavy-
inbound networks in general have higher 95th Percentile traffic compared to heavy-outbound
or balanced networks for the same average traffic. Consequently, heavy-inbound networks
have a higher billing volume than heavy-outbound networks for the same amount of total
traffic sent. We observe that the mean ratio is between 2.25 and 3 for heavy-hitter networks,
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Figure 2.1: Mean 95th Percentile to average ratio for different network types in the SWITCH
dataset.
especially in the last 4 years. However, the mean ratio always exceeds 3 for moderate-hitter
networks in those 4 years.
Figure 2.2 shows the mean 95th Percentile to average ratio for different classes of networks
in the IXP dataset. We observe that the mean ratio is higher for heavy-inbound networks
than for heavy-outbound networks, consistent with our analysis of the SWITCH dataset.
With the exception of BIX, the mean 95th Percentile to average ratio for networks at the other
two IXPs is larger for moderate-hitter networks than for heavy-hitter networks, meaning that
moderate-hitter networks have a burstier traffic profile than heavy-hitter networks.
2.3.4 Skewness of the traffic distribution
The above analysis shows that heavy-inbound and moderate-hitter networks have a higher
9
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Figure 2.2: Mean 95th Percentile to average ratio for IXPs, using different network classifi-
cations.
95th-to-average ratio as compared to other networks, meaning that their traffic profile is
likely to be burstier. Figure 2.3 illustrates the difference by plotting the mean skewness of
the traffic distribution for each network type.
Skewness reveals how much the traffic distribution leans to one side of the mean; for a
random variable X: Skewness = E [(X − µ)3]/(E [(X − µ)2])3/2, where µ is the mean. If a
probability distribution function is unimodal, then higher positive skew implies few values
higher than the mean, i.e., the 95th Percentile value would be closer to the average. The
empirical probability mass function for the traffic of each network is unimodal for our data
sets. Heavy-outbound networks have high positive skew (the mean is between 5 and 25),
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Figure 2.3: Mean skewness for different network types in the SWITCH dataset. Heavy-
outbound networks have a higher skewness, especially in the last 4 years.
especially in the last 4 years2, compared to heavy-inbound networks or balanced networks,
whose mean skewness is between 0 and 12 and 5 and 15, respectively. Similarly, heavy-
hitter networks have higher positive skew than moderate-hitter networks. Figure 2.4 shows
the mean skew of traffic for networks at each IXP, classified according to dominant traffic
direction and traffic volume. As in the SWITCH dataset, heavy-outbound and heavy-hitter
networks generally have a larger skewness than heavy-inbound and moderate-hitter networks.
In summary, the 95th-to-average ratio has been stable for various classes of networks
in our dataset over the last decade, indicating that a high-percentile billing scheme is still
useful. Certain networks (particularly heavy-outbound and heavy-hitter networks) are able
to achieve a lower 95th Percentile to average ratio (perhaps using intelligent means of traffic
2The level shifts around 2009 coincide with SWITCH connecting to AMS-IX, acquiring hundreds of new
peers, though the set of customers over which we compute statistics is unchanged.
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shaping), and hence a lower billing volume for the same total amount of transit traffic. Traffic
smoothing may allow networks to achieve a lower transit bill, but this says little about the
contribution of those networks to the provider’s peak traffic. The 95th Percentile of a network
does not account for when the peaks occur, and so it is unclear whether it is fair to charge
each customer using the same percentile.
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Figure 2.4: Mean skewness for networks in the IXP dataset.
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2.4 Fairness of 95th Percentile Billing
Motivated by the preceding discussion, we now focus on the fairness of the 95th Percentile
billing mechanism. We consider a billing mechanism fair if the amount of resources used by
a network is reflected in the amount it is charged. An appealing idea in this context is the
Shapley value, which assigns costs to the members in a cooperative game [49]. It possesses
many attractive properties – it is efficient, i.e., the sum of costs assigned to each member
is the total cost to the system, and it is symmetric, i.e., two members that have the same
contribution will be assigned the same cost.
2.4.1 Shapley Value Percentile Billing
Stanojevic et al. [52] presented a model of the ISP cost allocation problem as a cooperative
game. The cost function of a group is the 95th Percentile of the total traffic obtained by
adding the traffic of all members in that group. This cost estimate is consistent with the
idea that the transit provider must provision for peak traffic, and is itself billed by its
provider based on this value. The Shapley value (φi) of network i is then uniquely defined
by φi =
1
N !
∑
pi∈Π (V(S(pi, i)− V(S(pi, i)\i)) where V is the cost function, Π is the set of all
possible permutations of players N and S(pi, i) is the set of all players in ordering pi before
i and including i.
Once we determine the Shapley value of each network, we need to map it to a billing
percentile. Let the volume corresponding to the 95th Percentile value of the total traffic be V .
Then (by efficiency) the Shapley values of the customer networks will satisfy V = ∑i φi. Let
the volume corresponding to the 95th Percentile of network i be xi. Then the total volume
billed by the transit provider under the 95th Percentile billing scheme is
∑
i xi, which we
define as X . Trivially, X ≥ V . For an apples-to-apples comparison between the two billing
schemes, we define the normalized Shapley value of network i as si = φiX/V , so that the
total billing volume in both cases is X . Then each network can be charged based on a
percentile that yields the traffic volume closest its normalized Shapley value, which is the
13
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Figure 2.5: Shapley value percentiles: SWITCH dataset (Mar 2012) and IXP dataset (SIX,
Aug 2013).
“Shapley value percentile” of that network.
Computation of the Shapley value is quite complex—with N users, it has complexity
order of O(N !). Even for a moderate size ISP, which has around 50 users, the complexity is
of the order of 1064. Stanojevic et al. [52] used a Monte Carlo approximation, which achieves
a good trade-off between accuracy and complexity. We used this approximation to find the
Shapley value percentile for the SWITCH dataset (month of March 2012) and the SIX IXP
(August 2013). The results are shown in Figure 2.5. Clearly, the Shapley value percentiles
are widely different from the 95th Percentile .
In addition to computational complexity, the Shapley value percentile can be anywhere
between 0 and 100. This approach lacks the ability of restricting the charging percentiles
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to a fixed range. The handicaps of directly using the Shapley value motivate a need for a
simple proxy that captures its essence. A key observation is that a traffic profile has greater
Shapley value when it is concentrated during the peak periods when demand is highest.
Thus, Shapley value percentile billing would charge users with high peak traffic higher than
users with off peak traffic.
2.4.2 Overlap rank
Building on the intuition developed in the last section that it is fair to charge more to
networks with traffic during peak periods than off-peak periods, we will show how the current
95th Percentile billing mechanism can lead to unfairness as it does not consider peak and
off-peak periods. We define the peak periods of a transit provider as those in which the
total traffic carried by the transit provider exceeds the 95th Percentile of the provider’s total
traffic. We similarly define the peak slots for customer networks. Based on the number of
peak slots of networks that overlap with peak slots of the total traffic, we rank the networks
from highest to lowest and call it the overlap rank. Thus, a network with rank 0 has the
maximum number of peak slots that occur during the same time intervals as the peak slots
of the transit provider. We also rank networks based on their 95th Percentile and call it the
95th Percentile rank.
Figure 2.6 plots overlap rank vs. percentile rank (normalized to 100) for the IXP dataset
(first 3 plots) and one month (January 2012) from the SWITCH dataset (far right). If
networks with high 95th Percentile rank also had high overlap rank, most points would appear
on the diagonal, and imply that 95th Percentile billing is charging the contributors who
necessitate the provisioning of large transit links. Figure 2.6 tells a different story. The points
below the diagonal, especially those in the red shaded area (16% of networks for SWITCH)
have a high 95th Percentile rank but a low overlap rank, which means that their peaks are
mostly in the peak period, but their billing volume is relatively lower. Analogously, the
points above the diagonal line, especially in the gray region (15% of networks for SWITCH)
correspond to low 95th Percentile rank and high overlap rank. Their contribution to the peak
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period is low but they have a relatively high billing volume. Similar observations can also
be made from the IXP graphs in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Overlap rank vs 95th Percentile rank for IXP dataset (Aug 2013) and one month
of SWITCH dataset (Jan 2012). A large fraction of networks lie far from the diagonal,
meaning they have a large billing volume but little overlap with the provider’s peaks, or vice
versa.
2.4.3 Provision ratio
The overlap rank considers only the cardinality of overlap slots, without accounting for
diverse traffic volumes. A good proxy for the Shapley value should capture the volume during
peak slots, appropriately normalized with the amount of traffic generated by the network.
We define the provision ratio (PR) of a network as the ratio of the average traffic during
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the peak slots of total traffic to the 95th Percentile of that network’s traffic.
PRi =
Total traffic of i during peak slots / # of peak slots
95th Percentile of i’s traffic
The PR is essentially the ratio of traffic contributed by the network during the peak time
slots (or average capacity provided to that network during these peaks) to the peak traffic of
that network (excluding the top 5% of bursts); It can be viewed as the fraction of a network’s
peak traffic that occurs during the provider’s peak periods. We propose that the PR can be
an important component of a billing mechanism, because it captures the contribution of a
network’s traffic to the provider’s peak. The PR is also robust to the exact thresholds used
to compute it – we found that in our datasets, the provision ratio is robust to the exact
threshold for defining a peak slot, e.g., if we change the 95th Percentile to 85th percentile,
the provision ratio does not change significantly.
The provision ratio is not equal to the Shapley value percentile in an absolute sense, but
in a relative sense it appears to have the right characteristics. To quantify the similarity
between the two, we find the percentage of orders preserved between all possible pairs of
networks in both datasets. A transit provider with N customers will have NC2 customer
pairs. For each pair, order is preserved if the network that is charged a higher Shapley
percentile also has a higher provision ratio. We find that for the SWITCH dataset, the
provision ratio preserves between 76% and 82% of orders in the SWITCH dataset (each
month of 2012) and 89%, 75%, and 82% for the SIX, BIX, and ILAN IXPs, respectively
(August 2013). The strong similarity of orders indicates that provision ratio is indeed order
preserving.
2.4.4 Towards a new billing mechanism
One could argue that the 95th Percentile billing scheme is an approximation, aiming for
simplicity and predictability over fairness. At the other extreme is Shapley value pricing,
which charges each user differently based on their actual contribution to the provider’s
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costs. An open challenge is how to achieve both objectives – fairness and low computational
complexity. We are currently exploring the use of the provision ratio in a scheme that
determines the optimal percentile to charge a given customer. The objective of this scheme
would be to vary the billing percentile per customer, and to use the provision ratio as a
measure of the contribution of a customer to the provider’s peak traffic. This pricing scheme
would automatically assign lower billing percentiles (i.e., give discounts) to customers whose
peak traffic does not contribute significantly to the provider’s peak, and higher percentiles
to customers that contribute most to the provider’s peak. An important criterion for such a
scheme is that the provider should be able to communicate information about its peak and
off-peak periods to customers, without having to make its traffic profile available publicly.
For this purpose, the provider could design a tool that accepts a customer’s traffic profile and
analyzes it in relation to its own traffic to determine the percentile at which it would charge
the customer. Such a scheme would retain the attractive properties of burstable billing
(because it is still based on a billing percentile), while better accounting for a network’s
contribution to total provider costs. Our initial investigation indicates that this problem can
be formulated as a convex optimization, and hence solved efficiently.
2.5 Measuring Billing Volumes
We present a framework for percentile-based measurement of billing volumes. Consider a
transit provider with N customers indexed by i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. Each month, the transit
provider must determine the billing volumes of each customer.
The relationship between billing volume and billing percentile can be expressed using the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the customer network’s traffic. First, both the
inbound and outbound traffic volumes are measured in 5-minute intervals, and are used to
calculate the average transmission rates during each interval. Denote the empirical CDFs of
customer network i′s transmission rates by Fi(in)(.) and Fi(out))(.), for inbound and outbound
directions, respectively. Also, denote the inverse cumulative distribution functions by F−1i(in)(.)
and F−1i(out)(.). If the CDF function is not one-to-one, the inverse will be an interval (due to
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monotonicity of the CDF function). If this is the case, we take the supremum of the interval
to be the value of the inverse, i.e.,
F−1i(in)(y) = sup
{
x|Fi(in)(x) = y
}
, (2.1)
and similarly for outbound traffic. We then decide on whether the traffic is inbound or
outbound dominated by comparing the 95th Percentile volumes of the two, i.e., we compare
Vi(in)(0.95) = F−1i(in)(0.95) with Vi(out)(0.95) = F−1i(out)(0.95). We choose the overall CDF of
the customer i′s traffic to be the one with the larger 95th Percentile . Thus, if Vi(in)(0.95) >
Vi(out)(0.95), then we set Fi(x) = Fi(in)(x). Correspondingly, the volume billed by the 95th
Percentile scheme is Vi(0.95) = F−1i (0.95), and the sum total volume of billed traffic is
V95 =
∑N
i=1 Vi(0.95). As described in Section 4.1, the 95
th Percentile method is unfair
because it does not account for the fact that the temporal traffic profile of customers might
impose very different loads on the transit provider. For instance, a customer whose traffic
is concentrated in the peak periods of overall traffic would require the transit provider to
provision more capacity than one whose traffic is in the off-peak periods. A fair scheme
should ensure that the amount of resources used by a customer should be reflected in its
corresponding billing volume.
While both the Shapley value and Provision Ratio can be translated into percentile-
based volume measurement methods, they do not directly allow us to restrict the range of
acceptable billing percentiles. As our objective is to incentivize customers to occupy off-peak
periods, while not excessively dis-incentivizing those who do not, we desire a framework that
incorporates both fairness as well as flexibility in choosing billing percentiles.
2.6 Optimization Framework
We seek a scheme whereby customers occupying off-peak periods are given rebates, while
those that do not are charged extra. However, we also wish to ensure that the billing
percentiles are not overly large or small. Finally, this must be done at no loss of net revenue
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to the transit provider. How can we achieve these goals?
Suppose that the transit provider uses a price function B(.) to translate traffic volumes
into dollar charges. Often, this function is (approximately) concave and increasing [42] to
ensure discounts for large volume customers. We do not propose to alter the billing function,
but instead use B(.) as is. Let the revenue obtained through 95th Percentile based volume
measurement be M95. Then the solution to the following optimization problem attains our
goals:
max
{pi}
N∑
i=1
(0.95− pi)ωi − γ(
N∑
i=1
(0.95− pi)2 (2.2)
s.t. L ≤ pi ≤ H, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (2.3)
N∑
i=1
B
(
F˜−1i (pi)
)
≥M95. (2.4)
Here, the objective (2.2) is to ensure that the billing volume percentile is reduced below
0.95 as much as possible, i.e. provide the maximum possible incentives to customers. To
provide incentives for off-peak customers, we set the weight wi = (1/ρi)
α, where α ≥ 1. Since
the weight varies inversely with the normalized Provision Ratio, maximizing the objective
would assign larger pi values to customers with smaller weights i.e., high occupancy during
peak times. The second term in the objective is to smooth it, as otherwise the solution
would be to set pi to extreme high or low values. Parameter γ is used to decide the desired
smoothing.
We next have a (convex) constraint (2.3) that ensures that the percentiles output by the
optimization lie in an acceptable interval between [L, F ]. Constraint (2.4) ensures that the
transit provider does not suffer any loss of revenue (as compared to 95th Percentile based
volume measurements). As defined above, B(.) is a concave billing function. Now, since the
inverse CDF of traffic, F−1i , is empirical, it might not have any particular form. Hence, we
approximate it using a concave function F˜−1i in the range [L, F ]. In practice, we employed
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an approximation of the form F˜−1(x) = a + bx + c√x with c ≥ 0. Notice that the concave
approximation immediately implies that the constraint becomes convex.
Our problem formulation is in the form of convex optimization, and hence the solution
can be easily computed using convex solvers. If we ensure that 0.95 ∈ [L,H], then 0.95
satisfies the constraints. Then setting pi = 0.95 for all i would result in an objective value
of zero. Maximization of the objective can only increase the value, which means that the
optimal value should be non-negative. We denote the set of percentile values that solve
the optimization problem (2.2)–(2.4) by {pˆi}, and refer to them as the optimal weighted
percentiles (OWPs). In the next section we calculate the OWPs for customer networks using
multiple data traces, and compare the values with the equivalent Shapley value percentiles
(SVPs), in order to gauge the fairness achieved by this method. In this section first we
compare the fairness achieved by SVP versus OWP, using data sets of traffic seen by real
transit providers and then study the advantages of new billing mechanism if the traffic is
elastic. Our first data set (the “SWITCH” data set) is from SWITCH, a European transit
provider that serves educational institutions and some commercial organizations. The second
data set (the “IXP” data set) is parsed from MRTG graphs published by three European
Internet exchange points (IXPs): SIX, BIX and ILAN. From both data sets we extract traffic
rates of each customer network at 5-minute intervals.
Our comparison of SVP and OWP proceeds as follows. For each customer i, we first
calculate the 95th Percentile billing volume Vi(0.95), and use a billing function B(x) = 50x0.7
to translate these volumes into dollar charges. This form of the billing function is based on
real-world transit prices [42] and has been used in prior work [11, 14]. We refer to the sum
total revenue obtained over all customers as R95, and use it as the minimum target revenue
that that both the SVP and OWP schemes should assure to the transit provider. We then
compare which customers are targeted for higher/lower percentile billing in each method to
check if both methods are aligned in their conception of fairness.
To find the Shapley value percentiles (SVPs) corresponding to the above revenue tar-
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get, we use the same formulation as Section 2.4.1. Since calculating the Shapley value is
computationally intensive, we used a Monte Carlo approximation [52] with 10000 iterations.
Here, the idea is to pick random subsets of customers in Shapley value evaluation equation,
and average the value over such subsets. Then, for each customer i, we set Si = σiR95, and
determine the set of SVPs {pSi } using pSi = Fi(Si). Note, that for accurate results even this
process is computationally expensive.
To find the optimal weighted percentiles (OWPs), we limit the allowable percentiles to
3 units above and below 95%, that is L = 92% and H = 98% in (2.3). We set α = 5 when
selecting the weights, and a smoothing parameter γ = 200. We used the Levenberg Mar-
quardt algorithm [30] for approximating the inverse CDF function with a concave function,
and found that the normalized least squares errors are less than 10−2. The result of our
optimization is a set of percentiles {pˆi}. Note that the complexity of these calculations is
small as compared to determining the SVP.
We computed the SVPs and OWPs for four years of SWITCH data and 3 months of
IXP data. When we plotted the distribution of these percentiles, the support of SVPs varied
widely. For example the support of SVPs for February 2012 SWITCH data is [0.83, 0.99].
However, by design, the support of all OWP distributions is [0.92, 0.98]. Also, as desired,
the OWP scheme reduced the billing percentiles of many customers, while increasing that
of only a few. Since our conception of fairness is that of the Shapley value, we consider the
OWP method fair if the same customers are targeted for high/low percentile billing as in the
SVP method. We now show this kind of order preservation is largely maintained between
SVP and OWP. We first visualize percentile information for a month in the SWITCH data
set in Figure 2.7. We place the individual customers in increasing order of the reciprocal of
their Provision Ratios on the x-axis, and their average traffic on the y-axis. For example, a
customer with a large reciprocal of Provision Ratio (i.e., it occupies off-peak periods) and
small average traffic would appear in the bottom right of the plot. Each circle or square
represents a customer network, while the size and intensity of fill color is proportional to the
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relative percentile used to bill them.
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Figure 2.7: Inverse Provision Ratio order vs Average traffic order of SVPs and OWPs for
February 2012 SWITCH data.
We observe that in the SVP scheme, there is a gradual increase in billing percentiles
from the bottom right to the top left (with a few exceptions). The same trend is observed
in OWP. Although the actual percentiles used to bill are different, we see that by-and-large
the same customers are targeted in both schemes.
While the visualization indicates the validity of the OWP scheme in preserving fairness,
we would prefer to use numerical metrics. We define two such metrics, and show that SVP
and OWP are well aligned on both metrics. Our first metric is that of order preservation. We
say that order is preserved between two customers i and j if psi > p
s
j implies that pˆi > pˆj. We
compute the percentage of orders preserved in each month of our data sets. For the SWITCH
data set, this gives 48 samples over four years from 2009 to 2012. We plot the distribution
of percentage of orders preserved in Figure 2.8. Here, the x-axis is the percentage of orders
preserved in that sample, while the y-axis is the number of samples that had that value.
We see that all values are above 70% and many values are around 80%, indicating strong
order preservation between SVP and OWP. We observed similar results for IXP data sets:
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the percentage of orders preserved is above 78%. The second metric that we consider is the
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of percentage of orders preserved and Box and Whisker plot of
difference in ranks for four years.
difference in ranks of billing percentiles. Consider the two sets of billing percentiles {psi} and
{pˆi}, corresponding to SVP and OWP methods, respectively. We can arrange the percentile
values in ascending order in each set. Let rsi and rˆi refer to the order in which {psi} and
{pˆi}, respectively appear in the ordered sets. We call rsi and rˆi as the ranks of customer
i according to the two schemes, and consider the normalized rank difference (rsi − rˆi)/N .
The difference must lie in [−1, 1], and a large difference would mean that the ranks are very
different, while a small one indicates that they are close to each other. We group the data into
three-month intervals (quarters) and present a box-whisker plot of the distributions of the
normalized absolute differences over each quarter. Here, the bottom and top of each “box”
represents 1st and 3rd quartiles of the distribution for that quarter (i.e., 50% of the samples
are contained in both boxes together), while the bottom and top “whiskers” are equal to 1.5
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times the 1st and 3rd quartiles of the distribution. We observe that the distributions tightly
concentrate around 0, indicating strong preservation of ranks between the SVP and OWP
schemes.
Now we will see how this new billing mechanism could benefit the transit provider when
the traffic is elastic. Let us say that every customer tries to minimize the cost incurred by
moving the traffic from peak slots to non peak slots of previous month. But, moving all the
traffic is not feasible so we assume a bound on elasticity E that is the maximum amount of
traffic that can be moved. Let us assume that they employ min max strategy for removing
traffic from peak slots and max min strategy for filling the non-peak slots. The percentage
difference in the traffic reduction for different elasticities is shown in the figures below 2.9
and 2.10. The x-axis denote the index of users or customers and y-axis denote the percentage
reduction in billing volume achieved by moving traffic.
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Figure 2.9: Percentage of amount of billing volume reduction with E = 5% elasticity. The
x-axis denote the index of the customers and y-axis denote the percentage reduction achieved
by moving 5% of traffic to off-peak periods.
25
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Percentage difference 
Percentage Difference
Figure 2.10: Percentage of amount of billing volume reduction with E = 15% elasticity. The
x-axis denote the index of the customers and y-axis denote the percentage reduction achieved
by moving 5% of traffic to off-peak periods.
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, our goal was to empirically examine the effectiveness and fairness of
the 95th percentile pricing scheme, using a decade of historical traffic data and provide
an alternate schemes. Our analysis shows that over the years, certain networks have lower
95th-to-average ratio than others – for the datasets we studied, networks with predominantly
inbound traffic have higher 95th-to-average ratios, and would incur a higher billing volume
than those with predominantly outbound traffic (for the same amount of total traffic), and
similarly for moderate hitters vs. heavy hitters. Furthermore, we find that the 95th percentile
pricing scheme can be unfair, as the 95th Percentile traffic of a network is often unrelated
to the amount of time that network’s peak traffic overlaps that of its provider, nor does it
accurately represent the contribution of that network to the provider’s peak traffic.
We defined a new metric, the Provision Ratio (PR) for a network, which is easy to
compute and is able to capture the contribution of a customer traffic to the provider’s peak.
By using the Provision Ratio as a weight factor in the optimization scheme, the ISP is
able to assign lower percentiles to users that have a low contribution to the provider’s peak
periods. This scheme achieves a notion of fairness similar to the Shapley value, is efficient,
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and can provide rebates to customers that contribute less to the ISP’s peak traffic. We also
investigated how much the customers can save by moving their traffic into off peak periods.
The setup that we considered has one seller (the transit provider) and a finite number
of customers. In large Internet marketplaces such as Amazon, eBay etc., there are a large
number of sellers and customers. The techniques we used to analyze finite user markets are
intractable in this setting. In the next two chapters, we will study two such markets, each
with a large number of agents. The first market that we consider is resource allocation in
cellular network, which we discuss in the next chapter.
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3. A MEAN FIELD GAME APPROACH TO QOE-AWARE CELLULAR
SCHEDULING
3.1 Introduction
There has recently been a rapid increase in the use of smart hand-held devices for Internet
access. These devices are supported by cellular data networks, which carry the packets
generated by apps running on these smart devices. These apps can be modeled as queues
that arrive when the user starts the app, and depart when the user terminates that app.
Packets generated by an app are buffered in a queue corresponding to that app. Queueing
delays impact the quality of user experience (QoE) based on the app being used. For example,
the QoE of a streaming application might be more sensitive to queueing delays than that
of a file download. Users move around cells that each has a base station, and scheduling a
particular user provides service to the queue that represents his/her currently running app.
User interest could shift from app to app, regardless of whether or not there are buffered
packets. Hence, a queue might terminate and be replaced by a new one even if there are
jobs waiting for service.
An important problem in cellular data networks is that for scheduling, i.e., determining
which queues receive service at each time instant. Most work on scheduling has focused on
the case of a finite number of infinitely long lived flows, with the objective being to maximize
the total throughput. A seminal piece of work under this paradigm introduced the so-called
max-weight algorithm [54]. Here, the drift of a quadratic Lyapunov function is minimized
by maximizing the queue-length weighted sum of acceptable schedules. Later work (e.g.,
[33, 16, 40]) has used a similar approach in a variety of network scenarios. If queues arrive
and depart, then a natural scheduling policy in the single server case is a Longest-Queue-
First (LQF) scheme, in which each server serves the longest of the queues requesting service
from it. LQF has many attractive properties, such a minimizing the expected value of the
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longest queue in the system.
The above approach assumes that the queue length values are given to the scheduler, and
if we have heterogeneous apps, the cost on QoE of queueing for each can be determined from
the queue lengths. However, while the downlink queue lengths would naturally be available
at a cellular base station, the only way to obtain uplink queue information is to ask the
users themselves. However, a larger value of queue length results in a higher probability
of being scheduled under all the above policies, implying an incentive to lie. Also, such a
framework does not allow for the human end user to decide his or her own priorities for
the QoEs for different apps. For instance, one user might place a high importance on the
QoE of Skype and Facebook, whereas another might have high importance for YouTube and
Pandora. Thus, traditional approaches do not account for the human in the loop that is the
ultimate consumer of the service.
An appealing idea is to use a pricing scheme to inform scheduling decisions for cellular
data access. These prices could be in the form of tokens issued by the cellular service
provider that are used as currency in the service market. An example of a pricing approach
is presented in [22], which describes an experimental trial of a system in which day-ahead
prices are announced to users, who then decide on whether or not to use their 3G service
based on the price at that time. However, these prices have to be determined through trial
and error. Can we determine prices by using an auction?
Our key objective is to design an incentive compatible scheduling scheme that behaves in
a (weighted) LQF-like fashion. We consider a system in which each app bids for service from
the base station that it is currently connected to. The auction is conducted in a second-price
fashion, with the winner being the app that bids highest, and the charge being the value of
the second highest bid. It is well known that such an auction promotes truth-telling [28].
Would the scheduling decisions resulting from such auctions resemble that of LQF? Would
conducting such an auction repeatedly over time with queues arriving and departing result
in some form of equilibrium?
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3.1.1 Mean Field Games
We investigate the existence of an equilibrium using the theory of Mean Field Games
(MFG) [29, 55, 3, 9, 27, 56]. In MFG, the players assume that each opponent would play an
action drawn independently from a fixed distribution over its action space. The player then
chooses an action that is the best response against actions drawn in this fashion. We say
that the system is at Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if this best response action is itself a
sample drawn from the assumed distribution.
The MFG framework offers a structure to approximate so-called Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE) in dynamic games. PBE requires each player to keep track of their beliefs on
the future plays of every other opponent in the system, and play the best response to that
belief. This makes the computation of PBE intractable when the number of players is large.
The MFG framework simplifies computation of the best response, and often turns out to be
asymptotically optimal.
Work on MFGs has mostly focused on showing the existence, accuracy and stability of
MFE [29, 55, 3, 9]. In the space of queueing systems, some recent work considers the game
of sampling a number of queues and joining one [56]. However, ours is a scheduling problem
in queueing system interacting with an auction system, which we believe is unique.
In the space of applications, Iyer et al. [26] study advertisers competing via a second
price auction for spots on a webpage. The bid must lie in a finite real interval, and the
winner can place an ad on the webpage. With time, the advertisers learn about the value
of winning (probability of making a sale). Li et al. [31] consider the problem of mechanism
design for truthful state revelation (number of packets at each station) in a wireless D2D
streaming system. Their main result is to generalize the Groves mechanism to the mean
field regime. Both use some version of fixed point theorem to show existence of the MFE.
Neither of the above consider the use of auctions for service scheduling in queueing
systems, which is the basis of our problem. In our setup, the state is the queue with arrivals
and departures, and we allow bids to lie in the full positive real line. These considerations
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result in significant technical work to show existence and characterize the MFE.
3.1.2 Overview of Chapter
We introduce the Mean Field Game (MFG) in Section 3.2. Here, a selected agent (app)
has a belief ρ about the bid distribution of the other agents, and assumes that their bids will
be drawn independently from this distribution. The state of the agent is its current queue
length, and it faces a per-time step cost that is a function of its queue length, which models
the impact on QoE of queueing delay. The agent must place a bid based on the belief and
its current state and belief about other agents.
We consider the problem of determining the cost minimizing bid function and the cor-
responding value function as a Markov Decision Process in Section 3.3. We show that the
Bellman operator corresponding to the MDP is a contraction mapping with a unique min-
imum, implying that value iteration would converge to the best response bid. Further, we
show that the best response bid is monotone increasing in queue length. We call the bid
distribution across agents that results from playing the best responses as γ.
We next prove the existence of the MFE in Sections 3.4–3.5 by verifying the conditions
of the Schauder Fixed Point Theorem. We need to show that the mapping between the
assumed bid distribution ρ to the resultant bid distribution γ is continuous, and that the
space in which γ lies is contained in a compact subset of the space from which ρ is drawn. In
order to do this, we first show that the mapping between ρ and best response bid function is
continuous, and then show that the map between ρ and the state (queue length) distribution
is continuous. Putting these together yields the required continuity conditions. We then
verify the conditions of the Arzela`-Ascoli Theorem for showing compactness.
We show in Section 3.6 that the MFE in our case is an asymptotically accurate approxi-
mation of a PBE. The result follows from the fact that any finite subset of agents is unlikely
to have interacted with any of the others as the number of agents becomes large. Finally, we
present simulation results in Section 3.7, showing that MFE computation is straightforward.
Discussion: In the case of a single cost function (homogeneous QoE for all apps) the best
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response bid function is monotone increasing in the queue length regardless of ρ. This implies
that the service regime corresponding to MFE is identical to LQF (or a weighted version
if we have different QoE classes for apps). Further, our simulations suggest that if the
base stations were to compute the empirical bid distribution and return it to the users, the
eventual bid distribution would be the MFE. Thus, the desirable properties of LQF are a
natural result of auction-based scheduling, while the queue length distribution would be that
generated by LQF.
3.2 Mean Field Game Model
We consider a system consisting of N cells and NM agents (apps), which are randomly
permuted in these cells at each time instant, with each cell having exactly M agents1. The
model is consistent on the likely evolution of the 5G cellular system, wherein we expect a
large number of small, dense cells and much user mobility across different cells. The mobility
model is identical to the basic framework used in work on mobile wireless networks [21]. Each
cell contains a base station, which conducts a second price auction to choose which agent to
serve. Each agent must choose its bid in response to its state and its belief over the bids of
its competitors.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the MFG approximation, which is accurate in the limit asN becomes
large. An MFG is described from the perspective of a single candidate agent i, which assumes
that the actions of all its competitors are drawn independently from some distribution. The
asymptotic accuracy of the independence assumption follows from a standard argument on
the propagation of chaos whose details are provided in Section 3.6. In Figure 3.1, the auction
(shown as blue/dark tiles) and the queue dynamics (shown as beige/light tiles). Since we
focus on a single agent, we do not need to specify its identity explicitly, unless we wish
to compare its actions with those of other agents. Hence, we will drop the index i where
possible for ease of notation.
1Note that our results are essentially unchanged if M is a random variable with finite support.
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Figure 3.1: The game consists of an auction part (blue/dark tiles) and a queue dynamics
part (beige/light tiles). The system is at MFE if the distribution of the bid X is equal to
the assumed bid distribution ρ.
3.2.1 Auction System
At each time step k, the agent of interest competes in a second price auction against
M − 1 other agents, whose bids are assumed to be independently drawn from a continuous,
finite mean (cumulative) bid distribution ρ, with support R+. The state of the agent is its
current queue length q (the random variable is represented by Q). The queue length induces
a holding cost C(q), where C(.) is a strictly convex and increasing function. The cost function
could be one of a finite set of cost functions, modeling the impact on QoE of queueing for
the currently running app for that agent. However, since the analysis is identical for one or
a finite set of cost functions, we focus on the single cost function in the analysis below.
Suppose that the agent bids an amount x ∈ R+. The outcomes of the second price auction
are that the agent would obtain one unit of service with probability pρ(x) and would have to
pay an expected amount of rρ(x) when all the other bids are drawn independently from ρ.
Further, the queue has future job arrivals according to distribution Φ, with the random job
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size being denoted by A. Finally, the app can terminate at any time instant with probability
1 − β. Based on these inputs, the agent needs to determine the value of its current state
Vˆρ(q), and the best response bid to make x = θˆρ(q). The assumption that only a single unit
of service is provided at each base station is for simplicity of notation, and our results are
unchanged if we are allowed to choose some M˜ < M agents as winners in each auction. The
mechanism followed would be a M˜ + 1th price auction in that case.
3.2.2 Queueing System
The queueing dynamics are driven by the arrival process Φ and the probability of ob-
taining a unit of service being pρ(x) as described above. When the user terminates an app,
he/she immediately starts a fresh app, i.e., a new queue takes the place of a departing queue.
The initial condition of this new queue R is drawn from a regeneration distribution Ψ, whose
support is R+. The invariant distribution associated with this queueing system (if it exists)
is denoted Πρ.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. At each time k, the arrivals {Ak} are i.i.d random variables distributed
according to Φ. We assume that Ak ∈ [0, {A}], where A¯ is finite. Also, these random
variables have a bounded density function, φ (i.e., ||φ‖ < cφ, where ||.|| is the sup norm).
Assumption 2. The regeneration values {Rk} are i.i.d random variables distributed accord-
ing to Ψ, and they have a bounded density ψ (i.e., ‖ψ‖ < cψ, where ||.|| is the sup norm).
Assumption 3. The holding cost function C : R+ 7→ R+ is continuous, increasing and
strictly convex. We also assume that C is O(qm) for some integer m.
The polynomial form above is for technical reasons, but is not very restrictive since many
convex functions can be approximated quite well.
3.2.3 Mean Field Equilibrium
The probability that the agent’s bid lies in the interval [0, x] is equal to the probability
that the agent’s queue length lies in some set whose best response is to bid between [0, x].
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Thus, the probability of the bid lying in the interval [0, x] is Πρ(θˆ
−1
ρ ([0, x])), which we define
as γ(x). According to the assumed (cumulative) bid distribution, the probability of the same
event is ρ(x). If ρ(x) = γ(x), it means that the assumed bid distribution is consistent with
the best response bid distribution, and we have an MFE.
3.2.4 Agent’s decision problem
Let the candidate be agent i. Suppose that the belief over the bid of a random agent has
cumulative distribution ρ. We assume that ρ ∈ P where,
P = {G|G is a continuous c.d.f,
∫
(1−G(x))dx < E},
for some E < ∞, to be defined later. Besides, its current state, the information available
with the agent about the market at any time prior to the auction only includes the following:
1. The bids it made in each previous auction from last regeneration.
2. The auctions that it won.
3. The payments made for the auctions won.
Let Hi,k be the history vector containing the above information available to agent i at
time k. Suppose that the random variable representing the bid made by agent i at time
k is denoted by Xi,k, with the realized value being xi,k. Also, let X¯−i,k = maxj∈Mi,k Xj,k,
represent the maximum value of M − 1 draws from the distribution ρ. Thus, X¯−i,k is the
value of the highest opposing bid. The agent’s decision problem is to choose a bid function
θi, which maps its available information to a bid at each time xi,k.
Since the time of regeneration T ki is a geometric random variable, the expected cost of
agent i can be written as
Vi,ρ(Hi,k; θi) = E
[ ∞∑
t=k
βt[C(Qi,t) + rρ(Xi,t)]
]
, (3.1)
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where the expectation is over future state evolutions. By replacing the belief with ρ, we
have made an agent’s decision problem independent of other agents’ strategies. Hence, we
represent the cost by Vi,ρ(Hi,k; θi). Also, rρ(x) = E[X¯−i,kI{X¯−i,k ≤ x}] is the expected
payment when i bids x under the assumption that the bids of other agents are distributed
according to ρ. Hence, given ρ, the win probability in the auction is
pρ(x) = P(X¯−i,k ≤ x) = ρ(x)M−1. (3.2)
The expected payment when bidding x is,
rρ(x) = E[X¯−i,kI{X¯−i,k ≤ x}] = xpρ(x)−
∫ x
0
pρ(u)du. (3.3)
The state process Qi,k is Markov and has a transition kernel
P(Qi,k+1 ∈ B|Qi,k = q,Xi,k = x) =
βpρ(x)P((q − 1)+ + Ak ∈ B) + β(1− pρ(x))P(q + Ak ∈ B) + (1− β)Ψ(B), (3.4)
where B ⊆ R+ is a Borel set and x+ , max(x, 0). Recall that Ak ∼ Φ is the arrival between
(k)th and (k + 1)th auction and Ψ is density function of the regeneration process. In the
above expression, the first term corresponds to the event that agent wins the auction at
time k, while the second corresponds to the event that it does not. The last term captures
the event that the agent regenerates after auction k. The agent’s decision problem can be
modeled as an infinite horizon discounted cost MDP. It can be shown that there exists an
optimal Markov deterministic policy for our MDP [53]. Then, from (3.1), the optimal value
function of the agent is
Vˆi,ρ(q) = inf
θi∈Θ
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
βt[C(Qi,t) + rρ(Xi,t)] |Qi,0 = q
]
, (3.5)
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where Θ is the space of Markov deterministic policies.
Note that user index is redundant in the above expression as we are concerned with a
single agent’s decision problem. In future notations, we will omit the user subscript i.
3.2.5 Invariant distribution
Given cumulative bid distribution ρ and a Markov policy θ ∈ Θ, the transition kernel
given by (3.4) can be re-written as,
P(Qk+1 ∈ B|Qk = q) = βpρ(θ(q))P((q − 1)+ + Ak ∈ B)
+ β(1− pρ(θ(q)))P(q + Ak ∈ B) + (1− β)Ψ(B). (3.6)
Then, we have an important result in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The Markov chain described by the transition probabilities in (3.6) is positive
Harris recurrent and has a unique invariant distribution.
Proof. From (3.6) we note that, P(Qk+1 ∈ B|Qk = q) ≥ (1− β)Ψ(B), where 0 < β < 1 and
Ψ is a probability measure. The result then follows from results in Chapter 12, Meyn and
Tweedie [38].
We denote the unique invariant distribution by Πρ,θ.
3.2.6 Mean field equilibrium
As described in the Introduction, the mean field equilibrium requires the consistency
check that the bid distribution γ induced by the invariant distribution Πρ,θρ should be equal
to the bid distribution conjectured by the agent, i.e., ρ. Thus, we have the following definition
of MFE:
Definition 1 (Mean field equilibrium). Let ρ be a bid distribution and θρ be a stationary
policy for an agent. Then, we say that (ρ, θρ) constitutes a mean field equilibrium if
1. θρ is an optimal policy of the decision problem in (3.5), given bid distribution ρ; and
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2. ρ(x) = γ(x) , Πρ(θ−1ρ ([0, x])),∀x ∈ R+, where Πρ = Πρ,θρ.
Note that the game theoretic definition of the MFE is considers the existence of an
invariant distribution at a fixed time as the number of agents becomes asymptotically large.
In keeping with extending the ideas of a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium to the system with
a large number of agents, the definition does not require the occupancy distribution to
converge to the invariant distribution from an arbitrary initial condition as time becomes
large [26, 31, 3]. The approach may be contrasted with the stochastic systems literature
that often studies the mean field in the case where both the number of controllers and time
go to infinity (in some order), but the control policy is fixed (not a best response), and the
objective is to show that interchanging limits of time and number of particles produces the
same steady state distribution [5].
3.3 Properties of Optimal Bid Function
The decision problem given by (3.5) is an infinite horizon, discounted Markov decision
problem. The optimality equation or Bellman equation corresponding to the decision prob-
lem is
Vˆρ(q) = C(q) + βEA(Vˆρ(q + A))
+ inf
x∈R+
[
rρ(x)− pρ(x)βEA
(
Vˆρ(q + A)− Vˆ ρ((q − 1)+ + A)
)]
, (3.7)
where A ∼ Φ, and we use the notation max(0, z) = z+. Note that the decision problem above
is independent of the regeneration distribution Ψ, since the game simply ends at any time
with probability 1 − β from the agent’s perspective. However, from a system perspective,
the Markov chain describing the state transition is correctly represented by (3.6).
Define the set of functions
V =
{
f : R+ 7→ R+ : sup
q∈R+
∣∣∣∣ f(q)w(q)
∣∣∣∣ <∞
}
, (3.8)
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where w(q) = max{C(q), 1}. Note that V is a Banach space with w-norm,
‖f‖w = sup
q∈R+
∣∣∣∣ f(q)w(q)
∣∣∣∣ <∞.
Also, define the operator Tρ as
(Tρf)(q) =C(q) + βEAf(q + A)
+ inf
x∈R+
[
rρ(x)− pρ(x)β(EA(f(q + A)− f((q − 1)+ + A)))
]
, (3.9)
where f ∈ V . It is straightforward to show that the infimum in the above operator occurs at
β∆f(q)+, (3.10)
where ∆f(q) = EA(f(q + A) − f((q − 1)+ + A)). Then, substituting from (3.2), (3.3) and
(3.10), (3.9) can be rewritten as
(Tρf)(q) = C(q) + βEAf(q + A)−
∫ β∆f(q)+
0
pρ(u)du. (3.11)
The following lemma characterizes the optimal solution.
Lemma 2. Given a cumulative bid distribution ρ,
1. There exists a j ∈ N such that T jρ : V → V is a contraction mapping. Hence, there
exists a unique f ∗ρ ∈ V such that Tρf ∗ρ = f ∗ρ , and for any f ∈ V, T nρ f → f ∗ρ as n→∞.
2. The fixed point f ∗ρ of operator Tρ is the unique solution to the optimality equation (3.7),
i.e., f ∗ρ = Vˆρ.
3. Let, θˆρ(q) = β∆Vˆρ(q)
+. Then, θˆρ is an optimal policy.
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 8.3.6 in [25]. An exception to be noted here is that
the action space in our case is not a compact set which violates Assumption 8.3.1(a) in
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[25]. However, this assumption can be overridden if the statement of Lemma 8.3.8(a) in
[25] holds true. This applies to our case since, as derived in (3.10), a minimizer exists for
the infimum operator in (3.9) for every q. Further, Theorem 8.3.6 is specified with j = 1 (a
one-step contraction). Hence, we replace Assumption 8.3.2(b) with an appropriate condition
to obtain a j−step contraction. Please refer to Appendix A.1 for details.
Corollary 1. An optimal policy of the agent’s decision problem (3.5) is given by
θˆρ(q) = βEA
[
Vˆρ(q + A)− Vˆρ((q − 1)+ + A)
]
.
We now establish that Vˆρ and θˆρ are continuous and increasing functions.
Lemma 3. Given a cumulative bid distribution function ρ
1. Vˆρ is a continuous increasing function.
2. θˆρ is a continuous strictly increasing function.
Proof. Let f ∈ V . Suppose f is a continuous monotone increasing function. We first prove
that Tρf is also continuous monotone increasing function. Since, T
n
ρ f → Vˆρ according to
Statement 2 of Lemma 2, we conclude that Vˆρ also has the same property.
Let q > q′. Then,
Tρf(q)− Tρf(q′) = C(q)− C(q′) + βEA(f(q + A)− f(q′ + A))
+ inf
x
[rρ(x)− βpρ(x)EA(f(q + A)− f((q − 1)+ + A))]
− inf
x
[rρ(x)− βpρ(x)EA(f(q′ + A)− f((q′ − 1)+ + A))]
(a)
≥ βEA(f(q + A)− f(q′ + A)) + β inf
x
[pρ(x)EA(f(q′ + A)
−f((q′ − 1)+ + A)− f(q + A) + f((q − 1)+ + A))]
≥ βmin {EA(f(q + A)− f(q′ + A))+
EA(f((q − 1)+ + A)− f((q′ − 1)+ + A))
} (b)≥ 0,
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where (a) follows from the assumption that C(.) is an increasing function, and (b) follows
from the assumption that f(.) is an increasing function.
To prove that Tρf is continuous consider a sequence {qn} such that qn → q. Since f is a
continuous function, f(qn + a)→ f(q+ a). Then, by using dominated convergence theorem,
we have EAf(qn + A)→ EAf(q + A) and EAf((qn − 1)+ + A)→ EAf((q − 1)+ + A). Also,
∆f(qn) ≥ 0 as f is an increasing function. Then, from (3.11), we get that
Tρf(qn) = C(qn) + βEAf(qn + A)−
∫ β∆f(qn)
0
pρ(u)du
→ C(q) + βEAf(q + A)−
∫ β∆f(q)
0
pρ(u)du = Tρf(q).
Hence, Tρf is a continuous function. This yields Statement 1 in the lemma.
Now, to prove the second part, assume that ∆f is an increasing function. First, we show
that ∆Tρf is an increasing function. Let q > q
′. From (3.11), for any a < A¯ we can write
(Tρf)(q + a)− (Tρf)((q − 1)+ + a)− (Tρf)(q′ + a) + (Tρf)((q′ − 1)+ + a)
= C(q + a)− C((q − 1)+ + a)− C(q′ + a) + C((q′ − 1)+ + a)
+ βEAf(q + a+ A)− βEAf((q − 1)+ + a+ A)
− βEAf(q′ + a+ A) + βEAf((q′ − 1)+ + a+ A)
−
∫ β∆f(q+a)
β∆f(q′+a)
pρ(u) du+
∫ β∆f((q−1)++a)
β∆f((q′−1)++a)
pρ(u) du
= C(q + a)− C((q − 1)+ + a)− C(q′ + a) + C((q′ − 1)+ + a)
+ βEAf((q + a− 1)+ + A)− βEAf((q − 1)+ + a+ A)
− βEAf((q′ + a− 1)+ + A) + βEAf((q′ − 1)+ + a+ A)
+
∫ β∆f(q+a)
β∆f(q′+a)
1− pρ(u) du+
∫ β∆f((q−1)++a)
β∆f((q′−1)++a)
pρ(u) du
It can be easily verified that EA(f(q+ a− 1)+ +A)−EA(f(q− 1)+ + a+A)−EA(f(q′+ a−
1)+ +A) +EA(f(q′− 1)+ +a+A) ≥ 0 as f is increasing (due to Statement 1 of this lemma).
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From the assumption that ∆f is increasing, the last two terms in the above expression are
also non-negative. Now, taking expectation on both sides, we obtain ∆Tρf(q)−∆Tρf(q′) ≥
∆C(q)−∆C(q′) > 0. Therefore, from Statements 2 and 3 of Lemma 2, we have
θˆρ(q)− θˆρ(q′) = ∆Vˆρ(q)−∆Vˆρ(q′) ≥ ∆C(q)−∆C(q′) > 0.
Here, the last inequality holds since C is a strictly convex increasing function.
3.4 Existence of MFE
The main result showing the existence of MFE is as follows.
Theorem 4. There exists an MFE (ρ, θˆρ) such that
ρ(x) = γ(x) , Πρ
(
θˆ−1ρ [0, x]
)
,∀x ∈ R+.
We first introduce some useful notation. Let Θ = {θ : R 7→ R, supq∈R+
∣∣∣ θ(q)w(q) ∣∣∣ <∞}. Note
that Θ is a normed space with w-norm. Also, let Ω be the space of absolutely continuous
probability measures on R+. We endow this probability space with the topology of weak
convergence. Note that this is same as the topology of point-wise convergence of continuous
cumulative distribution functions.
We define θ∗ : P 7→ Θ as (θ∗(ρ))(q) = θˆρ(q), where θˆρ(q) is the optimal bid given by
Corollary 1. It can easily verified that θˆρ ∈ Θ. Also, define the mapping Π∗ that takes a
bid distribution ρ to the invariant workload distribution Πρ(·). Later, using Lemma 4 we
will show that Πρ(·) ∈ Ω. Therefore, Π∗ : P → Ω. Finally, define F as (F(ρ))(x) = γ(x) =
Πρ(θˆ
−1
ρ ([0, x])). Lemma 6 will show that F maps P into itself.
Now to prove the above theorem we need to show that F has a fixed point, i.e F(ρ) = ρ.
Theorem 5 (Schauder Fixed Point Theorem). Suppose F(P) ⊂ P. If F(·) is continuous,
and F(P) is contained in a convex and compact subset of P, then F(·) has a fixed point.
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In next section, we show that the mapping F satisfies the conditions of the above theorem,
and hence it has a fixed point. Note that P is a convex set. Therefore, we just need to show
that the other two conditions are satisfied.
3.5 MFE Existence: Proof
3.5.1 Continuity of the map F
To prove the continuity of mapping F , we first show that θ∗ and Π∗ are continuous
mappings. To that end, we will show that for any sequence ρn → ρ in uniform norm, we
have θ∗(ρn)→ θ∗(ρ) in w-norm and Π∗(ρn)⇒ Π∗(ρ) (where ⇒ denotes weak convergence).
Finally, we use the continuity of θ∗ and Π∗ to prove that F(ρn)→ F(ρ).
Step 1: Continuity of θ∗: First we will look at continuity of θ∗.
Theorem 6. The map θ∗ is continuous.
Proof. Define the map V ∗ : P 7→ V that takes ρ to Vˆρ(·). We begin by showing that
‖θˆρ1 − θˆρ2‖w ≤ K‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w, which means that the continuity of the map V ∗ implies the
continuity of the map θ∗.
Then we show two simple properties of the Bellman operator. The first is that for any
ρ ∈ P and f1, f2 ∈ V ,
‖Tρf1 − Tρf2‖w ≤ Kˆ‖f1 − f2‖w (3.12)
for some large Kˆ, independent of ρ. This result is available in Lemma 32 in Appendix A.2.1.
Second, let Tρ1 and Tρ2 be the Bellman operators corresponding to ρ1, ρ2 ∈ P and let
f ∈ V . We show that
‖Tρ1f − Tρ2f‖w ≤ 2(M − 1)K1‖f‖w‖ρ1 − ρ2‖. (3.13)
This result is available in Lemma 33 in Appendix A.2.1.
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We then have
‖T jρ1Vˆρ2 − T jρ2Vˆρ2‖w ≤ ‖T jρ1Vˆρ2 − T j−1ρ1 Tρ2Vˆρ2‖w
+ ‖T j−1ρ1 Tρ2Vˆρ2 − T j−2ρ1 T 2ρ2Vˆρ2‖w + +‖Tρ1T j−1ρ2 Vˆρ2 − T jρ2Vˆρ2‖w
≤ Kˆj−1‖Tρ1Vˆρ2 − Tρ2Vˆρ2‖w + · · ·+ ‖Tρ1T j−1ρ2 Vˆρ2 − T jρ2Vˆρ2‖w (3.14)
≤ (Kˆj−1 + · · ·+ 1)‖Tρ1Vˆρ2 − Tρ2Vˆρ2‖w
≤ 2(M − 1)K‖ρ1 − ρ2‖(Kˆj−1 + · · ·+ 1)‖Vˆρ2‖w (3.15)
Here, (3.14) and (3.15) follow from (3.12) and (3.13), respectively.
Now, let j be such that T jρ1 is an α-contraction, which is guaranteed to exist by lemma 2.
Note that Statement 1 of Lemma 2 implies that such a j <∞ exists. Then we have
‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w = ‖T jρ1Vˆρ1 − T jρ2Vˆρ2‖w
≤ ‖T jρ1Vˆρ1 − T jρ1Vˆρ2‖w + ‖T jρ1Vˆρ2 − T jρ2Vˆρ2‖w
=⇒ (1− α)‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w ≤ ‖T jρ1Vˆρ2 − T jρ2Vˆρ2‖w (3.16)
Finally, from (3.15) and (3.16), we get
‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w ≤
2(m− 1)K(Kˆj−1 + · · ·+ 1)‖ρ1 − ρ2‖
1− α ‖Vˆρ2‖w
≤ 2(m− 1)K(Kˆ
j−1 + · · ·+ 1)‖ρ1 − ρ2‖
1− α
× (‖Vˆρ1‖w + ‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w).
Therefore, if 2(m−1)K(Kˆ
j−1+···+1)
1−α ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖ < 12 , then
‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w ≤
4(m− 1)K(Kˆj−1 + · · ·+ 1)
1− α ‖Vˆρ1‖w‖ρ1 − ρ2‖
Hence, the maps V ∗ and θ∗ are continuous.
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Step 2: Continuity of the map Π∗: Let Πρ,θ(.) be the invariant distribution generated
by any θ. Recall that Π∗ takes ρ ∈ P to probability measure Πρ(.) = Πρ,θˆρ(.). First, we show
that Πρ,θ(.) ∈ Ω, where Ω is the space of absolutely continuous measures (with respect to
Lebesgue measure) on R+.
Lemma 4. For any ρ ∈ P and any θ ∈ Θ, Πρ,θ(·) is absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure on R+.
Proof. Πρ,θ(·) can be expressed as the invariant queue-length distribution of the dynamics
q →

Q′ + A with probability β
R with probability (1− β),
where A ∼ Φ and R ∼ Ψ, and Q′ is a random variable with distribution generated by the
conditional probabilities
P(Q′ = q|q) =1− pρ(θˆ(q))
P(Q′ = (q − 1)+|q) =pρ(θˆ(q))
Let Π′ be the distribution of Q′. Then for any Borel set B, Π can be expressed using the
convolution of Π′ and Φ :
Πρ,θ(B) = β
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(B − y)dΠ′(y) + (1− β)Ψ(B). (3.17)
If B is a Lebesgue null-set, then so is B − y ∀y. So, Φ(B − y) = 0 and Ψ(B) = 0 and
therefore Πρ(B) = 0.
We now develop a useful characterization of Πρ,θ. Let
Υ
(k)
ρ,θ(B|q) = P(Qk ∈ B|no regeneration, Q0 = q)
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be the distribution of queue length Qk at time k induced by the transition probabilities (3.6)
conditioned on the event that Q0 = q and that there are no regenerations until time k. We
can now express the invariant distribution Πρ,θ(·) in terms of Υ(k)ρ,θ(·|q) as in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. For any bid distribution ρ ∈ P and for any stationary policy θ ∈ Θ, the Markov
chain described by the transition probabilities in (3.6) has a unique invariant distribution
Πρ,θ(·). Also Πρ,θ and Υ(k)ρ,θ are related as follows:
Πρ,θ(B) =
∑
k≥0
(1− β)βkEΨ(Υ(k)ρ,θ(B|Q)), (3.18)
where EΨ(Υ(k)ρ,θ(B|Q)) =
∫
Υ
(k)
ρ,θ(B|q)dΨ(q).
Proof. Υ
(k)
ρ,θ(B|q) is the queue length distribution assuming no regeneration has happened
yet, and the regeneration event occurs with probability β independently of the rest of the
system. It is then easy to find Πρ,θ(B) in terms of Υ
(k)
ρ,θ(B|q) by simply using the properties
of the conditional expectation, and the theorem follows. Note that in EΨ(Υ(k)ρ,θ(B|Q)), the
random variable is the initial condition of the queue, as generated by Ψ. Full details are
available in Appendix A.2.2.
We shall now prove the continuity of Π∗ in ρ.
Theorem 7. The mapping Π∗ : P 7→ Ω is continuous.
Proof. By Portmanteau theorem [8], we only need to show that for any sequence ρn → ρ in
w-norm and any open set B, lim infn→∞Πρn(B) ≥ Πρ(B). By Fatou’s lemma,
lim inf
n→∞
Πρn(B) = lim inf
n→∞
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR [Υ(k)ρn (B|Q)]
≥
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR [lim inf
n→∞
Υ(k)ρn (B|Q)] (3.19)
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where Q ∼ ΨR. Let Υ(k)ρ = Υ(k)ρ,θˆρ . We prove in Lemma 34 (see Appendix A.2.2) that
lim infn→∞Υ
(k)
ρn (B|q) ≥ Υ(k)ρ (B|q) for every q ∈ R+, and the proof follows.
Step 3: Continuity of the mapping F : Now, using the results from Step 1 and Step 2,
we establish continuity of the mapping F . First, we show that F(ρ) ∈ P .
Lemma 6. For any ρ ∈ P, let γ(x) = (F(ρ))(x) = Πρ(θˆ−1ρ ([0, x])), x ∈ R+. Then, γ ∈ P.
Proof. From the definition of Πρ, it is easy to see that γ is a distribution function. Since
θˆρ is continuous and strictly increasing function as shown in Lemma 3, θˆ
−1
ρ ({x}) is either
empty or a singleton. Then, from Lemma 4, we get that Πρ(θˆ
−1
ρ ({x})) = 0. Together, we
get that γ(x) has no jumps at any x and hence it is continuous.
To complete the proof, we need to show that the expected bid under γ(.) is finite. In
order to do this, we construct a new random process Q˜k that is identical to the original
queue length dynamics Qk, except that it never receives any service. We show that this
process stochastically dominates the original, and use this property to bound the mean
of the original process by a finite quantity independent of ρ. Full details are presented in
Appendix A.2.3.
We now have the main theorem.
Theorem 8. The mapping F : P 7→ P given by (F(ρ))(x) = Πρ(θˆ−1ρ ([0, x])) is continuous.
Proof. Let ρn → ρ in uniform norm. From previous steps, we have θˆρn → θˆρ in w-norm and
Πρn ⇒ Πρ. Then, using Theorem 5.5 of Billingsley [8], one can show that the push-forwards
also converge:
Πρn(θˆ
−1
ρn (·))⇒ Πρ(θˆ−1ρ (·)).
Then, F(ρn) converges point-wise to F(ρ) as it is continuous at every x, i.e., (F(ρn))(x)→
(F(ρ))(x) for all x ∈ R+.
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It is easy to show that in the norm space P , point-wise convergence implies convergence
in uniform norm. This result is proved in Lemma 35 in Appendix A.2.3. This completes the
proof.
3.5.2 F(P) contained in a compact subset of P
We show that the closure of the image of the mapping F , denoted by F(P), is compact
in P . As P is a normed space, sequential compactness of any subset of P implies that
the subset is compact. Hence, we just need to show that F(P) is sequentially compact.
Sequential compactness of a set F(P) means the following: if {ρn} ∈ F(P) is a sequence,
then there exists a subsequence {ρnj} and ρ ∈ F(P) such that ρnj → ρ. We use Arzela`-Ascoli
theorem and uniform tightness of the measures in F(P) to show the sequential compactness.
The version that we will use is stated below:
Theorem 9 (Arzela`-Ascoli Theorem). Let X be a σ-compact metric space. Let G be a family
of continuous real valued functions on X. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
1. For every sequence {gn} ⊂ G there exists a subsequence gnj which converges uniformly
on every compact subset of X.
2. The family G is equicontinuous on every compact subset of X and for any x ∈ X, there
is a constant Cx such that |g(x)| < Cx for all g ∈ G.
Suppose a family of functions D ⊆ P satisfies the equivalent conditions of the Arzela´-
Ascoli theorem and in addition satisfy the uniform tightness property, i.e., ∀ > 0 there exists
and x such that for all f ∈ D 1 ≥ f(x) ≥ 1 − . Then, for any sequence {ρn} ⊂ D, there
exists a subsequnce {ρnj} that converges uniformly on every compact set to a continuous
increasing function ρ on R+. As D is uniformly tight it can be shown that ρnj converges
uniformly to ρ and that ρ ∈ P . Therefore, D is sequentially compact in the topology of
uniform norm.
In the following, we show that F(P) satisfies uniform tightness property and condition 2
in Arzela´-Ascoli theorem. First verifying the conditions of Arzela´-Ascoli theorem, note that
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the functions in consideration are uniformly bounded by 1. To prove equicontinuity, consider
a γ = F(ρ) and let x > y.
γ(x)− γ(y) = Πρ(θρ(q) ≤ x)− Πρ(θρ(q) ≤ y)
= Πρ(y < θρ(q) ≤ x) (3.20)
Lemma 7. For any interval [a, b], Πρ([a, b]) < c · (b− a), for some large enough c.
Proof. The proof follows easily from our characterization of Πρ in terms of Υ
(k)
ρ .
The above lemma and equation (3.20) imply that γ(x) − γ(y) ≤ c(θ−1ρ (x) − θ−1ρ (y)).
To show equicontinuity, it is enough to show that lim supy↑x
γ(x)−γ(y)
x−y ≤ K(x) for some K
independent of ρ, which we will show now.
lim sup
y↑x
γ(x)− γ(y)
x− y = lim supy↑x
Πρ(y < θρ(q) ≤ x)
x− y
= lim sup
y↑x
Πρ
([
θ−1ρ (y), θ
−1
ρ (x)
])
x− y
≤ c lim sup
y↑x
θ−1ρ (x)− θ−1ρ (y)
x− y
= c lim sup
y↑x
θ−1ρ (x)− θ−1ρ (y)
θρθ−1ρ (x)− θρθ−1ρ (y)
Let x′ = θ−1ρ (x) and y
′ = θ−1ρ (y). Now,
lim sup
y↑x
γ(x)− γ(y)
x− y ≤ c lim supy′→x′
x′ − y′
θρ(x′)− θρ(y′)
= c lim sup
y′→x′
x′ − y′
β∆V (x′)− β∆V (y′)
≤ c lim sup
y′→x′
x′ − y′
β (∆C(x′)−∆C(y′))
≤ c 1
H(x′)
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Where,
0 < H(x′) =

EA[C ′(x′ + A)− C ′(x− 1 + A)] x′ > 1
EA[C ′(x′ + A)] x′ ≤ 1
and C ′(x) = dC(x)
dx
.
Finally, we have the following lemma showing that F(P) is uniformly tight.
Lemma 8. F(P) is uniformly tight, i.e., for any  > 0 and any f ∈ F(P), there exists an
x ∈ R such that 1−  ≤ f(x) ≤ 1.
Proof. From Lemma 6, we have F(P) ⊆ P . Hence, the expectation of the bid distributions in
F(P) is bounded uniformly. An application of Markov inequality will give uniform tightness.
3.6 Approximation Results: PBE and MFE
In this section we prove that the mean field policy is an -Nash equilibrium. We have
the following theorem:
Theorem 10. Let (ρ, θˆρ) constitute an MFE. Suppose at time 0 the queue length of the
users is set independently across users according to Πρ; and that their initial belief is also
consistent. Also, suppose that all queues except queue 1 play the MFE policy θˆρ. Then, for
any policy θN of queue 1 that may be history dependent and any q ∈ R+, we have
lim sup
N→∞
V N1,µ1,0(q; θˆρ, (θˆρ)−1)− V N1,µ1,0(q; θN , (θˆρ)−1) ≤ 0,
where µ1,0 = Πρ and the superscript N has been added to explicitly indicate the dependence
on the number of cells.
The main idea behind the proof is a result called propagation of chaos, and it identifies
conditions under which any finite subset of the state variables are independent from each
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other. We state this result now in our context. We only provide brief sketches of proofs in
this section, since the methodology is much the same as [20] and space constraints do not
allow us to present the full version of the proofs here.
Lemma 9 (Propagation of chaos). For any fixed indices i1, . . . , ik, let L(QNi1 (t), . . . , QNik(t)
denote the probability law of the k-tuple of corresponding queues in the MN-queue system,
at time t. Suppose that L((QNi1 (0), . . . , QNik,0(0)) = ⊗kΠρ, where (ρ, θρ) is the solution to the
MFE equation. Also, suppose that all queues are following mean field equilibrium strategy.
Then for any T > 0, we have
L(QNi1 (T ), . . . , QNik(T )⇒ ⊗kΠρ,
as N →∞.
Proof. We shall only consider the case k = 2; the proof of the general case is similar. We can
follow the proof of Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 in Graham and Meleard [20]. The proof is divided
into two parts; the first part proves that for any two agents i and j,
‖L(QNi , QNj )− L(QNi )⊗ L(QNj )‖D → 0,
where the subscript D refers to the total variation norm. In the second, we show that
L(QNi ) ⇒ Πρ. Both parts rely on studying interaction graphs, defined in [20], which char-
acterize the amount of interactions that any finite subset of agents may have had in the
past.
The proof of Theorem 10 is as follows. Suppose we start at time t = 0 with queue length
of agent 1 being Q1(0). We can choose a time T large enough so that the value added by
auctions occurring after time T is less than , due to discounting. Thus, the difference in
value contributed by these auctions, when using policy θN and θˆρ can be bounded by 2, and
we can restrict attention to the first T auctions.
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Using ideas similar to Lemma 9, we show that probability of the event EN that other
agents that interact with agent 1 at time t have never been influenced by agent 1 goes to
1 as N becomes large. Thus, the belief of distribution of queue lengths of other agents
encountered converges to Πρ according to Lemma 9. Then we can show that for any  > 0
and N ,
V N1,µ1,0(q; θρ, (θρ)−1)− V N1,µ1,0(q; θN , (θρ)−1) ≤ ,
which yields the desired result.
3.7 Simulation Results
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We now turn to computing the MFE distribution. We simulate a large system with
100,000 users distributed among 10,000 cells with 10 users per cell. For simplicity of simu-
lation, we truncate and discretize both state and bid spaces. The truncated state space is
S = {0.01m, 0 ≤ m ≤ 2000}, while the bid space is X = {0.15m, 0 ≤ m ≤ 3000}. The job
arrival and regeneration distributions are both chosen to be uniform over interval [0, 1]. The
service rate of each base station is assumed to be 5 units per time slot. Finally, the holding
cost function is chosen as C(q) = q2.
Our simulation simply follows the choices made by each agent and calculating the em-
pirical distribution that would result at each time step. Let ρ0(x) = min{0.001x, 1}, x inX
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and Π0 = Ψ. For every positive integer n, do the following:
1. Compute the optimal value function, Vˆn, which is the unique solution to the following
equation,
Vˆn(q) = C(q) + βEA[Vˆn(q + A)]−
∑
x≤β∆Vˆn(q),x∈X
pρn(x),
where ∆Vˆn(q) = EA[Vˆn(q + A)] − EA[Vˆn((q − 1)+ + A)]. We apply value iteration
(Section 6.10 [46]) to compute an approximate solution to the above equation.
2. Compute the optimal bid function, θˆn as
θˆn(q) = βEA[Vˆn(q + A)− Vˆn((q − 1)+ + A)].
3. Next, all agents employ the optimal bid policy from Step 2 and update their states.
Then we compute the candidate steady state distribution by evaluating emperical
distribution of state.
4. Finally, compute the empirical bid distribution, ρn+1(x) = Πn[θˆ
−1
n ([0, x])]. If ||ρn −
ρn+1|| < , then ρ = ρn+1 and exit. Otherwise, set n = n+ 1 and go to Step 1.
If the algorithm converges, then its output distribution ρ, is an approximation of the MFE
bid distribution.
We simulated the algorithm for three set of parameters: 1. (β = 0.9,M = 10), 2. (β =
0.95,M = 10) and 3. (β = 0.9,M = 15). Also, we chose the accuracy parameter  = 0.008.
Figure 3.2 shows that the algorithm converges in less than 20 iterations in all three cases. In
each iteration, Step 1 (value iteration) is the most computationally intensive. It converges
in 80 recursions, with each recursion having to update |S| number of variables, and with
each variable update requiring at most |X | number of arithmetic operations. All together,
the computational complexity of each iteration is in the order of 80 × |S| × |X | arithmetic
operations.
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The queue length distributions at MFE are shown in Figure 3.3. We observe that the
distribution curves exhibit a rightward shift with increase in β or M . Note that larger β
makes queues live longer without regeneration, while higher M reduces each individual’s
average service rate. Hence, the queues get longer on average. We show the optimal bid
functions at MFE in Figure 3.4. As expected from our analysis, the bid functions are
monotonically increasing in queue length.
3.8 Conclusions
Our algorithm for computing the MFE immediately suggests a simple implementation
scheme. Suppose each mobile device has a network interface manager on which the human
user sets up priorities for different apps. The interface manager also should be aware of
the cost functions corresponding to the QoE of different apps. Now, suppose that the base
stations were to calculate the empirical bid distribution at each time instant, and return it to
the interface manager. The interface manager plays its best response to this bid distribution.
Value iteration could be done either on each device or at a data center and provided as a
look up table to the interface manager. The base stations combine all the bids to create a
new empirical bid distribution. Such a proceeding is essentially identical to the algorithm
that we employed above, and would converge in a similar fashion.
We had assumed a single cost function for the agent (app), but as long as there are a finite
set of cost functions (corresponding to a finite number of app types) we can incorporate the
cost function as part of the state of the agent, with the cost function being chosen according
to some distribution at each regeneration (corresponding to choosing to start a new app with
some probability). Such a modification causes no changes to any of our analysis. Then the
mean field bid distribution accounts for the distribution of cost functions (app popularities),
and the agent takes a decision based on this distribution as before. The only difference to
the achieved equilibrium is that it now follows a weighted version of LQF, with the weights
corresponding to the cost on QoE of the competing apps.
To summarize our work, we explored the question of whether it is possible to design an
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scheduling policy that allows for declaration of value by humans in the loop and effects on
QoE, and which has the attractive properties of a (weighted) LQF service regime. We used
a mean field framework to show that as the number of agents in the system becomes large,
this objective can indeed be fulfilled using a second price auction at each server. Our design
appears to lend itself well to implementation and this will be our future goal.
In this chapter, we studied a large scale market of agents (queues) competing for service,
and established the existence of an efficient Mean Field Equilibrium. In the next chapter,
we will consider a complementary problem of competition across many small scale providers
that participate in an Internet marketplace.
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4. MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIA OF PRICING AND WORK-QUALITY SELECTION
GAMES IN INTERNET MARKETPLACES
4.1 Introduction
The world has recently seen an explosion in the growth of Internet marketplaces. While
large scale online goods retailers are well established, recently developed market places have
allowed small scale players to participate, as well as for the proliferation of the sale of
services as well as goods. For example, Amazon Mechanical TurkTM and Hacker’s List1 are
marketplaces to match tasks whose completion requires human intelligence, with appropriate
individuals that can perform them. Marketplaces that enable small scale goods sellers to
reach their target audience range from broad ones such as Amazon and Ebay, or more
specialized ones such as Swappa2 that focuses on used smart phones.
The heterogeneous mix of agents who have different lifetimes and differing abilities to
complete jobs has meant that establishing credentials in a marketplace is usually by means
of a reputation scheme, wherein users that have interacted with these agents leave feedback
based on their experience. It has been empirically observed that having a higher reputation
carries a sale price premium to the tune of about 5− 10% [19]. To observe this phenomenon
in practice, we collected the data from Swappa.com, which is an online market place for the
sale of used smart phones. Here, a seller is allowed to indicate the condition of the phone
(fair, good, mint or new), and customers provide star ratings of the sellers. Each successful
transaction is posted under the heading of “recent sales” with the make and model of the
phone, the sale price and the rating of the seller. We collected data for 2 months and obtained
4233 unique data points. We focussed on the two major service providers in the US (AT&T
and Verizon), so as to avoid effects of lower demand associated with smaller carriers.
We found that reputation on Swappa tends to pool around 1 star or 5 stars, with relatively
1http://hackerslist.com
2http://swappa.com
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few points in-between. Hence, we divide our data set into two classes of reputation 0 and
1. The distribution of the sale price of phones at the two different reputations for different
conditions of phones is plotted in the Figure 4.1. The “violin plot” shown is a box plot along
with a depiction of the empirical distribution of the data around it. We note that the effect
of reputation on sale prices appears to be uniform across the data, and a high reputation
allows for a markup of about $50 on average. For example, a phone declared as “fair” by
a seller with a low reputation sells at a price that is less by $50 (on average) than a phone
declared to be in the same condition by one with a high reputation.
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Figure 4.1: The effect of reputation on sale price. Reputation is classified as “high” (=1) or
“low” (=0). We consider four conditions of phones: fair, good, mint and new. Comparing
phones of the same condition (shown in the same color), we observe a markup of about $50
for a high reputation.
Our objective in this chapter is to study the dynamics of competition across agents
providing a nominally identical service or good in an Internet marketplace. Here, the agents
(sellers) offering the service have an inherent competence or quality of service that is unknown
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to potential customers. This “work-quality” parametrizes characteristics such as how well
the agent is capable of performing the job (eg. on Hacker’s List), the customer service that
he provides (eg. on Amazon), whether he truthfully reveals the condition of the good (eg. on
Swappa) and so on. Customers do not see the work-quality directly, but are only aware of the
posted reputation. As such, they take a decision on which agent to choose for service based
on a combination of the offered price and reputation. The customer updates the reputation
once the job is completed.
It is observed in [19] that delays in processing jobs are considered quite unfavorably, and
indeed marketplaces such as Mechanical Turk allow the imposition of deadline by which jobs
must be completed, while sites such as Amazon allow the customer to cancel the transac-
tion without loss until the item is shipped. Consistent with this idea, we assume that the
marketplace is interested in ensuring high throughput and low delays, and hence imposes a
holding cost on each seller based on its number of pending jobs. The agent providing service
has a random lifetime, after which he leaves the system. Such behavior is typical of small
scale service providers and retailers.
How should an agent with a certain reputation and a certain number of pending jobs
to be completed price his good or service against competing offers? The challenge faced by
an agent is to tradeoff the need to set a low price to incentivize customers to explore its
service (and potentially enhance its reputation), while at the same time trying to maximize
its payoff at the current reputation by setting higher prices. While doing so, the agent needs
to model the likely prices set by the competing providers.
Modeling the actions of each individual competitor in a marketplace where the number
of agents is very large is prohibitively complex for any particular agent. Indeed, given that a
potential customer only views the offered prices and reputations of a finite subset3 of agents,
a particular agent is unlikely to have gone head-to-head with any of the competitors it faces
for some particular job if the agent lifetimes are all randomly drawn. Thus, it might in fact
3This subset will be platform-specific but typically a small and random set of agents, even with specific
search terms included.
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be unnecessary for any agent to compute the behavior of each potential competitor in order
to determine the optimal price. This setting of infinite agents, each with ephemeral lifetimes
and with random finite subsets interacting with each other at each step is the typical setting
of a mean field game.
4.1.1 Mean Field Games
The problem of an agent estimating the probable actions of a randomly drawn subset
of competitors at each time, taking a best response action, and updating the belief us-
ing Bayes’ Rule after observing the realized actions of the competitors is the scenario in a
repeated Bayesian game. A Mean Field Game (MFG) is the limiting case of a Bayesian
game under which the number of agents becomes large, and the interactions between any
finite subset of agents becomes infrequent. When these conditions are met, it is an accurate
approximation to assume that the states and hence the actions of any finite subset of com-
petitors are independent of each other, which is the so-called chaos hypothesis [20]. This
hypothesis provides the basis for the MFG [29] under which we consider the system from
the viewpoint of a single agent that has a belief that his opponents actions would be drawn
independently of each other from some candidate probability distribution, and takes a best
response action based on his current state and this belief. The system is said to be at a
Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if this action is itself a sample consistent with the candidate
distribution.
The MFG approach has recently been used in several different problems on games with a
large number of agents, each subset of which meet infrequently [55, 2, 9, 56, 26, 34, 31, 32].
Most pertinent to our work are [56, 26, 34]. In [56] jobs arrive into a system of many queues
and must decide how many queues to sample, with the objective of joining the least loaded
queue. There is a cost to sampling each queue and hence each job must take a decision based
on its belief about how many queues are being sampled by the other jobs. The problem of
auctioning spots on a webpage to competing advertisers is considered in [26], where the
set of competing advertisers at each auction are drawn randomly from a large pool. The
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advertisers must learn the true value of winning, i.e, the probability of selling an item via
the advertisement over time. A problem of multiple queues competing using an auction to
obtain service from a server (a cellular network) is studied in [34]. Here, the objective is to
show that the MFE that results has small service delays.
Our problem can be seen as a system of many servers competing for jobs that pick the
one that has the best combination of price and reputation; any inference on load or innate
ability has to be inferred from agents having similar reputation. Thus, the jobs estimate the
work-quality provided by the servers via their reputation, and the estimate becomes more
accurate as more jobs are served by any particular server. Our objective is to characterize
the policy employed by the servers to attract jobs to themselves. Our problem is distinct
from those considered in the literature, and is methodologically similar only in that we utilize
the general framework of showing existence of MFE by verifying the conditions of a fixed
point theorem. We will point out the difference and our innovations in the text.
4.1.2 Main Contributions
Our analytical model takes the form of a system in which jobs (customers) enter at a
constant rate, and a subset of agents (servers) declare prices in order to obtain these jobs.
Each server has an inherent work-quality of job completion (a parameter that indicates the
probability of providing “good” or “bad” service), which known to itself but is unknown to
jobs. However, each job leaves a (potentially noisy) “good” or “bad” review of the server
that it utilized, and the server’s reputation (the best estimate of quality thus far) is visible
to all jobs. A key novelty of our model is that the customer selects a server based on a
linear combination of both price and the server’s reputation. The challenge faced by the
server is to determine the optimal price, based on the fact that reputation is only updated
when a customer accepts its price. Thus, a low price would result in a high probability of
being selected, and a possibility of enhancing one’s reputation (particularly if it is less than
the true work-quality). However, such an action would also mean that the revenue obtained
through completing the job is low. Furthermore, servers are charged a holding cost by the
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marketplace so as to incentivize short delays in completion.
Our first contribution is in establishing the existence of an optimal bidding policy and
characterizing policy under the mean field regime. Our main insight that enables us to
obtain a closed form solution is the observation that our marketplace can be viewed as an
auction mechanism in which the servers bid their “effective price,” which is combination
of both their declared price and reputation, but actually receive a reward (if selected) of
the declared price. Posed in this fashion, we have a repeated first price reverse auction
(lowest bid wins) wherein the agents estimate the future while bidding. We also determine
an equivalent of the agent’s “type” (the terminology used in mechanism design literature
to compare the fitness to win of different agents) that encapsulates the residual work, the
reputation, the work-quality and future rewards. Since we show that the system operates in
a manner similar to a standard auction, the agent with the highest type wins the auction.
We further show that the type is decreasing in residual work and increasing in reputation.
Our second contribution is methodological. We show the existence of the Mean Field
Equilibrium under our marketplace game across servers. Our proof technique requires the
establishment of a continuous map from the assumed bid space (the belief distribution) to the
resultant bid distribution of the agents bidding under that consistent belief. The procedure
involves following the map from belief → bid → state transition kernel → invariant state
distribution → resultant bid distribution. Finally, we show that the map is between convex
compact spaces, establishing the result. Unique to our current work is a state space that is
countable and uncountable variables that requires the use of results of [24] to show existence
of a best response and [6] in showing continuity of the map.
Our final contribution is on data collection and numerical studies. Although there has
been prior work on calculating the price markup engendered by a good reputation, none
that we are aware of takes into account the impact on future reputation while choosing the
current price. In order to answer this question numerically, we use the data from the used
smart phone market, Swappa, to determine the right parameters for the value of reputation
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in our model. We show numerically system with a large number of agents that the MFE
is attained within a small number of iterations. We then provide comparative estimates of
how each parameter (residual work, good reviews, total reviews and true quality) impact the
“type” of the agent and his bid. Apart from verifying the analytical results, we illustrate
the tradeoff between trying to incentivize customers to explore by setting low prices when
reputation is less than the true quality, and to exploit one’s reputation when the reputation
exceeds the true quality. We also provide time series analysis of high and low quality agents
and show how the former play a long range strategy of building up reputation and then
exploiting it, while the latter play the short range strategy of making as much as possible
before the system learns their true nature.
4.2 Mean Field Model
We consider a system with NM servers that act as strategic agents in our system. These
agents are randomly permuted and divided into N clusters with M agents in each cluster.
At each discrete time instant k = 1, 2, 3, · · · , M jobs arrive into the system, and each job is
assigned to a different cluster. Each agent in a cluster specifies a price (that we refer to as a
bid) for completion of the job, and if its bid is accepted by the job, the agent is awarded the
payment stated in its bid. We study the system in the mean field regime in which N →∞,
and the agents assume independence across their competitors’ actions. Our setup is typical
and the asymptotic accuracy of the approximation follows immediately from [20]. A proof
of the asymptotic convergence of the finite system to the mean field system using the results
of [20] in a setup that that is similar at a high level to ours is available in [26, 34]. Since the
proof is similar in our current context. Figure 4.2 gives an overview of our model and the
details are given below.
4.2.1 State Space of Agent
In the mean field regime, we consider a generic agent (server) who competes against M−1
other agents, whose bids are believed to be drawn independently from some distribution.
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Figure 4.2: Mean Field Model: Parameters related to the mechanism are shown in blue,
while the state transition parameters are shown in red.
The state of this agent consists of the queue length, the service quality and its reputation.
We denote the residual work load in the queue of the agent just before time instant k by
qk ∈ [0,∞] (the random variable is represented by Qk). An agent can complete each job with
either a “high” quality w.p. η or “low” quality w.p. 1− η. The quality parameter η ∈ (0, 1]
is the realization of the random variable H that follows a distribution Υ, and is assumed
to be fixed for the lifetime of the agent. An agent can perform a good job with quality he
choses ηc. If he choses a quality ηc > η, he incurs a cost of K(η, ηc) and if he choses ηc ≤ η,
the cost is 0.
The marketplace tries to estimate the agents’s quality via a reputation scheme in which
customers provide feedback on whether they received high or low quality service. The rep-
utation of an agent is estimated via a β−distribution β(αk, βk), where αk is the number of
positive ratings (random variable Ak) and βk is the number of negative ones (random vari-
able Bk). Hence, the reputation function g(αk, ξk) = αk/(αk + βk). Finally, let ξk = αk + βk
be the total number of ratings received up to time k, with the equivalent random variable
Ξk. Then the realized state of the agent at time k is the tuple (qk, αk, ξk, η). For simplicity,
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we assume that the reputation is updated immediately after the agent’s bid is accepted by
the customer, and that the job reports the realized quality truthfully. In reality, there might
be a random interval of time for the job to be completed and the customer to rate the
service quality. Thus, the reputational updates might be bursty, which would complicate
the model. However, our assumption implies that the agents would be conservative in their
behavior and would do no worse in a delayed or bursty rating system. There might also be
noise in reporting the realized quality with which the job was performed, i.e., the customer
may provide inaccurate feedback. This effect is easy to incorporate into our model, since it
simply changes the probability that good quality job completion would result in an increased
number of positive ratings.
4.2.2 State Transitions
The state of the system could change due to the following events.
Departures:At each time slot, the server completes dk units of work. Here, dk ∈ (0,∞) is
the realization of the random variable Dk drawn from the distribution Φ, which is assumed
to have a finite mean. When the dk units of work are completed, the queue state changes
from qk to (qk − dk)+.
Arrivals:We assume a new job of unit size arrives in the cluster of the selected agent at
each time slot. Let xk ∈ [0,∞] be the bid submitted by the server in slot k (the equivalent
random variable is denoted Xk). This bid is the output of the policy employed by the agent
θρ(qk, αk, ξk, ηk), where ρ is the belief of the agent about its competitors actions, and will be
defined precisely at the end of this section. If the server wins the auction, the queue state
qk changes to qk + 1. Let Wk denote a unit random variable, whose realization wk takes a
value 1 if the server i wins the action in slot k, and else 0. As indicated above, with each
arrival, the reputation changes to (αk + 1, ξk + 1) with probability ηc and (αk, ξk + 1) with
probability 1− ηc.
Regeneration:Each server has a geometrically distributed lifetime and can quit in any time
slot w.p. 1 − δ. This assumption is consistent with the fact that the human agents (often
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students) at small scale service sites such as Mechanical Turk or even retail sites like Ebay
are active for a while, and then move on to professional pursuits. We assume that a departing
agent stops bidding for new jobs, but would complete the residual work in his queue. The
agent is immediately replaced with a newly arriving agent. We refer to such a departure
and replacement as a regeneration event. Thus, from the system perspective, the agent can
regenerate at any time with probability 1− δ. When regeneration occurs the agent’s initial
state is (Rq, Rα, Rξ, Rη) drawn from the distribution Ψ.
In summary, from the perspective of the system, the state of the agent at time k + 1 is
qk+1 =

Rq if regenerates at k
(qk − dk + wk)+ otherwise.
(4.1)
(αk+1, ξk+1) =

(Rα, Rξ) if regenerates at k
(αk, ξk) if wk = 0
(αk + 1, ξk + 1) w.p. ηc if wk = 1
(αk, ξk + 1) w.p. (1− ηc) if wk = 1.
(4.2)
ηk+1 =

Rη if regenerates at k
ηk otherwise.
(4.3)
Note that from the perspective of the agent, there is actually no regeneration, and it
simply departs the system at some time. Thus, the evolution of state from an agent’s view
point (and hence its optimal action) would be different from the high-level view point of the
system as a whole. We take heed of this point while developing the best response policy in
Section 4.3.
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4.2.3 Bid, Payment and Cost
The marketplace charges a holding cost C(qk) to the sever at each time slot k. We assume
that C(qk) is a polynomial of degree p ≥ 1 and convex increasing in queue size. Also, at each
time slot if the server’s bid is accepted, it obtains a payment equal to its bid yk (random
variable Yk). The net payoff for the agent in time slot k is ykwk − C(qk). Note that we
assume that the agent does not experience a cost for performing work, since we can subtract
out this constant cost per unit time from the model.
4.2.4 Effective Bid and Customer Choice
Customers (jobs) choose the agents (servers) based on both the bid amount as well
as reputation. We model the effective bid of the server as the linear combination xk ,
yk− zg(αk, ξk), where g(α, ξ) = α/ξ and z is a parameter that trades off bid and reputation.
Xk is used to denote the random variable corresponding to effective bid. Then the assumption
is that customers choose the agent that has the lowest effective bid. Customers are assumed
to be short-lived, quasi-linear utility and myopic. Thus, they use the information they have
when the appear to make a best guess of reward, hence the particular form of the effective
bid.
Such an effective bid is consistent with the idea of reputation as enabling premium prices
[19]. Clearly, the function g(α, ξ) = α/ξ is increasing in α and decreasing in ξ, in tune with
empirical observations [19]. Note that the smallest effective bid is −z, corresponding to an
actual bid of 0, and a value of g(α, ξ) = 1. More general models of reputation can aslo be
represented by g(.). Finally, we denote the (cumulative) distribution of effective bids by ρ.
4.3 State Dynamics and MFE
As described earlier, under the mean field approximation we consider the bid selection
problem faced by a generic agent of interest, who assumes that the effective bids of all other
agents are drawn independently from a candidate (cumulative) distribution ρ and calculates
a best response based on his current state. Note that for simplicity, we will analyze our
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system using the effective bid as the parameter chosen by the agent; the translation back to
the real bid simply involves an additive term. While performing the calculation of effective
bid, the agent assumes that ρ is fixed for all time, which, as we will see in the definition
presented at the end of this section, would indeed be the case at MFE.
We denote the space of candidate effective bid distributions by P . The elements of P are
taken as cumulative probability distributions with support as a finite interval [−z, T ] in R+,
and which are absolutely continuous w.r.t the Lebesgue measure. Furthermore, we assume
that each member of P is zero until a threshold, and then strictly increases over a finite
interval to reach 1. The reason for this choice stems from the intuition that even an agent
with a zero queue length would not bid 0, since it stands to get a higher payoff by bidding a
non-zero value. Hence, there should exist a non-zero “reserve bid” below which no bids will
occur. We will show the existence of a mean field equilibrium in this space in Section 4.6.
4.3.1 Agent’s Decision Problem
As the agent of interest maintains a belief ρ about the effective bid distribution of all its
competitors, the agent’s objective function is
Vρ,η(θ) = Eθ
[ ∞∑
t=k
δt (−C(Qt) + rρ(Xt, At,Ξt, Ht)
]
, (4.4)
where expectation is over future state evolutions under policy θ, and rρ(.) is the payoff
(or reward) function that we define next. Note that we have explicitly shown the quality
parameter η, which remains fixed over the lifetime of the agent.
Expected Reward:Since the agent (server) receives the full value of the bid if selected by
the customer, the expected reward if the agent’s effective bid is x is simply rρ(x, α, ξ) =
pρ(x)(x + z g(α, ξ)). Here, pρ(x) is the probability of the effective bid being accepted (a
“win”). Thus, the mechanism is essentially a sealed bid reverse first price auction using
effective bids, followed by payment with an additive markup. As described in Section 4.2,
the customer decides which server (agent) to choose by comparing their effective bids and
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choosing the one that is the smallest. Let C1, C2, · · · represent a set of M − 1 I.I.D random
variables, each with (cumulative) distribution ρ. The probability of winning for a server that
has an effective bid of x is then given by
pρ(x) = P
(
x ≤ min
j
Cj
)
(4.5)
=
(
P
(
x ≤ C1
))(M−1)
=
(
1− ρ(x)
)(M−1)
(4.6)
Hence, the reward
rρ(x, α, ξ) = (x+ z g(α, ξ))
(
1− ρ(x)
)(M−1)
. (4.7)
Agent State Evolution Process:We can now write down the evolution of state from the
perspective of the generic agent of interest. The state process (Q,A,Ξ, H) for an agent with
quality parameter η is
P
(
Qk+1 ∈ B,Ak+1 = α,Ξk+1 = ξ,Hk+1 = η|Qk = qk, Ak = αk,Ξk = ξk, Hk = ηk, Xk = x, Yk = ηc
)
= δpρ
(
x)
(
P((Qk + 1−Dk)+ ∈ B)(1αk+1,ξk+1(α, ξ))ηc1ηk(η)
+ P((Qk + 1−Dk)+ ∈ B)(1αk,ξk+1(α, ξ))(1− ηc)
)
1ηk(η)
+ δ(1− pρ
(
x
)(
P((Qk −Dk)+ ∈ B)(1αk,ξk(α, ξ))
)
1ηk(η).
We can now formulate the agent’s bid selection problem as a Markov Decision Problem
(MDP). The optimal value function of the agent is
Vρ,η = sup
θ∈Θ
= Eθ
[ ∞∑
t=k
δt (−C(Qt) + rρ(Xt, At,Ξt)
]
, (4.8)
where Θ is the space of Markov deterministic policies.
68
4.3.2 Invariant Distribution
The state process from the system-wide perspective is different from that of a single agent,
since it also involves regenerations that are irrelevant to any particular agent. However, the
state transitions occur under the Markov policy θ chosen by the agent in (4.8). In other
words, the policy employed by the agent is optimal from its own perspective, and generates
a state transition kernel for the system as a whole. Thus, the state transition kernel Q that
describes the evolution of (Q,A,Ξ, H) under policy θ is as given below.
P(Qk+1 ∈ B,Ak+1 = α,Ξk+1 = ξ,Hk+1 ∈ B′|Qk = qk, Ak = αk,Ξk = ξk, Hk = ηk)
= δpρ
(
θ(qk, αk, ξk, ηk)
) (
P((Qk + 1−Dk)+ ∈ B)(1αk+1,ξk+1(α, ξ))ηk1B′(ηk)
)
+ P((Qk + 1−Dk)+ ∈ B)(1αk,ξk+1(α, ξ))(1− ηk)1B′(ηk)
)
+ δ(1− pρ
(
θ(q, αk, ξk, ηk)
)
(
P((Qk −Dk)+ ∈ B)(1αk,ξk(α, ξ))1B′(ηk)
)
+ (1− δ)Ψ(B,αk+1, ξk+1, B′) (4.9)
We denote the invariant distribution of the above transition kernel by Πρ. Under the mean
field approximation, the invariant distribution Πρ corresponds to the empirical state dis-
tribution the original (infinite agent) system. Thus, if some randomly chosen agent in the
infinite agent system were sampled, its state would be drawn from Πρ.
4.3.3 Mean Field Equilibrium
Definition 2 (Mean field equilibrium). Let ρ be a candidate effective bid distribution and
θρ be a stationary policy for an agent. Then, we say that (ρ, θρ) constitutes a mean field
equilibrium if
1. θρ is an optimal policy of the decision problem in (4.8), given effective bid distribution
ρ; and
2. ρ(x) = γ(x) , Πρ
({
(q, α, ξ, η) : (q, α, ξ, η) ∈ θ−1ρ ([−z, x])
})
,∀x ∈ R+.
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4.4 Existence of Optimal Policy
In this section, we first show that optimal work-quality decision can be taken independent
of bid decision. We then show that there indeed exists an optimal bid policy θ∗ρ that would
maximize the objective function shown in (4.8). Our argument follows a procedure outlined
in Herna´ndez-Lerma et al. [24]. We then obtain a closed form expression for the optimal bid
function by viewing the server (agent) selection scheme as a version of a first price reverse
auction.
The Bellman equation corresponding to our problem is
Vρ(q, α, ξ, η) = sup
x∈[−z,∞]
max
ηc∈[0,1]
{
rρ(x, α, ξ)− C(q) + δ ED
[
pρ(x)Vρ((q + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)ηc
+ pρ(x)(Vρ((q + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)(1− ηc) + (1− pρ(x))(Vρ((q −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]}
(4.10)
Lemma 10. Optimal work-quality decision is independent of the optimal bid decision and
the bellman equation for the optimal bid is given by
Vρ(q, α, ξ, η) = sup
x∈[−z,∞]
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ z g(α, ξ) + ∆qVρ(q, α, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αVρ(q, α, ξ, η)))},
(4.11)
where ∆αVρ(q, α, ξ, η) = δED
[
(Vρ((q+1−D)+, α+1, ξ+1, η)−Vρ((q+1−D)+, α, ξ+1, η))
]
,
and ∆qVρ(q, α, ξ, η) = δED
[
Vρ((q + 1 − D)+, α, ξ + 1, η) − Vρ((q − D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
and K∗ is
the convex conjugate of K.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix B.1.1.
Define the space of possible value functions V as
V =
{
f : (R+,N,N, [0, 1])→ R+ : sup
q∈R,ξ∈N,α≤ξ
|f(q, α, ξ, η)| <∞
}
. (4.12)
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Next, define the Bellman operator Tρ as follows:
(Tρf)(q, α, ξ) = δED
[
f((q −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
− C(q)+
sup
x∈[−z,∞]
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ z g(α, ξ) + ∆qf(q, α, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η)))}.
where, ∆αf(q, α, ξ, η) = δED
[
(f((q+ 1−D)+, α+ 1, ξ+ 1, η)− f((q+ 1−D)+, α, ξ+ 1, η))],
and ∆qf(q, α, ξ, η) = δED
[
f((q + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)− f((q −D)+, α, ξ, η)].
We show the existence of the optimal value function (and hence effective bid function)
by verifying certain properties of our MDP, and then applying results from [24].
Theorem 11. For the MDP problem,
1. The Bellman equation (4.11) has a unique solution V ∗ρ
2. There exists a deterministic stationary policy θ∗ρ, which achieves this V
∗
ρ
3. The operator Tρ is a contraction mapping that is ‖Tρu− Tρu′‖w ≤ γ′ ‖u− u′‖w ,∀u, u′ ∈
V with γ′ < 1.
Proof. First, we need three auxiliary lemmas 36, 37, 38, which we prove in Appendex B.1.1.
These lemmas are equivalent to the Assumptions 8.3.1, 8.3.2 and 8.3.3 in [24]. Parts 1 and
2 above follow from Theorem 8.3.6 of [24], while Part 3 follows from the proposition 8.3.9 of
[24].
Now that we have shown the existence of the optimal value and effective bid functions,
we characterize the effective bid (and hence the actual bid) in terms of the value function.
We achieve this characterization by casting our agent selection mechanism as a first price
reverse auction with a total of M agents and then using the Envelope Theorem [39] to derive
the optimal bid. In our auction, each agent assumes that the states of the other M − 1
agents are drawn in an I.I.D fashion from a distribution Π. Our objective is to identify the
bid of a particular player as a function of his realized state. We have the following result.
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Theorem 12. The optimal effective bid is given by the following conditional expectation
which has a similar form to a general first price reverse auction.
θ∗ρ(q, α, ξ, η) = −E
[
ν˜ |ν˜ ≤ ν(q, α, ξ, η)] (4.13)
where, ν(q, α, ξ, η) = zg(α, ξ) + ∆qVρ(q, α, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αVρ(q, α, ξ, η)), (4.14)
and ν˜ ∼ maxj=1,2,···M−1 ν(Qj, Aj,Ξj, Hj) with (Qj, Aj,Ξj, Hj) ∼ Π ∀j (I.I.D). (4.15)
Proof. According to our model, a job chooses the agent that submits the lowest effective
bid. Thus, we can think of the mechanism as a standard reverse auction in which each
agent submits an effective bid, the agent with lowest bid wins and is paid some premium in
addition to the effective bid that depends on reputation. We use the envelope theorem to
derive the closed form expression of the bid, and in doing so we come up with the notion of
the “type” of the agent as function of its state, which characterizes its probability of winning
the auction. The details are given in Appendix B.1.3
The idea of the agent type defined in (4.14) allows us to rewrite the dynamic auction in
the same fashion as a static one-shot auction. Essentially, the value of winning for the agent
both currently and in the future is captured by his type. We will study the properties of the
type, both analytically and numerically, to obtain insights on how it impacts the bid of the
agent under different state realizations.
4.5 Properties of Optimal Policy
In this section, we derive several useful properties of the optimal bid function, which,
apart form proving insight into how the state of an agent impacts his bid, also will be useful
in establishing the existence of the MFE in Section 4.6. Most of these results are intuitively
clear. Our first result shows the decreasing nature of the value function in the queue length.
Lemma 11. Given a cumulative bid distribution function ρ, V ∗ρ is a continuous strictly
decreasing function of q.
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Proof. Our approach is as follows. We assume that f ∈ V is a strictly decreasing function
of q. We prove that under this assumption, Tρf is also a strictly decreasing function of q.
Since T nρ (f)→ V ∗ρ , V ∗ρ will also be a strictly decreasing function of q. The details are given
in Appendix B.2
Our next result follows a similar approach to show the increasing nature of effective bid
with α.
Lemma 12. For a given effective bid distribution ρ, V ∗ρ strictly increases with α.
Proof. We assume that f strictly increases with α and we prove that Tρf also strictly in-
creases with α. Since T nρ f → V ∗ρ , V ∗ρ will increase with α. The details are given in Ap-
pendix B.2.2
We next prove a useful property that the value of the transition upon being selected by
the job, ∆V ∗ρ , is decreasing in queue length.
Lemma 13. Let νf (q, α, ξ, η) = zg(α, ξ) + ∆qf(q, α, ξ, η) + supηc
{
∆αf(q, α, ξ, η)
}
, then
1. νV ∗ρ (q, α, ξ, η) strictly decreases with q.
2. νV ∗ρ (qH , α, ξ, η)−νV ∗ρ (qL, α, ξ, η) ≤ ∆C(qL)−∆C(qH), where ∆C(q) = δED
[
C((q+1−
D)+)− C((q −D)+)].
Proof. Again we assume that both properties hold for a function f() and prove that they
are true for Tf(). Full details are given in Appendix B.2.3
The result indicates that the agent has a reducing incentive to accept more jobs as the
queue increases, and would hence choose larger effective bids. We now prove this result.
Lemma 14. Given a cumulative distribution function ρ, the optimal policy X∗(q, α, ξ)
strictly increases with queue length.
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Proof. From Theorem 12, the optimal policy can be written as
X∗(q, α, ξ, η) = −E[ν˜ |ν˜ ≤ ν(q, α, ξ, η)].
We see that X∗(q, α, ξ, η) decreases with ν as the expectation value term increases with
ν. We know that ν(q, α, ξ, η) = zg(α, ξ) + δ∆V (q, α, ξ). From Lemma 13, ∆V (q, α, ξ) is
strictly decreasing with q, which means that ν(q, α, ξ) strictly decreases with q. Hence, the
optimal policy strictly increases with queue length.
Corollary 2. If all agents have the same fixed reputation (i.e., we have a pure price compe-
tition), then by Lemma 14, the optimal policy is equivalent to each job joining the shortest
queue in the cluster.
The last result is interesting, since it suggests that if the market place enforces a holding
cost, and all servers are equally good, the customers are automatically incentivized to join
the queue promises the lowest delay. Essentially, the market mechanism effectively forces
agents to reveal (a function of) their true queue lengths in this case.
Lemma 15. Given a cumulative distribution function ρ, ν(q, α, ξ, η) increases with α for a
given q, ξ, η.
Proof. We will again show the preservation of the property through the Bellman function. We
assume νf (q, α, ξ, η) = zg(α, ξ)+∆qf(q, α, ξ, η)+K
∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η)) is increasing with α and
then show νTρf (q, α, ξ, η) also increases with α. Details are given in the Appendix B.2.4.
This result shows that the type is increasing with reputation, and hence if all else is
held constant an agent with a higher reputation is more likely to be selected by a job. In
Section 4.8, we will numerically study impact of the relationships that we have derived in
this section, and [provide insights on how their variation impacts the choices made by the
agent.
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4.6 Existence of Mean Field
In this section, we prove the existence of the mean field equilibrium in our system.
Formally, the main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 13. There exists an MFE (ρ, θ∗ρ) such that ρ(x) = γ(x) , Πρ(θ∗−1ρ,z [−z, x]), where
θ∗ρ,z(q, α, ξ, η) = θ
∗
ρ(q, α, ξ, η)− zg(α, ξ).
We first need the following notation. We define the space of effective bid policies Θ ={
θ : (R+,N,N, [0, 1]) → [−z,∞)
∣∣∣ ‖θ‖w < ∞}. We also define Θ∗ : P → Θ such that
(Θ∗(ρ))(q, α, ξ, η) = θ∗ρ,z(q, α, ξ, η) , θ∗ρ(q, α, ξ, η) − zg(α, ξ). Also, define the mapping Π∗ :
P → Ω that takes the bid distribution to the invariant state distribution Πρ. Finally, we
define F as (F(ρ))(x) = γ(x) = Πρ(θ∗ρ,z[−z, x]). We will show that F maps P into P itself.
We will establish the existence of the MFE by verifying the conditions of the following
fixed point theorem.
Theorem 14. (Schauder Fixed Point Theorem). Suppose F(P) ⊂ P. If F(P) is contained
in a convex and compact subset of P, then F(.) has a fixed point.
In our model all the users employ first price auction and the function F depends on this
auction format. Instead of proving the compactness for this F , we will prove a much general
result which proves existence of MFE for any standard auction. But, first we will find the
relations between different auction formats. Then we will prove continuity and compactness
results. The key idea here is to look from the perspective of second price auction.
4.6.1 General Auction
Theorem 15. (Payoff Equivalence Theorem) Let h be the value distribution, and let A
denote a standard reverse auction and Nh,A denote Nash-equilibrium of auction A when the
value distribution is h. Then
1. Equilibrium bid distribution in A is ρA(x) = h
(N−1A,h(x)) and in Second prive auction
S is h.
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2. Reward, rρA,A(Nh,A(ν)) = rh,S(ν).
3. Probability of winning in equilibrium, Pr
(Nh,A(ν)|ρA) = Pr(ν|h).
Let LMS denote the market with second price reverse auction and LMA denote a market
with standard reverse auction.
Theorem 16. If (ρS, θS) denote Mean Field Equilibrium of LMS and let A be any stan-
dard auction with symmetric increasing Nash equilibrium NA,h when the value is distributed
according to h, then LMA has an MFE (ρA, θA), such that
1. ρA(x) = ρS
(N−1A,ρS(x))
2. θA(q, α, ξ, η) = NA,ρ
(
θS(q, α, ξ, η)
)
Lemma 16. The value function of second price auction under assumption ρS is equal
to the value function of auction A with the assumption ρA. That is VρS ,S(q, α, ξ, η)) =
VρA,A(q, α, ξ, η)).
Proof. We we show that for any policy X under S, there exists a policy XA, such that if
X(q, α, ξ, η) = b, XA(q, α, ξ, η) = NA,ρA(b) which will have same value function.
V XρS ,S(q0, α0, ξ0, η0) = EX
[∑
k
δk
(
rρS ,S(bk)− C(qk)
)]
(4.16)
V XAρA,A(q0, α0, ξ0, η0) = EXA
[∑
k
δk
(
rρA,A(b
′
k) + zg(αk, ξk)− C(qk)
)]
= EXA
[∑
k
δk
(
rρA,A(NA,ρS(bk)) + zg(αk, ξk)− C(qk)
)]
= EXA
[∑
k
δk
(
rρS ,S(bk) + zg(αk, ξk)− C(qk)
)]
= EX
[∑
k
δk
(
rρS ,S(bk) + zg(αk, ξk)− C(qk)
)]
= V XρS ,S(q0, α0, ξ0, η0)
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Since NA in strictly increasing, for any policy XA we can find a policy X for which the value
functions agree. Therefore the optimal value functions should also agree and the optimal
policy θA(q, α, ξ, η) = NA,ρS(θS(q, α, ξ, η)).
Lemma 17. The state distribution remains same ΠρA,A(q, α, ξ, η) = ΠρS ,S(q, α, ξ, η)
Proof. The transition kernel only depends on pρ(θ
∗(q, α, ξ, η and the following holds
pρs(θ
∗
s(q, α, ξ, η) = pρA(θ
∗
A(q, α, ξ, η), (4.17)
the steady state distribution will be same for any standard auction.
4.6.2 Continuity of the map F
Now we will show the continuity of the map of first price auction F . To prove this, first
we will prove the continuity of Θ∗ and Π∗ with ρ.
4.6.2.1 Continuity of Θ∗
Lemma 18. Θ∗ : P → Θ is a continuous function of ρ.
Proof. We have, Θ∗(ρ)(q, α, ξ, η) = θ∗ρ(q, α, ξ, η) and
θ∗ρ(q, α, ξ) = θ
∗
ρ,z(q, α, ξ) + zg(α, ξ) (4.18)
= arg max
x∈[−z,∞)
{
pρ
(
x)(x+ zg(α, ξ, η) + ∆qVρ(q, α, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αVρ(q, α, ξ, η))
)}
+ zg(α, ξ).
(4.19)
Let h(ρ, x) = pρ(x, α, ξ)
(
x − δ∆Vρ(q, α, ξ)
)
, and R(ρ) = [0,∞). We use Berge’s maximum
theorem [6] to establish the continuity of θρ. The details are given in Apendix B.3.1
4.6.2.2 Continuity of Π∗
Lemma 19. For any ρ ∈ P and any θ ∈ Θ, Πρ,θ() is absolutely continuous with respect to
the product measure of Lebesgue measure on R+, the counting measure on N+ and counting
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measure on N+.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.3.2
We develop a useful alternate characterization of Πρ. Define Γ
(k)
ρ (B,α, ξ, B′|q0, α0, ξ0, η0)
as the probability that the state at time slot k is in the set (B,α, ξ, B′) given that the initial
state is (q0, α0, ξ0, η0) and there is no regeneration until time k.
Γ(k)ρ (B,α, ξ, B
′|q0, α0, ξ0, η0) = P
(
(Qk, αk, ξk, ηk) ∈ (B,α, ξ, B′)|(q0, α0, ξ0, η0), no regen
)
Lemma 20. Πρ(B,α, ξ, B
′) =
∑
k≥0 δ
k(1− δ)EΨ
[
Γkρ ((B,α, ξ, B
′)|(State))
]
where,
EΨ
[
Γkρ ((B,α, ξ, B
′)|(State))
]
=
∫
Γkρ ((B,α, ξ, B
′)|(q0, α0, ξ0, η0)) dΨ(q0, α0, ξ0, η0).
Proof.
Πρ,θ(B,α, ξ, B
′) = lim
m→∞
Πmρ,θ(B,α, ξ, η)
= lim
m→∞
m∑
k=0
δm−k(1− δ)P (Qm−k ∈ B,αm−k = α, ξm−k = ξ, ηm−k ∈ B′)|regen at k)
= lim
m→∞
m∑
k=0
[
δm−k(1− δ)
∫
Γm−kρ,θ
(
(B,α, ξ, B′)|(q0, α0, ξ0, η0)
)
dΨ(q0, α0, ξ0, η0)
]
= lim
m→∞
m∑
k=0
δm−k(1− δ)EΨ
[
Γm−kρ,θ
(
B,α, ξ, B′|(State)
)]
=
∑
k≥0
δk(1− δ)EΨ
[
Γkρ,θ ((B,α, ξ, B
′)|(State))
]
where, EΨ
[
Γkρ,θ ((B,α, ξ, B
′)|(State))
]
=
∫
Γkρ,θ ((B,α, ξ, B
′)|(q0, α0, ξ0, η0)) dΨ(q0, α0, ξ0, η0)
Now we will use the previous characterization to derive the density of the distribution
Πρ.
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Lemma 21. The density of the Πρ exists and is given by,
Πρ(q, α, ξ, η)
=
∑
k≥1
δk(1− δ)
∑
a∈Lk
ψ(Gk((q, α, ξ), a), η)
[
Γk (ak = a|(Gk((q, α, ξ), a), η))
]
Jk((q, α, ξ), a)
(4.20)
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix B.3.3.
Lemma 22. The mapping Π∗ : P → Ω is continuous in ρ ∈ P.
Proof. We need to prove that as ρn converges to ρ in ω-norm, Πρn,θρn converges to Πρ,θρ
in distribution. We use the Portmanteau Theorem to prove this. The details are given in
Appendix B.3.4
Lemma 23. For any ρ, γ(x) = Πρ
(
θ∗−1ρ,z [−z, x]
) ∈ P.
Proof. P is the space of continuous and finite mean distriution functions. So, we need to
prove that γ(x) is continuous and has finite mean. The details are given in Appendix B.3.5
We are now ready to show the continuity of the mapping F, between ρ to γ.
Lemma 24. F : P → P is continuous with respect to ρ.
Proof. We have (F(ρ))(x) = Πρ(θ∗−1ρ,z [−z, x]), and Πρ and θ∗ρ are continuous in ρ. Let ρn → ρ
in uniform norm, then from 22 Πρn → Πρ, and from 18, θ∗ρn → θ∗ρ. From Theorem 5.5 of [8],
the push forward is also continuous, so, Πρn(θ
∗−1
ρn (.)) → Πρ(θ∗−1ρ (.)). Therefore Fρn(x) →
Fρ(x).
4.6.3 Continuity of FA
We have proved the continuity of the map in the first price auction format. Now we will
show that this implies map corresponding to any standard auction format is continuous.
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Lemma 25. If F is continuous then a second price reverse auction mapping FS is also
continuous.
Proof. If ρS,n → ρS, we need to prove that,
FS(ρS,n)→ FS(ρS) where, FS(ρS) = ΠρS ,S
(
θ−1ρS ,S([−z, x])
)
. (4.21)
Let ρn = ρS,n
(N−1(x)).
FS(ρS,n) = ΠρS,n,S
(
θ−1ρS,n,S([−z, x])
)
= Πρn
(
θ−1ρS,n,S([−z, x])
)
= Πρn
(
θ−1ρn (N ([−z, x]))
)
= F(ρn)(N (x))
)
→ F(ρ)(N (x))
)
= Πρ
(
θ−1ρ (N ([−z, x]))
)
= ΠρS ,S
(
θ−1ρS ,S([−z, x])
)
= FS(ρS)
There fore, FS is continuous.
Now we will show the compactness of the range space. It is easy to show this in second
price auction. So, we will prove the compactness for second price auction and established
the MFE existence in second price auction which establishes the existence of MFE in any
standard auction.
4.6.4 Compactness of Range Space FS
The final condition that we need to verify is the compactness of the range space of F .
To prove this first we will prove the equi-continuity of F(P).
Lemma 26. FS(P) is equi-continuous.
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Proof. Let γ ∈ F(P). To prove the set of γ(x) are equi-continuous we will show that
γ′+(x) = lim supy→x
γ(y)−γ(x)
y−x is bounded. The details are given in the Appendix B.3.6.
Since FS is equi-continuous by Arzela-Ascoli lemma FS is compact. By Schauder Fixed
point theorem there exists a fixed point γS in second price auction. From Lemma 27 ρA is
the MFE in the first price auction
Lemma 27. ρA(x) = ρS
(
N−1A,ρS(x)
)
is the MFE in the first price auction, that is FA(ρA) =
ΠρA,A
(
θ−1ρA,A([−z, x])
)
.
Proof.
γA,ρA(x) = FA(ρA) = ΠρA,A
(
θ−1ρA,A([−z, x])
)
= ΠρS ,S
(
θ−1ρA,A([−z, x])
)
= ΠρS ,S
(
θ−1ρS ,S
(N−1A,ρS([−z, x])))
= ρs
(N−1A,ρS([−z, x]))
= ρA(x)
4.7 Non-Uniform Prior
We assumed that the Bernoulli parameter of the quality distribution of agents is drawn
from the Uniform distribution, but this may not be true in all situations. If the prior
distribution from which the Bernoulli parameter is drawn is known to the users then the
optimal quality estimator will be a Bayesian estimator. In this section we will prove that any
such Bayesian estimator will satisfy certain properties and establish the existence of MFE
for any prior distribution.
We proved the existence of MFE for any g(α, ξ) function as along as g() is increasing
in alpha and decreasing in ξ. Now we prove that any Bayesian estimator will satisfy these
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properties. First we will find the expression for the Bayesian estimator given a prior distri-
bution.
Lemma 28. If the prior distribution of η is µ, then the Bayesian estimator is given by,
g(α, ξ, µ) =
∫
η
η Binom(α, ξ − α, η)dµ(η)∫
η
Binom(α, ξ − α, η)dµ(η) .
Proof. We observer (α, ξ) and know the distribution µ of η. Then we have
P((α, ξ)|η = η∗) = Binom(α, ξ − α, η∗)
=⇒ dP(η = η
∗|(α, ξ))
dη
=
dP(η=η∗,(α,ξ))
dη
P((α, ξ))
=
dµ(η∗)
dη
P((α, ξ)|η = η∗)∫
η
P((α, ξ)|η′ = η)dµ(η)
=
dµ(η∗)
dη
Binom(α, ξ − α, η∗)∫
η
Binom(α, ξ − α, η)dµ(η) .
Best estimator is the mean under the aposteriori distribution, therefore,
g(α, ξ, µ) =
∫
η
η Binom(α, ξ − α, η)dµ(η)∫
η
Binom(α, ξ − α, η)dµ(η) .
Lemma 29. The following properties holds true,
1. g(α + 1, α + 1 + β, µ)− g(α, α + β, µ) ≥ 0
2. g(α, α + β + 1, µ)− g(α, β + α, µ) ≤ 0
Proof. The details are given in the Appendix B.4.1.
Corollary 3. Bayesian estimator g() has the following properties,
1. g(α, ξ, µ) ≤ g(α + 1, ξ, µ)
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2. g(α, ξ, µ) ≥ g(α, ξ + 1, µ)
Proof. Let β = ξ − α and gˆ(α, β, µ) = g(α, α + β, µ) then using lemma 29,
g(α + 1, ξ, µ)− g(α, ξ, µ)
= g(α + 1, α + β, µ)− g(α, β + α, µ)
= g(α + 1, α + β, µ)− g(α + 1, α + β + 1, µ) + g(α + 1, α + β + 1, µ)− g(α, β + α, µ)
=
(
g(α + 1, α + β, µ)− g(α + 1, α + β + 1, µ)
)
+
(
g(α + 1, β + α + 1, µ)− g(α, α + β, µ)
)
≥ 0
The second part can be proved in a similar way.
4.8 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we present the insights gained from numerically evaluating the optimal
policy and the MFE in a numerical fashion. Our first objective is to obtain a sense of what
parameters would be accurate in real Internet marketplaces today.
4.8.1 Determining z from Data
As mentioned in the introduction, we gathered data from Swappa.com in order to deter-
mine the price premium that customers would potentially be willing to pay in order to receive
service from an agent with a higher reputation. We first divide the phones into classes such
that all devices in a class have the identical make, model and condition. Hence, the effective
sale price should be same for any particular class, with the markup only depending on the
reputation of the seller. To determine the effect of reputation, we minimize the square of the
difference of the effective bid between all members of a class. Hence, the trade off parameter
for a product κ is,
zκ = arg min
z
∑
i
∑
j
∣∣(mi − zri)− (mj − zrj)∣∣2,
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where i and j denote the indices of the data points corresponding to class κ. Since this
expression is quadratic we can find the minimizer by differentiating and finding the critical
point. Thus,
zκ =
∑
i
∑
j(mi −mj)(ri − rj)∑
i
∑
j(ri − rj)2
.
We use the lowest observed sale price of a class as the base price of that class, and denote
it as mκ. Since the phones have different base prices, we desire to normalize the zκ values
to obtain an estimate of the parameter for a canonical product with a base price of $100. In
order to do this, we simply set z¯κ = zκ × 100/mκ. We evaluated the value of z¯κ for different
classes of phones and the results are as shown in Table 1. The average of z¯κ appropriately
weighted by the number of sample points in each class is 9.5%. In other words, the markup
of a perfect reputation for a canonical product with a base price of 100 is of the order of
$9.50. We then assume that since every agent bears this base price of $100 to provide
Table 4.1: Value of z¯κ for different products.
Phone New Mint Good Fair
iphone6 ATT-16G 5.45 7.75 6.5 -
iphone6 VRZ-16G 10.9 6.0 6.5 1.58
iphone6 VRZ-64G 11.32 11.46 6.4 -
iphone6 Plus ATT-16G 16 7.67 4.7 -
iphone6 Plus ATT-64G 11.07 9.09 7.33 9.72
Samsung NT4 ATT-32G 18.03 13.57 12.21 -
Samsung S6 VRZ-32G 12.62 11.297 11.7 2.98
Samsung S6 VRZ-64G 7.36 11.98 2.23 -
Samsung S6 ATT-32G 12.94 8.13 10.27 5.64
Samsung S6 ATT-64G 19.24 10.57 15.98 -
Samsung NT4 VRZ-32G 6.71 13.0 15.63 10.32
service, we can equivalently set the service cost equal to zero, and only consider the markup
due to reputation.
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4.8.2 Large Particle Simulations
We next determine the MFE distribution. Since our state space is R × N × N, we
discretize the state space to a resolution of 0.01 for queue lengths, and truncate all at 20
units. Similarly, we also discretize the bid space. We assume that the amount of service at
any time step is uniformly distributed in [0, 0.25], and that there are M = 10 agents per
cluster. We set the parameter z = 10. Further, we choose the holding cost as C(q) = q2.
In our simulations, we consider 1, 000, 000 agents (sometimes called “particles” in the
literature) divided into 1000 clusters. At each time step, we calculate the empirical distribu-
tion of states (corresponds to Π,) and using value iteration over the Bellman equation (4.11),
we calculate the best response bid for each state. Each agent then places a bid based on its
state, the lowest effective bid wins and we update the states of all agents. We then calculate
the empirical state and bid distributions. We assume that the system has converged to the
MFE, when the maximum point-wise difference between the effective bid distributions from
one iteration to the next are less than 0.001. Essentially, we try to approximate uniform
convergence. We found that convergence occurred quickly within 6 iterations of state.
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Figure 4.3: Value Function variation with queue size and reputation.
The dependence of the optimal value function with queue length, reputation and true
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quality at MFE is plotted in Figure 4.3. We observe that the value function strictly decreases
with queue size and increases with reputation and quality as expected.
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Figure 4.4: Variation of type with queue size, reputation and quality.
The variation of the “type” ν(q, α, ξ, η) with its arguments is shown in Figure 4.4. Recall,
that the type maps the state of the agent to its likelihood of obtaining the job, with a larger
type yielding higher probability of winning. Figure 4.4 A shows that the type is decreasing
in queue length, with the decrease becoming more pronounced as reputation falls. Hence,
as desired, the agent is less likely to win as its residual work builds up. Figure 4.4 B shows
the variation of type for increasing reputation. As expected, the an enhanced reputation
results in a larger type. What is particularly intersting is the relationship between the true
quality of the agent (0.6 in this experiment) and the shape of the type as the reputation
grows. We see that curve has a point of inflexion and is concave on one side and convex on
the other. This is essentially the tradeoff between incentivizing exploration and exploiting
reputation. When reputation is below the true quality the marginal increase in type for
increasing reputation is less that when the reputation is higher than the true quality. In
other words, an agent with an abnormally large reputation for his given quality has a very
high probability of winning. Figure 4.4 C shows that the type is increasing with quality as
expected.
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In Figure 4.5 A and B, we show the dependence of optimal effective bid and the corre-
sponding real bid with queue size. The bids are increasing as the queue length increases,
which is consistent with the observation made in Figure 4.4 A that the type decreases with
queue length. Essentially, the agent bids high so as to avoid winning the job (or if he wins,
the payoff is greater than the holding cost imposed). Figure 4.5 C and D illustrate the same
effect of reputation versus true quality observed in Figure 4.4 B. We notice that the effective
bid has a point of inflection, and the effective bid drops faster when the reputation is larger
than the true quality, meaning that the agent is more likely to win.
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Figure 4.5: Optimal effective bid variation with queue size and reputation.
We next study the temporal evolution of average reputation and bids of agents that have
a particular quality. In Figure 4.5 E and F we group all agents that have a quality of 0.8
and plot their average reputation with time and compare it with the average over all the
agents that have a quality of 0.4. One would expect that the reputation should gradually
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converge to the true quality as time proceeds and this is indeed observed. More interesting
is the evolution of average bids of these agents shown in the Figure 4.6. We see that the high
quality agents (η = 0.8) bid low initially to enhance their reputation, and then gradually
raise their bids as the reputation increases. However, the low quality agents try to exploit
their initial reputation as much as possible by bidding high, and then their bids fall and
flatten out quickly as their quality becomes apparent in the reputation.
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Figure 4.6: ηc chosen at different states.
4.8.3 Strategic ηc
To observe the effects of strategic aspects of quality we simulated the system with 0
queue cost. First we plotted the distribution of ηc chosen by the agents. Figure 4.7 shows
the distribution of ηc both is strategic case and non strategic case. We can see that in non
strategic case since the quality parameter is drawn from uniform distribution the ηc distri-
bution is uniform. But in case of strategic case there is more weight at higher reputations.
So the agents are performing the jobs at higher qualities to get better reputation scores.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we considered the problem of determining the optimal price (bid) selection
policy in a competitive marketplace that has many service providers that are relatively
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Figure 4.7: ηc distribution with time.
short lived. We setup a model in which jobs come at a steady rate into the marketplace
and use both reputation and price jointly as a means of selecting a service provider. We
showed that our marketplace can be thought of a version of a first price reverse auction, and
characterized the best response bidding policy under the mean field assumption. We also
showed that the assumption is valid by proving the existence of a MFE. We gathered data
to find an accurate parameter to represent the tradeoff between reputation and offered price,
and then numerically studied the system to understand the interplay between the different
state variables of an agent.
Our findings suggested that a service provider that has a high inherent quality should
try to establish is reputation by bidding low initially and securing many jobs, and then
exploit that reputation by bidding high later on. However, a service provider with a low
quality would seek to exploit what reputation he has by bidding high, since the value of each
customer secured is in the payment it obtains, and not in any enhancement of reputation
(indeed, the reputation would likely decrease until it hits the true quality).
In this chapter, our goal was to understand how competing sellers or service providers
set prices their goods while accounting for their reputation, and established the existence of
Mean Field equilibrium. The market that we considered were conventional in the sense that
providers and consumers were well differentiated. However, with the rise of the sharing econ-
omy, markets are moving in the direction of producers and consumers frequently switching
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roles. A sharing system of the kind is a P2P network in which the resource being traded is
link capacity. In the next chapter, we will study how to allocate resources efficiently in such
P2P file sharing networks.
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5. PROVABLE STABLE POLICIES IN P2P FILE SHARING
5.1 Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing networks such as BitTorrent [13] have been studied in-
tensely in recent years, using analytical models, simulation studies, and large scale field
experiments. This interest partly stems from the dominance of P2P as a source of Inter-
net traffic in past years. Even today, although the traffic fraction has reduced to around
3-4% in North America, P2P sharing still occupies a significant fraction of about 30% of
traffic in the Asia-Pacific region [50]. Interest also stems from a desire to understand the
thought-provoking phenomenon of apparent scaling up of the throughput of a P2P network
as the number of peers grows, which enables them to effectively distribute content with low
file-download times during high demand situations called flash-crowds.
In a P2P network, a file is divided into fixed-size chunks, and a peer possessing a set of
chunks can upload those chunks to other peers that need them. Once a peer has downloaded
all chunks, it could continue to serve other peers or leave the system. A so-called seed server
that possesses all chunks and never leaves is often used to ensure that no particular chunk
ever goes missing. It is the feature of integrating the upload capacity of each peer into the
system that is supposed to enable system-wide throughput scaling up with the number of
peers. However, since peers can only share chunks that they possess, it is crucial to ensure
the wide availability of all chunks to enable maximum usage of available upload capacity
with each peer.
The problem of ensuring that all chunks are easily obtainable—ideally by engendering
equal numbers of copies of each chunk over the network—was considered by the original
designers of P2P networks. For example, BitTorrent, which is the most popular P2P network
protocol, uses an algorithm called rarest-first (RF) to try to achieve this goal [13]. Here, the
idea is to keep a running estimate of the frequency of all chunks in the system. When a peer
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has a chance to download a chunk, it chooses the least frequent (i.e., the “rarest”) among
all the chunks that it needs. In practice, peers keep track of the frequency of chunks in local
subsets. Intuition suggests that such “boosting” of rare chunks might ensure a near-uniform
empirical distribution of chunks.
Recent work has postulated that under some conditions, the rarest-first policy used by
BitTorrent actually does not achieve its goal, and can actually be harmful to system perfor-
mance. In particular, [23] studied a chunk-level model of P2P sharing under which new peers
that do not possess any chunks arrive into the system at some rate, contacts between peers
happen at random, and at each contact a chunk is transferred to a requesting peer under
a given policy. Peers depart immediately after completing the file download. The objective
was to determine if the system is stable under a given policy, i.e., at any time is the number
of peers that have not yet received the whole file finite or is it exploding to infinity? The
result was that under several policies including rarest-first and random chunk selection, a
particular chunk can become very rare across the network—a phenomenon referred to as the
missing chunk syndrome. This causes the creation of a large set of peers that are missing
only that one chunk, referred to as the one club. In turn, the seed server must serve the
missing chunk to almost all peers (which then depart), which means that the system is un-
stable unless the upload capacity of the seed server is of the order of the arrival rate of peers
into the system. Thus, the phenomenon largely negates the value of the P2P system.
More recently, experimental studies have revealed that the missing piece syndrome is
an observable phenomenon occurring in BitTorrent networks [36]. The results show that
when the seed server has low or intermittent upload capacity, the throughput of the system
saturates as the number of peers grows. In turn, this causes lengthened stay of peers in
the system between arrival and completion, where an increasingly large number of peers are
waiting to obtain the final chunk before leaving. In other words, designing policies that can
ensure stability of a P2P network under a fixed seed server capacity for all peer arrival rates
is practically relevant.
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5.1.1 Related Work on Stable Algorithms
There has been extensive work on P2P networks, and we refer here only to those directly
relating to the scaling properties of a single swarm. A large system assumption was made
in [47, 57, 51], and the evolution of peers and seeds is described using a system of differential
equations. While [47, 57] study the stationary regime and indicate the stability of BitTorrent-
like systems for all arrival rates, [51] considers the transient regime and studies how much
seed server capacity is needed to attain a target sojourn time (the time between the arrival
of a peer and its completing the file download). Results on stability and scaling here require
that at least a fixed fraction of the peers’ upload capacity can always be utilized—an implicit
assumption of chunk availability. As shown in [23], this assumption need not hold for all
chunk selection policies, and a chunk-level model is needed for accurate analysis.
Chunk-level models have considered the missing chunk problem from two angles. The
first method is to explicitly insist that peers that have completed the download should
stay in the system as servers for some period of time. For example, [17] presents results
on fairness vs. system performance based on how long peers stay after completion. In a
more recent work [58], it was analytically shown that the system is stable as long as peers
stay long enough to serve of the order of one additional chunk after completion. Indeed,
in the original BitTorrent implementation this often happened naturally, since most users
manually stopped participation at some point after download was completed. However,
current implementations allow for the peer to depart immediately after completion, which
can lead to the instability observed in [36].
The second method is to assume that peers would leave immediately after completion,
and to design the chunk sharing policy such that the missing chunk syndrome is avoided.
Some algorithms of this nature are “boosting” policies that can be thought of as modified
versions of rarest-first. For example, the rare chunk (RC) algorithm studied in [48, 41, 45]
picks three peers at random and chooses a chunk that is available with exactly one of the
selected peers (called a “rare” chunk). Also studied in [45] is a variant of this algorithm
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called the common chunk (CC) algorithm, which proceeds as in the RC algorithm when the
peer has no chunks, then follows a policy of sampling a single peer with random selection
among its required chunks until it only needs one more chunk, and then proceeds by sampling
three peers and only downloading a chunk if every chunk with it appears at least twice with
the sampled peers. However, although stable, these algorithms appear to have long sojourn
times in some settings [7].
More recent work on chunk sharing policies [7] describes an algorithm called group sup-
pression (GS), which is based on observations made in [23]. The policy is based on computing
the empirical distribution of the states in the system, where a state of a peer is the set of
chunks available with that peer. Peers that belong to the state with highest frequency are
not allowed to upload chunks to peers that have fewer chunks than themselves, thus sup-
pressing entry into the highest frequency group. Although this policy appears to have low
sojourn times in simulations, it is somewhat complex since it requires the knowledge of the
entire empirical state distribution. Furthermore, the authors are only able to prove stability
in a P2P network with exactly 2 chunks, while the stability of the general case is left as a
conjecture.
A different model is presented in [35], wherein peers arrive into the system already pos-
sessing one randomly selected chunk. This system is stable for many policies (including
random chunk selection), but is constrained by the fact that the initial chunk has to be
provided by the seed server. Thus, in this case too the seed’s capacity must scale with the
arrival rate of peers, and the system might be unstable otherwise.
5.1.2 Main Results
The nominal objective of the rarest-first policy is to ensure a uniform chunk distribution
across the network, which it actually does not achieve in all cases, causing instability as
shown in [23]. Our intuition is that rather than following a policy of boosting low-frequency
chunks as rarest-first does, simply preventing the most frequent chunk(s) from being shared
would allow less frequent chunks to catch up, and drive the empirical distribution of chunks
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towards the desired uniform distribution. Implicitly, this would also remove a small fraction
of the upload capacity, keeping peers in the system a little longer, and hence enabling them
to share more copies of rare chunks.
Following this intuition, we propose a policy that we refer to as mode suppression (MS),
which is based on terminology used in statistics in which the mode is the most frequent
value(s) in a data set. Thus, we keep track of the frequency of chunks in the system, and
when a peer contacts another peer, it is allowed to download any chunk except the one(s)
belonging to the mode. Any chunk may be downloaded if all chunks are equally frequent
(i.e., if all chunks belong to the mode). The policy is simple to implement, and since all that
is needed is the frequency of chunks; which is already a part of BitTorrent, the information
needed for decision making is low.
We consider a continuous time model in the manner of [23, 45, 7] in which peers that
have no chunks, enter the system according to a Poisson process with a certain arrival rate.
There is a seed server that has an independent Poisson clock of a fixed rate, and at each
clock tick, it contacts a single peer and uploads a chunk to it following a given policy. Each
peer also has an independent Poisson clock of a fixed rate, and at each clock tick, the peer
contacts a randomly selected peer and uploads a packet to it following the same policy. Our
main analytical result is that under this model, mode suppression is stable under all peer
arrival rates in a system in which the file is divided into any number of chunks.
The result follows from stability analysis using an intuitive Lyapunov function. Although
the proof is somewhat involved, we show that mode suppression indeed is able to ensure that
the drift is negative in all relevant cases, yielding stability.
We observe through simulations that mode suppression actually does come very close to
attaining a uniform distribution of chunks in the system. In particular, we start the system
in a corner case where one of the chunks is available only at the seed server, and observe the
evolution of the system afterwards. We also compare with random chunk selection, rarest-
first, and group suppression. A comparison of results on these algorithms is presented in
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Table 5.1, where m is the number of chunks that the file is divided into. Furthermore, in
simulations to compare sojourn time, we found that GS and MS have similar performance,
but neither is better than the other in all cases.
Table 5.1: Comparison of global chunk distribution based policies.
Algorithm m = 2 m > 2 Information
Random Unstable Unstable None
Rarest-First Unstable Unstable Chunk Frequency
Group Suppression Stable Unknown Complete Distribution
Mode Suppression Stable Stable Chunk Frequency
Since all the above algorithms require some kind of global chunk frequency or chunk
set frequency for decision making, we then design a version of mode suppression that only
depends on localized information. Under this algorithm, which we refer to as distributed
mode suppression (DMS), a peer contacts three other peers at random, and among the
chunks available with more than one peer, we define the local mode to be the chunk(s)
with greatest frequency. The peer is allowed to download any chunk that is not part of the
local mode. Any chunk may be downloaded if all chunks are equally frequent. We compare
the sojourn time of this algorithm numerically with the other localized decision making
algorithms discussed in Section 5.1.1. All the distributed algorithms do about as well or
significantly better than the global-chunk-frequency-based algorithms, with DMS having the
lowest sojourn time of all algorithms in all cases.
5.2 System Model
We consider a P2P file sharing system for a single file divided into m chunks. This file
sharing system has a unique seed that has all m chunks, and the seed stays in the system
indefinitely. Peers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ. Each incoming peer
arrives without any chunks and stays in the system till it obtains all m chunks of the file.
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In this model, a peer leaves as soon as it has all m chunks of the file. The peers can receive
the chunks in two ways, either directly from the seed or from other peers.
Whenever the seed or a peer contact another peer, it is deemed as a contact. Therefore,
each peer and the seed have individual contact processes corresponding to the sequence of
contact instants. Upon contact the seed or the peer transfer a missing chunk to the contacted
peer, according to a chunk selection policy. When chunk selection policy depends solely on
the current state of the system, it is called a Markov chunk selection policy.
5.2.1 Contact Processes
The time interval between two contacts are assumed to be random, independent, and
identically exponentially distributed, i.e. all contact processes are assumed to be independent
and Poisson. The Poisson contact rate for the seed is assumed to be U , and each peer is
assumed to have a common contact rate of µ.
5.2.2 State space
At any time t, the number of peers in the system with a proper subset of chunks S ⊂ [m]
is denoted by XS(t) ∈ N0 , {0, 1, . . . }. The system at time t can be represented by the state
X(t) = (XS(t) : S ⊂ [m]).
The total number of peers at any time t is denoted by
|X(t)| =
∑
S⊂[m]
XS(t).
For any Markov chunk selection policy, the continuous time process {X(t), t > 0} is Markov
with countable state space X , NP([m])\[m]0 . The stability region is defined as the set of arrival
rates λ, for which the continuous time Markov chain X(t) is positive recurrent.
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5.2.3 State transitions
The generator matrix for the process X(t) is denoted by Q. For this continuous time
Markov chain, there can only be a single transition in an infinitesimal time. We denote
the system state as x ∈ X just before any transition, and let eS be the unit vector in the
dimension corresponding to a proper subset S ⊂ [m].
There are three types of possible transitions. First type of state transition is the arrival
of a new peer, that leads to an increase in the number of peers with no chunks. The
corresponding transition rate is denoted by
Q(x, x+ e∅) = λ.
Second and third type of transitions occur, when a peer with S ⊂ [m] chunks receives a
chunk j /∈ S from the contacting seed/peer. In both these cases, the next state is denoted
by TS,j(x). Second type of state transition occurs when the reception of new chunks doesn’t
lead to a departure. This transition is denoted by
TS,j(x) , x− eS + eS∪{j}, xS > 0, |S| < m− 1.
Third type of state transition occurs for a peer with m−1 chunks, which departs the system
after getting the last chunk upon contact. This transition is denoted by
TS,j(x) , x− eS, xS > 0, |S| = m− 1.
At a system state x, if the contacting source has T chunks and the contacted receiving
peer has S chunks, then the set of available chunks that can be transferred is T \S. Selection
of which chunk to transfer is called the chunk selection policy, that governs the evolution
of the process X(t). In particular, the last two transition rates Q(x, TS,j(x)) can only be
computed for a specific Markov chunk selection policy. We describe the proposed chunk
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selection policy and the corresponding transition rates in the following section.
5.3 Mode Suppression policy
In this section, we describe the mode suppression policy and provide its rate transition
matrix. First, let us establish some notation. The set of allowable transfers from a peer
with set of chunks T to a peer with set of chunks S, is denoted by A(x, T, S) ⊆ T \ S, and
the cardinality of this set is denoted by h(x, T, S), that takes integral values between 0 and
m. Recall that the seed has all the chunks, and hence the set of allowable chunk transfers
by the seed is A(x, [m], S). Below, we describe the specifics of selecting the set of allowable
transfers.
If there are no peers in the system, there is no need for chunk transfer. Hence without
any loss of generality, we consider the mode suppression policy when there exist peers in
the system, or |x| > 0. Here, we assume that each peer has the knowledge of all chunk
frequencies in the system. Frequency of the jth chunk is
pij(x) ,
∑
j∈S xS
|x| .
The chunks that attain the highest frequency arg max{pij(x) : j ∈ [m]} are called the modes
of the chunk frequencies. The set of modes is defined as
I(x) , {i ∈ [m] : pii(x) ≥ pij(x),∀j 6= i}.
The mode suppression policy restricts transmission of chunks that belong to the set of
modes. Specifically, when the index set I(x) is a strict subset of all chunks, the contacting
source excludes the most popular chunk(s) (i.e., the modes) from the set of allowable trans-
fers. Otherwise, when all chunks are equally popular, the source allows all possible transfers.
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Mathematically, one can write the allowable transfer set for mode suppression policy as
A(x, T, S) =

T \ (S ∪ I(x)), I(x) ⊂ [m],
T \ S, I(x) = [m].
From the superposition of independent Poisson contact processes, the rate at which either
the seed or one of the peers with chunk j contact any peer is also Poisson with the aggregate
rate
Rj(x) , U + µ
∑
T :j∈T
xT = U + µ|x|pij(x).
The probability of the source contact process contacting a peer with chunk subset S is xS|x| .
If the contacting source has T chunks, then it can transfer one out of h(x, T, S) available
chunks to the contacted peer with S chunks. The transition of type TS,j occurs when either
the seed or one of the peers with chunk j /∈ S contact a peer with chunks S, and transfer
chunk j among all the possible choices. From the thinning and superposition of independent
Poisson processes, we can write for j /∈ S and xS > 0
Q(x, TS,j(x)) = xS|x|
(
U
h(x, [m], S)
+ µ
∑
T :j∈T
xT
h(x, T, S)
)
.
5.3.1 Stability Region of Mode Suppression Policy
In this section we characterize the stability region of mode suppression policy.
Theorem 17. The stability region of the mode suppression policy is λ ≥ 0 for file-sharing
systems with at least two chunks, and positive contact rates U, µ.
Proof. To prove the positive recurrence of the continuous time Markov chain X(t), we employ
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Foster-Lyapunov criteria [37]. We consider the following Lyapunov function,
V (x) =
m∑
i=1
(
(pi − pii)|x|
)2
+ C1
(
(1− pi))|x|+ C2(M − m∑
i=1
pii|x|
)+
, (5.1)
where, C1, C2 and M are positive constants that depend on m,λ, U, µ, and pi = maxi pii.
Note that the explicit dependency of pi(x) on x is not shown for simplicity.
The intuition behind this Lyapunov function is as follows. Since the nominal objective is
to attain a uniform distribution, we should expect that the policy should promote negative
Lyapunov drift whenever the current state differs from uniformity. Hence, our Lyapunov
function is designed to penalize for the cases where chunks have differing frequency, where
some might have zero frequency, and where all have zero frequency.
The expected rate of change of potential function for a Markov process X(t) from state
x is called the mean drift from this state, and is given by
∑
y
Q(x, y)(V (y)− V (x)) = QV (x).
Mean drift from a state x for the Markov process X(t) in terms of its generator matrix Q
can be written as
QV (x) = Q(x, x+ ∅)(V (x+ ∅)− V (x)) +
∑
j∈[m]
Q(x, TS,j(x))(V (TS,j(x))− V (x)).
First, we compute the mean drift corresponding to a new peer arrival. The arrival of a new
peer does not change the number of peers with chunk j ∈ [m]. However, it does lead to a
unit increase in the number of peers in the system. That is,
Q(x, x+ e∅)(V (x+ e∅)− V (x)) = λC1.
The rest of the proof proceeds as follows. We divide the states into two cases when the
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chunk frequency is (i) non-uniform and (ii) uniform, and in each case we show that the drift
is negative.
Case 1: I(x) ( [m]: In this case, no popular content is allowed to be transferred. Hence,
any transition of type TS,j(x) occurs only for j /∈ I(x). When S ∪ {j} ( [m], this transition
leads to unit increase in the number of peers with chunk j, and no change in the number of
peers with other chunks. The corresponding change in potential function for S ∪ {j} ( [m]
and M ∈ Z+ equals
V (TS,j(x))− V (x) = 1− 2(pi − pij)|x| − C21{M>∑i pii|x|}.
Since the number of popular chunks has to be at least unity, this difference is strictly negative
for all non-zero states x. For this transition, we can trivially bound the cardinality of the
allowable transfers by supT h(x, T, S) ≤ |Sc|. This provides a lower bound on the transition
rate
Q(x, TS,j(x)) ≥ xS|Sc||x|Rj.
When S = {j}c, it is clear that the set of allowable transfer is {j} for the contacting sources.
Hence, h(x, T, S) = |Sc| = 1 and the transition rate is
Q(x, TS,j(x)) = xS|x|Rj.
Further, the transition TS,j(x) leads to a departure from the system of peer with S = {j}c
chunks. That is, this transition leads to a unit decrease in number of peers with chunks
other than j. The change in potential function V (TS,j(x)) − V (x) for the transition from
state x to state TS,j(x), for S ∪ {j} = [m] and M ∈ Z+, is upper bounded by
1− 2(pi − pij)|x|+ C2(m− 1)1{M+m−1>∑i pii|x|}.
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The fraction of users that have all the pieces except jth piece is denoted by γj(x) , x{j}c|x| , and
the aggregate number of chunks in the system at all peers is denoted by r ,
∑
S⊆[m] |S|xS =∑
i∈[m] pii|x|. Aggregating all the above results and notations, and observing that |Sc| ≤ m,
we can find an upper bound on the mean drift from state x as
C1λ−
∑
j /∈I(x)
Rj
m
[
(2(pi − pij)|x| − 1)(1− pij)
+ C2(1− pij − γj)1{M>r} − γjC2m(m− 1)1{M+m−1>r}
]
.
(5.2)
We will divide the state space in to three regions and show that in each region the drift is
negative. The details are given in the Appendix C. Now, we consider the uniform chunk
frequency case.
Case 2: I(x) = [m]: In this case, the chunk frequencies are identical, that is pi = pii for
each chunk i ∈ [m], and any chunk j can be transferred. This also implies that the contact
rate Rj = U +µpij|x| is uniform for all chunks j, and can be denoted by R = U +µpi|x|. For
S ( {j}c, a transition of type TS,j(x) doesn’t lead to any departure from the system. The
number of peers with chunk j has a unit increase by one, and chunk j becomes the popular
chunk. There is no change in the number of peers for other chunks. Hence the potential
change, due to this transition, is
V (TS,j(x))− V (x) = m− 1− C1 − C21{M>r}.
For S = {j}c, a transition of type TS,j(x) leads to the departure of the receiving peer from
the system. In this case, the number of peers with chunk j remains same, the number of
peers having other chunks has a unit decrease. The potential change due to this transition,
is
V (TS,j(x))− V (x) ≤ m− 1− C1 − C2(m− 1)1{M+m−1>r}.
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Using the same techniques as in Case 1, we can upper bound the drift of state x by,
C1λ−R
[
(C1 −m+ 1)(1− pi) + C2(1− pi − γj)1{M>r}
− γjC2m(m− 1)1{M+m−1>r}
]
.
(5.3)
Similar to Case 1, we will divide the state space in to three regions and show that in each
region the drift is negative. The details are given in the Appendix C.
5.4 Threshold Mode Suppression
In the previous section we proposed a new chunk selection policy called Mode Suppression
and proved that the stability region is λ > 0. In this section we generalize the Mode
Suppression and propose a new policy called Thresholded Mode Suppression and discuss its
stability.
In Mode suppression the chunks in the mode are suppressed even if their frequency count
(number of peers that have this chunk) is marginally higher than the others. Consider the
situation in which the frequency count of all the chunks is same except for one chunk which
has a count one less than the others. In this case no other chunk will be allowed to be
transferred except for the one chunk. So, this results in frequent suppression and hence
higher sojourn times.
To address this problem we can relax the constraint for suppression. We will define a
threshold parameter denoted by T ∈ N and suppress the chunks in the mode only if the
frequency count of the mode is more than the least frequency item by at least T units.
Recall that pij(x) =
∑
S:j∈S
xS
|x| , pi(x) = maxj pij(x), pi(x) = minj pij(x) and M(x) is the
set of mode indices,M(x) = {k|pik(x) = p¯i(x)}. In Threshold Mode Suppression (TMS)
the set of suppressed chunks DT in state x for some threshold T ∈ N is defined as,
DT (x) =
{
k|pik(x) ∈M(x) and pi(x)|x| ≥ pi(x)|x|+ T
}
. (5.4)
When T = 1, the Threshold Mode Suppression will become vanilla Mode Suppression and
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when T =∞, this will be equivalent to Random Chunk selection policy as there will not be
any suppression.
5.4.1 Rate Transition Matrix (Q) of TMS
The set of chunks a peer B can transfer to S is denoted by A(x,B, S) and the cardinality
is denoted by h(x,B, S) = |A(x,B, S)|. In TMS as we suppress the chunks in the set DT ,
the set of allowed packets A(x,B, S) is given by,
A(x,B, S) = B\(S ∪DT ). (5.5)
Now we will compute the components of the rate matrix. When an arrival happens the state
of the system changes from x to x+ eφ. As the arrival process is a poisson process with rate
λ,
Q(x, x+ eφ) = λ (5.6)
Let us denote the state a peers goes to from S if it receives a chunk j /∈ S by TS,j. In our
model as the peer leaves the system as soon as it receives all the chunks, TS,j is equal to,
TS,j(x) =

x− eS + eS∪{j} if S ∪ {j} ⊂ [m]
x− eS if S ∪ {j} = [m]
(5.7)
The transition rate from S to T (S, j), ∀S : j /∈ S in TMS is given by,
Q(x, TS,j(x)) =

xS
|x|
(
U
h(x, [m], S)
+ µ
∑
B:j∈B
xS
h(x,B, S)
)
if j /∈ DT (x)
0 if j ∈ DT (x).
(5.8)
All other entries in the rate transition matrix other than the diagonal entries are 0 and the
diagonal entries are equal to the negative sum of all the entries in that row.
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5.4.2 Stability of TMS
First we prove some auxiliary results before proving the main result.
Lemma 30. In TMS, pi can at most be m−1
m
.
Proof.
∑
i
pii|x| ≤ (m− 1)|x| (5.9)
=⇒ mpi|x| ≤ (m− 1)|x| (5.10)
=⇒ pi ≤ (1− 1
m
) (5.11)
=⇒ (1− pi) ≥ 1
m
(5.12)
Lemma 31. In TMS, during not-suppression case, 1− pi ≥ 1
2m
when |x| ≥ 2mT .
Proof. In TMS we have,
pi|x| ≤ pi|x|+ T (5.13)
=⇒ pi ≤ pi + T|x| (5.14)
=⇒ pi ≤ m− 1
m
+
T
|x| (5.15)
(5.16)
When |x| > 2mT , pi ≤ 1− 1
m
+ 1
2m
=⇒ 1− pi ≥ 1
2m
Theorem 18. The stability region of Threshold Mode Suppression (TMS) is λ > 0 for any
finite threshold T <∞, if m ≥ 2, µ > 0 and U > 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of stability of Mode Suppression and the same
Lyapunov function with a different constant C1 works in this case. We will mainly highlight
106
the differences here. The Lyapunov function is,
V (x) =
m∑
i=1
(
(pi − pii)|x|
)2
+ C1
(
(1− pi))|x|+ C2(M −∑
i
pii|x|
)+
(5.17)
We will divide the state space into two regions - suppressing region and not-suppressing
region. Suppressing region is when DT (x) is not null set and not-suppressing region is when
DT (x) is null set. First we will start with suppressing region and show that the drift is
negative except in a finite set.
Region 1: Suppressing Region: DT (x) 6= φ
We further divide this region into three regions,
R11:
{
x|DT (x) 6= φ
} ∩ {x|pi(x) ≥ δ}:
QV (x) ≤ C1λ+
∑
j /∈DT (x)
1
m
(1− pij)(U + µpij|x|)(−2|x|(pi − pij) + 1)
≤ C1λ− pi|x|
(2U
m2
∧ µ
)
+ 1 if |x| > M +m− 1
≤ C1λ− pi|x|g(µ, U) + 1 if |x| > M +m− 1 (5.18)
≤ − for a large x where, g(µ, U) = min
{2U
m2
, µ
}
. (5.19)
R12:
{
x|DT (x) 6= φ
} ∩ {x|pi(x) < δ, pi(x)|x| ≥ M
m
}:
QV (x) ≤ C1λ+
∑
j /∈DT (x)
1
m
(1− pij)(U + µpij|x|)(−2|x|(pi − pij) + δC2m2(m− 1))
≤ C1λ− pi|x|
(2U
m2
∧ µ(2− δC2m2(m− 1))
)
+K ′
≤ C1λ− pi|x|
(2U
m2
∧ µ
)
+K ′
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≤ C1λ− pi|x|g(µ, U) +K ′ (5.20)
≤ − for a large x. (5.21)
R13:
{
x|DT (x) 6= φ
} ∩ {x|pi(x) < δ, pi(x)|x| < M
m
}:
QV (x) ≤ C1λ+
∑
j /∈DT (x)
1
m
(1− pij)(U + µpij|x|)
(− 2|x|(pi − pij) + 1)
− C2U
m
( 1
m
− δ(m(m− 1) + 1)
)
≤ C1λ− pi|x|g(µ, U) + 1− C2U
m
( 1
m
− δ(m(m− 1) + 1)
)
(5.22)
≤ − for C2 sufficiently large. (5.23)
Region 2: Not-Suppressing Case: DTMS = φ
In this case we have,
(
pi(x)− pi(x)
)
|x| < T .
R21:
{
x|DT (x) 6= φ
} ∩ {x|pi(x) ≥ δ}:
QV (x) ≤ C1λ−
(
U + µpi|x|
)[(1− pi)
m
(
C1 − (2T + 1)(m− 1)
)]
≤ C1λ− µpi|x|
[
(1− pi)
m
(
C1 − (2T + 1)(m− 1)
)]
≤ C1λ− µ
2m2
(
C1 − (2T + 1)(m− 1)
)
pi|x| (5.24)
≤ − for a large x. (5.25)
R22:
{
x|DT (x) 6= φ
} ∩ {x|pi(x) < δ, pi(x)|x| ≥ M
m
}:
QV (x) ≤ C1λ− pi|x|µ
2m2
(
C1 − (2T + 1)(m− 1)− δC2m2(m− 1)
)
(5.26)
≤ − for a large x. (5.27)
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R23:
{
x|DT (x) 6= φ
} ∩ {x|pi(x) < δ, pi(x)|x| < M
m
}:
QV (x) ≤ C1λ− pi|x|µ
2m2
(
C1 − (2T + 1)(m− 1)
)
− C2U
m
( 1
2m
− δ(m(m− 1) + 1)
)
(5.28)
≤ − for C2 large enough. (5.29)
Though the TMS policy is stable for any finite threshold T for any λ > 0, the sojourn
time of TMS depends on the threshold(T) we choose. We found empirically that choosing
the threshold twice the number of chunks, that is T = 2m gives the best sojourn times.
More details are given in the simulations section.
5.5 Simulation Results
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Figure 5.1: Number of peers in the system when m = 5, U = 1 and µ = 1. Random becomes
unstable in some cases, whereas MS and DMS are always stable.
In this section, we show the results from numerical simulations that illustrate the perfor-
mance of different chunk selection policies. Recall that our candidate policies are (i) random
chunk selection, (ii) rarest-first, (iii) rare chunk, (iv) common chunk, (v) group suppression,
(vi) mode suppression, and (vii) distributed mode suppression. A description of these poli-
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cies can be found in Section 5.1. For all the simulations, we kept the peer contact rate and
seed contact rate to 1. To simulate a Poisson process, we make use of the fact that inter ar-
rival times of a Poisson process follow an exponential distribution. Each peer in the system,
including the seed, generates an exponential random variable with mean 1
µ
= 1
U
= 1, and
the peer or the seed with the smallest value gets a chance to contact another peer. After the
contact, a chunk transfer takes place instantaneously according to the chosen chunk selection
policy.
5.5.1 Stability of Mode Suppression Policy
We begin the simulation with 500 empty peers. Whenever a peer receives all the chunks,
it immediately leaves the system. In Figure 5.1, we plot the number of peers in the system
as time progresses for three different polices, namely (i) random chunk selection, (ii) mode
suppression, and (iii) distributed mode suppression. The purpose of simulating the random
chunk selection policy, which is known to be unstable, is to provide a visual representation
of what an unstable regime appears like, in order to compare with stable policies. In this
simulation, the number of chunks is taken as 5, and the peer arrival rate (λ) is varied. We
observe that when the peer arrival rate is less than seed rate (λ = 0.5 < 1 = U), the random
chunk selection policy is stable and in all other cases λ > U , the number of peers grows large
and the system is unstable. However, in case of mode suppression and distributed mode
suppression, the system is stable for all arrival rates.
5.5.2 Missing Piece Syndrome in Random Chunk Selection
We observed in Figure 5.1 that the random chunk selection policy is not stable when
λ > U . We determine the reason for this instability by observing the evolution of the chunk
frequency. In Figure 5.2, we plot the time evolution of the number of peers and the fraction
of peers having different chunks in the system, for the random chunk selection policy with
m = 5 and λ = 4. We see that when number of peers becomes large, one chunk remains
rare. As time progresses, the chunk represented by the red/starred line becomes rare and
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remains rare forever. However, all other chunks are available with most of the peers. This
is precisely the formation of the one-club caused by the missing piece syndrome.
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Figure 5.2: Evolution of peers and chunk frequencies under the random chunk selection
policy. One of the chunks becomes a “missing chunk” (red/starred line).
5.5.3 Chunk Frequency Evolution
A stable chunk selection policy has to be robust to the one-club state. In other words,
a stable policy should be able to boost the frequency of a rare chunk. To see how different
policies handle the one-club situation, we start the system with 500 peers that have all
the chunks except first chunk (i.e., all peers are part of the one-club). In Figure 5.3, we
plot the evolution of the chunk frequency for different policies under this initial condition.
We see that when using the rarest-first policy, the rare chunk remains rare and abundant
chunks remain abundant—a clear sign of instability. In all stabilizing policies, the rare
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Figure 5.3: Chunk frequency evolution in a system with m = 5 chunks under different
policies when starting from the state of a “missing-chunk” ( whose frequency is indicated by
a red/dashed line). Rarest-first is clearly unstable, since it cannot recover, whereas the other
protocols manage to bring the chunk back into peer circulation and stabilize the system.
chunk is made available by giving priority to that chunk in some way. For instance, in case
of mode suppression, no other chunk will be transmitted until the frequency of the rare
chunk is equal to the frequency of all other chunks. Once this happens, the frequencies of
the different chunks remain almost same, and hence we only see a thin spread across the
frequencies. Other policies also manage to bring the rare chunk back into circulation and
the corresponding statistics become similar to all other chunks. We also observe that the
stabilization time to increase the frequency of rare chunk to the same level as that of other
chunk frequencies, is much shorter for MS and DMS when compared to other algorithms.
5.5.4 Sojourn times
In addition to stability, an important performance metric is the sojourn time of a peer,
which is defined as the amount of time a peer spends in the system collecting all chunks
before leaving. In Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5, we plot the average sojourn times of the peers
for different policies, for the arrival rate λ = 4 and different numbers of chunks that the
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file is divided into (m). In Figure 5.4 we only included the first 1000 peers that left the
system and in the Figure 5.5 we included rest of the peers. We can observe that the TMS
has best sojourn times in both cases. Though the Group Suppression has good stationary
sojourn times the mixing times are large and have very high variance. In m = 3, the average
stationary sojourn times of TMS, DMS and group suppression are very close to m. Since the
rate of peer contact is 1, this fact indicates that these algorithms attains the best possible
trade-off between suppression (to keep peers in the system) and sharing (to enable peers to
gather chunks).
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Figure 5.4: Mean mixing sojourn times of policies for different values of m. Distributed mode
suppression has the best performance in all cases.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyzed the scaling behavior of a P2P swarm with reference to its
stability when subjected to an arbitrary arrival rate of peers. It has been shown earlier
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Figure 5.5: Mean stationary sojourn times of policies for different values of m. Distributed
mode suppression has the best performance in all cases.
that not all chunk sharing policies are stable in such a regime, and our goal was to design
a simple and stable policy that yields low sojourn times. Our main observation was that,
contrary to the traditional approach of boosting the availability of rare chunks, preventing the
spread of the most frequent chunk(s) yields a simple and stable policy that we entitled mode
suppression (MS), and a generalized version that we refer to as Threshold Mode Suppression
(TMS). We analytically proved their stability, and showed using numerical studies that
Threshold Mode Suppression achieves near optimal sojourn times.
Our results indicate that there is a delicate trade-off between sharing (i.e., uploading
a useful chunk if at all possible) and suppression (i.e., trying to reduce chunk transfers to
keep peers in the system so that they can help others). The chunk selection policy has a
fundamental impact on this trade-off. On one hand, by suppressing some chunk sharing
(as in the GS, MS or DMS algorithms), we can ensure peers stay longer at the expense
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of increasing sojourn time, with too much suppression leading to instability. On the other
hand, trying too hard to be work conserving (maximizing sharing as in random or RF) with
the idea of reducing sojourn times can lead to instability due to chunk starvation.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we studied the equilibrium and resource allocation efficiency of different
network market systems. In chapter 2, we studied the Internet Service Provider (ISP) transit
billing market. We showed that the current 95th Percentile percentile billing mechanism is
unfair through a study of measured transit data volumes. We then considered the design of
a fair cost allocation scheme using the concept of Shapley value percentile (SVP) from the
framework of cooperative game theory. To overcome the complexity of SVP, we proposed a
new billing scheme using a convex optimization framework, and a new metric called Provision
Ratio. The new billing mechanism is flexible enough for the transit provider to incorporate
billing constraints and close to SVP in terms of fairness.
After analyzing market with finite agents then we examined market systems with large
number of agents in chapters 3 and 4. First, in chapter 3 we modeled auction-based schedul-
ing in cellular system as a Bayesian game. As the number of agents becomes asymptotically
large, it is difficult to find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We then used the notion of Mean
Field Equilibrium (MFE) and established that this system has a unique MFE. We also
showed that the best response policy in this system takes the form of longest queue first
policy. Then in chapter 4, we considered the problem of determining the optimal price selec-
tion policy in a competitive marketplace that has many service providers that are relatively
short lived. We showed that our marketplace can be thought of a version of a first price
reverse auction, and characterized the best response bidding policy under the mean field
assumption. We again established the existence of a Mean Field Equilibrium.
Finally in chapter 5, we analyzed a P2P network file sharing system in which there is
a single seed that has all chunks, and non-altruistic peers that leave the system as soon
as they obtain all the chunks. It is established in the literature that rarest-first chunk
selection policy, and in general any work conserving policy is unstable if the arrival rate is
large. Although counter intuitive, some amount of suppression of sharing chunks is needed
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to promote system stability. In this spirit, we proposed a simple chunk selection policy called
Mode Suppression in which we suppress the sharing of chunks that are widely available in
the system. We showed that this policy is easy to implement as it depends only on the
marginal chunk frequencies, and is stable for any peer arrival rate. We also developed a
variant called Threshold Mode Suppression in which we suppress the most popular chunks
only if they are significantly more abundant than the least frequency chunks. We showed
through simulations that TMS has the best sojourn times among all the policies.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
We may rewrite the the definition of Tρ in (3.9) as
(Tρf)(q) = inf
x∈R+
Sf (q, x) (A.1)
where Sf (q, x) = C(q) + rρ(x) + βEQ1 [f(Q1)|q, x]. Given the current state and action pair,
(q, x), the first two terms in Sf (q, x) constitute the current cost, while the last term is the
future expected cost, where Q1 is one-step future state variable. Further, from (3.9), we have
EQ1 [f(Q1)|q, x] = (1− pρ(x)EA[f(q + A)]
+ pρ(x)EA[f((q − 1)+ + A].
The proof proceeds through a verification of the assumptions of Theorem 8.3.6 in [25].
An exception is that action space in our case is not a compact set which violates As-
sumption 8.3.1(a) in [25]. However, this assumption can be overridden if the statement
of Lemma 8.3.8(a) in [25], equivalently Condition (3) below, holds true. Further, we desire
to show the existence of a j ∈ N such that T jρ is a contraction mapping. Since Theorem 8.3.6
is derived for j = 1, we replace Assumption 8.3.2(b) with Condition (5) given below.
Now, we prove the following statements.
1. C(q) + rρ(x) is a continuous function in x ∈ R+.
2. EQ1 [f(Q1)|q, x] is continuous in x ∈ R+ for every f ∈ V .
3. For any f ∈ V , there exists a measurable function θf : R+ → R+ such that θf (q) attains
minimum in (A.1). Further, Sf (q, θf (q)) is a measurable function for any f ∈ V .
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4. There exists a nonnegative constant c1 such that supx |C(q) + rρ(x)| ≤ c1w(q) where
w(q) = max{C(q), 1}.
5. There exists j ∈ N and c2 with c2 < 1 such that βj sup~x EQj [w(Qj)|q, ~x] ≤ c2w(q) + c3
where Qj is j-step future state variable and ~x is a j-length sequence of actions.
6. The function E[w(Q1)|q, x] is continuous in x ∈ R+
Conditions (1) and (2) are obvious from the continuity of rρ(x) and pρ(x). Further, as
derived in (3.10), θf (q) = ∆f(q)
+ where ∆f(q) = EA(f(q + A) − f((q − 1)+ + A)). The
measurability of functions θf (q) and Sf (q, θ(q)) are evident from their definitions. Condition
(4) holds true from the definition of w(q) and from the fact that
rρ(x) ≤ lim
y→∞
rρ(y) < (M − 1)
∫ ∞
0
(1− ρ(x))dx < (M − 1)E
where the last inequality follows as ρ ∈ P . Condition (5) follows from the fact that,
βjEQj [w(Qj)|q, ~x] ≤ βj max{1, C(q + jA¯)}
≤ βj(k1w(q) + k2),
where A¯, as defined in Assumption 1, is the maximum arrival possible between any two
adjacent auctions and k1 > 0, k2 are some constants independent of j. The above results
follows from (A.2) and the definition of w(q). Then, there exists a j such that βjk1 = c2 < 1
and hence (5) holds. Finally, the last condition follows from Condition (2) as w(q) ∈ V .
Given that the above conditions are met, we can prove the first statement of Lemma 2.
The proof is essentially identical to that of Theorem 8.3.6 in [25]. The second statement of
the lemma can be obtained by comparing (3.9) and (3.7). The last part of the lemma follows
from (3.10).
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A.2 Proofs from Section 3.5
In this section, we present details of proofs that were omitted from Section 3.5. We divide
this section into parts based on the development of that section.
A.2.1 Proofs Pertaining to Section 3.5-A: Step 1
Lemma 32. Suppose ρ1, ρ2 ∈ P. Then, ‖θˆρ1 − θˆρ2‖w ≤ K‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖w
Proof. For any q ∈ R+, by the definition of θˆρ we have,
|θˆρ1(q)− θˆρ2(q)|
= |β[EA[Vˆρ1(q + A)− Vˆρ1((q − 1)+ + A)− Vˆρ2(q + A) + Vˆρ2((q − 1)+ + A)]]|
≤ βEA|Vˆρ1(q + A)− Vˆρ2(q + A)|+ βEA|Vˆρ1((q − 1)+ + A)− Vˆρ2((q − 1)+ + A)|
≤ β‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖wEA(w(q + A) + w((q − 1)+ + A)) ≤ K‖Vˆρ1 − Vˆρ2‖ww(q)
Lemma 33. Let ρ ∈ P and f1, f2 ∈ V. Then,
‖Tρf1 − Tρf2‖w ≤ Kˆ‖f1 − f2‖w (A.2)
Proof. Using the characterization of Tρ from eq. (3.11), we have that, for any q ∈ R+
|Tρf1(q)− Tρf2(q)| ≤β‖f1 − f2‖K1w(q) +
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ β∆f1(q)
β∆f2(q)
|ρM−1(u)| du
∣∣∣∣∣
≤β‖f1 − f2‖K1w(q) + β|∆f1(q)−∆f2(q)|
≤β(K1 +K2)‖f1 − f2‖w(q)
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A.2.2 Proofs Pertaining to Section 3.5-A: Step 2
Proof of Lemma 5. For brevity, denote Πρ,θ(·) be Π(·) and Υ(k)ρ,θ = Υ(k) . Let −τ be the last
time before 0 the chain regenerated. We have
Π(B) =
∞∑
k=0
P(B, τ = k) (A.3)
=
∞∑
k=0
P(τ = k)P(B|τ = k) (A.4)
Since the regeneration events are independent of the queue-length and occur geometrically
with probability (1− β), P(τ = k) = (1− β)βk. Hence,
Π(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkP(Q0 ∈ B|τ = k) (A.5)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkE(E(1Q0∈B|τ = k,Q−k = Q)|τ = k) (A.6)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkE(Υ(k)(B|Q)|τ = k) (A.7)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR(Υ(k)(B|Q)). (A.8)
since Q−k ∼ ΨR given τ = k.
Lemma 34. lim infn→∞Υ
(k)
ρn (B|q) ≥ Υ(k)ρ (B|q)
Proof. The proof proceeds through mathematical induction on k. For k = 0, we have
Υ
(0)
ρn (B|q) = 1(q∈B) and hence the hypothesis holds true. Suppose that the hypothesis is true
till k = m − 1. To prove the lemma, we just need to verify that the hypothesis holds for
k = m. Let Pq,ρ(.) be the one step transition kernel of the queue dynamics conditioned on the
following facts: the initial state is q, the bids are generated according to the optimal policy
given by Corollary 1 and no regeneration. Verify that Pq,ρn(·) =⇒ Pq,ρ(·) by considering the
integrals of a bounded continuous function. Then, by Skorokhod representation theorem,
there exists Xn and X on common probability space such that Xn ∼ Pq,ρn , X ∼ Pq,ρ and
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Xn → X a.s. We have,
lim inf Υ(m)ρn (B|qn) = lim inf E(Υ(m−1)ρn (B|Xn)) (A.9)
≥E(lim inf Υ(m−1)ρn (B|Xn)) (A.10)
≥E(Υ(m−1)ρ (B|X)) (A.11)
=Υ(m)ρ (B|q), (A.12)
where eq. (A.10) follows from Fatou’s lemma, and eq. (A.11) follows from the induction
hypothesis.
A.2.3 Proofs Pertaining to Section 3.5-A: Step 3
Details of proof of Lemma 6. To complete the proof, we need to show that the expected bid
under the cumulative distribution function ρˆ is bounded from above by a constant that is
independent of ρˆ. To that end, define a new Markov random process Q˜k with the probability
transition matrix
P(Q˜k+1 ∈ B|Q˜k = q) = β1(q+A¯∈B) + (1− β)ΨR(B) (A.13)
where A¯ is the maximum possible arrival between any two consecutive auction instants. The
process Q˜k has an invariant distribution which is given by,
Π˜(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR(1(q+kAˆ)∈B). (A.14)
The proof of the above result is identical to that of Lemma 5. For any q given, the above prob-
ability measure (A.13) stochastically bounds the probability measure in eq. (3.6). Therefore,
it can be shown that Π˜ stochastically dominates Πρ for all ρ ∈ P , i.e, Πρ 4 Π˜.
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Now, the expected value of the optimal bid function θˆρ(q) under Πρ satisfies,
EΠρ [θˆρ(q)] ≤EΠ˜[θˆρ(q)] ≤ EΠ˜[Vˆρ(q + A¯)] (A.15)
≤
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨR(Vˆρ(q + (k + 1)A¯)) (A.16)
Above, the first inequality follows from stochastic dominance of Π˜ and the second inequality
is due to the definition of optimal bid function. From (3.7), we can observe that for any
ρ, Vˆρ(q) ≤
∑∞
k=0 β
kC(q + kA¯) independent of ρ. Since C(q) ∈ O(qm) for some m, we have
Vˆρ(q) ∈ O(qm). Then, EΨR(Vˆρ(q + (k + 1)Aˆ)) ∈ O(km) as the moments of ΨR are bounded.
This directly gives that EΠρ [θˆρ(q)] is bounded by the some constant that is independent of
ρ and, hence independent of ρˆ.
Lemma 35. In P, pointwise convergence implies uniform convergence.
Proof. Let ρn, ρ ∈ P and ρn → ρ point-wise. Given  > 0, choose L large enough so that
ρ(L) > 1− . Since ρ is continuous function by definition, it is uniformly continuous on the
compact set [0, L]. Therefore, we can construct a sequence 0 = x1 < x2 < · · · < xk = L such
that and |ρ(xi+1)−ρ(xi)| < . Let J be large enough so that for all n > J , |ρ(xi)−ρn(xi)| < 
for all i. For any y such that xi < y < xi+1,
|ρ(y)− ρn(y)| <|ρ(y)− ρ(xi)|+ |ρ(xi)− ρn(xi)|+ |ρn(y)− ρn(xi)|
<|ρ(xi+1)− ρ(xi)|+ |ρ(xi)− ρn(xi)|+ |ρn(xi+1)− ρn(xi)|
<2|ρ(xi+1)− ρ(xi)|+ |ρ(xi)− ρn(xi)|+ 2 < 5 (A.17)
While if L < y, then
|ρ(y)− ρn(y)| < |ρ(y)− ρn(L)|+ |ρn(L)− ρ(L)|+ |ρ(y)− ρ(L)| (A.18)
< 1− ρ(L) + + + 1− ρ(L) < 4. (A.19)
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Therefore, |ρ(y)− ρn(y)| < 5 for all n > J and hence ρn converges to ρ uniformly.
A.2.4 Proofs Pertaining to Section 3.5-B
Proof of Lemma 7. We know that Π([a, b]|ρ, θ) = ∑k≥0(1 − β)βkEΨR(Υ(k)ρ ([a.b]|Q0)). Let
Ak be the net arrivals and Dk be the net departures till time k. Then,
Υ(k)ρ ([a, b]|Q0) = E(1(Q0+Ak−Dk∈[a,b])|Q0) (A.20)
= E(E(1(Q0+Ak−Dk∈[a,b])|Dk, Q0)|Q0) (A.21)
= E(E(1(Ak∈[a−Q0+Dk,b−Q0+Dk])|Q0, Dk)|Q0) (A.22)
≤ c1 · (b− a). (A.23)
The above results hold since the random variable Ak is independent of Q0 and Dk for any k
and it has a bounded density function. Therefore, EΨR(Υ
(k)
ρ ([a.b]|Q0)) ≤ c·(b−a) for all k > 0.
For k = 0, we know that ΨR has a bounded density which implies ΨR([a, b]) ≤ c1ψ · (b− a).
These two results prove that there is a large enough c such that Πρ([a, b]) < c · (b− a).
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 4
B.1 Proofs from Section 4.4
B.1.1 Details of proof of Lemma 10
By grouping the terms containing x in equation (4.10), we get
Vρ(q, α, ξ, η) (B.1)
= δED
[
Vρ((q −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
− C(q)+
sup
x∈[−z,∞]
max
ηc∈[0,1]
{
pρ(x)(−K(ηc, η) + x+ z g(α, ξ) + δ∆Vρ(q, α, ξ, η))
}
,
= δED
[
Vρ((q −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
− C(q)+
sup
x∈[−z,∞]
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ z g(α, ξ) + max
ηc∈[0,1]
{−K(ηc, η) + δ∆Vρ(q, α, ξ, η)})},
= δED
[
Vρ((q −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
− C(q)+
sup
x∈[−z,∞]
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ z g(α, ξ) + ED
[
δVρ((q + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η) (B.2)
− δVρ((q −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
+ max
ηc∈[0,1]
{−K(ηc, η)
+ ηc δED
[
(Vρ((q + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)− Vρ((q + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η))
]})}
= δED
[
Vρ((q −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
− C(q) + sup
x∈[−z,∞]
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ z g(α, ξ) + ∆qVρ(q, α, ξ, η)
+ max
ηc∈[0,1]
{−K(ηc, η) + ηc∆αVρ(q, α, ξ, η)})}, (B.3)
Let us assume K(x) is∞ when x /∈ [0, 1] and let K∗ denote the convex conjugate of K, then
equation B.3 can be simplified as,
Vρ(q, α, ξ, η) = δED
[
Vρ((q −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
− C(q)+
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sup
x∈[−z,∞]
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ z g(α, ξ) + ∆qVρ(q, α, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αVρ(q, α, ξ, η)))}. (B.4)
B.1.2 Existence of optimal policy
We first have a result indicating that the per stage cost and transitions are bounded. For
consistency with [24], we define the per-state cost function
c((q, α, ξ, η), x) = C(q)− pρ(x)(x+ z g(α, ξ)),
We then have the following result.
Lemma 36. There exist nonnegative constants c1 and c2, with 1 ≤ c2 < 1/δ, and a weight
function ω ≥ 1 such that for every state (q, α, ξ)
1. supx∈[−z,∞] |c((q, α, ξ), x)| ≤ ω(q, α, ξ) and
2. supx∈[−z,∞]
∫
ω(s)Q(ds|q, α, ξ, x) ≤ c2ω(s) + c3,
where Q is the transition kernel defined in (4.9), x ∈ [−z,∞] is any effective bid, and s
represents a three tuple corresponding to state.
Proof. Consider a candidate weight function of the form ω(q, α, ξ) = max{1, C(q)}. Part 1
follows from the following argument.
c((q, α, ξ), y) = C(q)− pρ(x)(x+ z g(α, ξ))
≤ C(q) ≤ ω(q, α, ξ).
Now, consider
∫
ω(s)Q(ds|q, α, ξ, x). As ω(s) is increasing in q and the maximum value
that q can take for any x is q + 1, we have
sup
x∈[−z,∞]
∫
ω(s)Q(ds|q, α, ξ, x) ≤ ω(q + 1, α, ξ)
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Recall that C(q) is a polynomial function of q of degree p. Then we have
ω(q + 1, α, ξ)
ω(q, α, ξ)
=
a1(q + 1)
p + a2(q + 1)
(p−1) + . . .
a1(q)p + a2q(p−1) + . . .
=
a1(1 + 1/q)
p + a2
q
(1 + 1/q)(p−1) + . . .
a1 +
a2
q
+ . . .
<
1
δ
for q greater than some q0.
Let c2 = maxq>q0
ω(q+1,α,ξ)
ω(q,α,ξ)
and c3 = maxq≤q0 w(q + 1). Then we have
sup
x∈[−z,∞]
∫
w(s)Q(ds|q, α, ξ, x) ≤ c2w(s) + c3
with c2 < 1/δ.
The next result shows the continuity of the expected weight of transition in the effective
bid x.
Lemma 37. For every state (q, α, ξ), the function ω′(q, α, ξ, x) ,
∫
ω(s)Q(ds|q, α, ξ, x) is
continuous in x ∈ [−z,∞].
Proof. Using the same candidate weight function of the form w(q, α, ξ) = max{1, C(q)}, we
have
ω′(q, α, ξ, x) :=
∫
ω(s)Q(ds|q, α, ξ, x)
= E
[
C((q + 1−D)+)pρ(x) + C((q −D)+)
(
1− pρ(x)
)]
Therefore, ω′ is continuous with x if pρ is continuous with x, which in turn depends on the
continuity of ρ(x). As we assumed that ρ(.) is continuous, ω′ is continuous with respect to
x.
We need one final result on compactness before we can show the existence of the optimal
bid function.
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Lemma 38. For every state (q, α, ξ),
1. The control-constraint set is compact;
2. The cost per stage is lower semi-continuous in action
3. The function u′(q, α, ξ, x) :=
∫
u(s)Q(ds|q, α, ξ, x) is continuous in x for every function
u ∈ V.
Proof. We assumed that the support of the mean field distribution of effective bid is a
compact set [z, T ] in R+. This means that no agent will choose an effective bid above T ,
as the probability of winning is 0. Hence, the action will lie in a compact set [−z, T ]. Now,
to prove the second part of the theorem, consider the cost in each stage C(q) − pρ(x)(x +
z g(α, ξ)). Expanding the probability of winning, we get C(q)−(x+z g(α, ξ))
(
1−ρ(x))
)M−1
.
Since, we assumed that ρ is continuous, the cost per each stage is continuous with respect
to x.
As above, the function depends on x through pρ(x) in the third part of the theorem.
Hence, continuity follows from the continuity of ρ.
B.1.3 Details of Proof of Theorem 12
Since we know that the optimal bid exists, we replace sup with max in (4.11), and the
Bellman equation to calculate x becomes
Vρ,η(q, α, ξ)
= δED
[
Vρ,η((q −D)+, α, ξ)
]
− C(q) + max
x∈[−z,∞)
{
pρ(x)(x+ zg(α, ξ) + δ∆Vρ,η(q, α, ξ))
}
= δED
[
Vρ,η((q −D)+, α, ξ)
]
− C(q) + max
x∈[−z,∞)
{
pρ(x)(x+ ν(q, α, ξ, η))
}
,where,
ν(q, α, ξ, η) = zg(α, ξ) + δ∆Vρ,η(q, α, ξ). (B.5)
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Note that ν(q, α, ξ, η) essentially determines the “type” of the agent in the mechanism
design terminology. Since we have a standard auction format, we expect the agent with the
largest value of ν (smallest effective bid) to win the auction. Let
U(ν(q, α, ξ, η)) = max
x∈[−z,∞)
{
pρ(x)(x+ ν(q, α, ξ, η))
}
(B.6)
With a slight abuse of notation, let X∗(ν) be the optimal bid function, assumed to be
decreasing in ν; essentially the users generate their new types ν and then participate in the
reverse auction. We will see that this assumption indeed holds true once we determine the
function. We assume symmetry in that all agents use the same bid function. Now, if xopt is
the optimal bid then
U(ν(q, α, ξ, η)) =
{
(xopt + ν(q, α, ξ, η))P(M−1)[X∗−1(xopt)]
}
(B.7)
=
{
(xopt + ν(q, α, ξ, η))× P(M−1)[(ν(Q,A,Ξ, H)) ≤ ν((q, α, ξ, η))]
}
, (B.8)
where the decreasing property of X∗(·) is used in the last step. Using the form in (B.7)
and X∗(·) being invertible we can transform the bid determination problem by directly
incorporating the bid function as
U(ν(q, α, ξ, η)) = max
x∈[−z,∞)
{
(x+ ν(q, α, ξ, η))P(M−1)[X∗−1(x)]
}
(B.9)
In the current form we can apply the Envelope Theorem [39], to obtain
dU(ν(q, α, ξ, η))
d(ν(q, α, ξ, η)
= PM−1(X∗−1(xopt))
= PM−1(ν(Q,A,Ξ, H)) ≤ ν((q, α, ξ, η)))
The minimum possible effective bid is x = −z, under which the probability of winning is 1
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but payoff is 0. This can occur at a reputation α/ξ = 1. Therefore,
U(ν(q, α, ξ, η)) =
∫
Ω
PM−1
[
(ν(Q,A,Ξ, H) ≤ ν(q′, α′, ξ′, η′)]dq′dα′dξ′dη′ (B.10)
where Ω = {(q′, α′, ξ′, η′) : ν(q′, α′, ξ′, η′) ≤ ν(q, α, ξ, η)}. Thus, we have
xopt = −ν(q, α, ξ, η) +
∫
Ω
PM−1
[
(ν(Q,A,Ξ, H) ≤ ν(q′, α′, ξ′, η′)]dq′dα′dξ′dη′
P(M−1)[(ν(Q,A,Ξ, H)) ≤ ν((q, α, ξ, η))]
=− E[ν˜ |ν˜ ≤ ν(q, α, ξ, η)],
where the last expression follows by a standard integration-by-parts argument when
P[(ν(Q,A,Ξ, H)) ≤ ν((q, α, ξ, η)] is absolutely continuous.
B.2 Proofs from Section 4.5
Lemma 39. If there exists x∗f , x
∗
g such that f(x
∗
f ) = supx{f(x)} and g(x∗g) = supx{g(x)},
then the following inequalities holds true,
1. sup{f(x)} − sup{g(x)} ≤ sup{f(x)− g(x)}
2. sup{f(x)} − sup{g(x)} ≥ − sup{g(x)− f(x)} = inf{g(x)− f(x)}
3. sup{f(x)} − sup{g(x)} ≤ f(x∗f )− g(x∗f ), where x∗f = argmax f(x)
4. sup{f(x)} − sup{g(x)} ≥ f(x∗g)− g(x∗g), where x∗g = argmax g(x)
5. − sup{g(x) − f(x)} ≤ f(x∗g) − g(x∗g) ≤ sup{f(x)} − sup{g(x)} ≤ f(x∗f ) − g(x∗f ) ≤
sup{f(x)− g(x)}
Proof. we have, sup{f(x) + g(x)} ≤ sup{f(x)}+ sup{g(x)}. Substitue f − g as f , we get
sup{f(x)− g(x) + g(x)} ≤ sup{f(x)− g(x)}+ sup{g(x)}
=⇒ sup{f(x)} − sup{g(x)} ≤ sup{f(x)− g(x)}
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Now,
sup{f(x)} − sup{g(x)} ≤ sup{f(x)− g(x)}
=⇒ − sup{f(x)}+ sup{g(x)} ≥ − sup{f(x)− g(x)}
=⇒ sup{f(x)} − sup{g(x)} ≥ − sup{g(x)− f(x)}
B.2.1 Details of Proof of Lemma 11
Let qL < qH , by assumption we have f(qL) > f(qH). Now,
Tρf(qL, α, ξ, η)− Tρf(qH , α, ξ, η) =
= ED
[
(f((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)δ
]− C(qL)+
+ sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ zg(α, ξ) + ∆qf(qL, α, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(qL, α, ξ, η))
)}
− ED
[
(f((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)δ
]
+ C(qH)
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ zg(α, ξ) + ∆qf(qL, α, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(qH , α, ξ, η))
)}
a
> δED
[
(f((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]− δED[(f((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)]
+ sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ zg(α, ξ) + ∆qf(qL, α, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(qL, α, ξ, η))
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ zg(α, ξ) + ∆qf(qH , α, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(qH , α, ξ, η))
)}
b≥ δED
[
(f((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]− δED[(f((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)]
+ pρ(xb)
(
xb + zg(α, ξ, η) + ∆qf(qL, α, ξ)−K(ηb, η) + ηb(∆αf(qH , α, ξ, η))
)
− pρ(xb)
(
xb + zg(α, ξ, η) + ∆qf(qH , α, ξ, η)−K(ηb, η) + ηb(∆αf(qH , α, ξ, η))
)
c
= δED
[
(f((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]− δED[(f((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)]
+ pρ(xb)
(
∆qf(qL, α, ξ, η)−∆qf(qH , α, ξ, η)
+ ηb(∆αf(qH , α, ξ, η))− ηb(∆αf(qH , α, ξ, η))
)
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d
= δED
[
(f((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]− δED[(f((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)]
+ pρ(xb)
(
δED
[
(1− ηb)f((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
− (1− ηb)f((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)+
− (f((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)− f((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η))+
+ ηbf((qL + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)− ηbf((qH + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
])
e
= δ(1− pρ(xb))ED
[
(f((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)− (f((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
+ δpρ(xb))(1− ηb)ED
[
(f((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
− (f((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
]
+ δpρ(xb))ηbED
[
(f((qL + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
− (f((qH + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
]
f
> 0,
where, (a) follows from the assumption that C(q) is a strictly convex increasing function
in q, (b) follows from Lemma 39.4. Equalities (c), (d) and (e) are just rearranging and
expanding terms and (f) follows from our assumption that f is decreasing in q. Next, we
prove the continuity. Let us take a sequence qn → q. By assumption, f is continuous,
and therefore f(qn) → f(q). As f is a decreasing function of queue, f((q − D)+, α, ξ) is
dominated by f(0, α, ξ), which is integrable. Hence by the Dominated Convergence theorem
ED(f((qn −D)+, α, ξ)→ ED(f((q −D)+, α, ξ). Therefore, T nρ f → V ∗ρ is also continuous.
B.2.2 Details of Proof of Lemma 12
Let αL < αH , then f(q, αH , ξ, η) > f(q, αL, ξ, η). We will prove that Tρf(q, αH , ξ, η) >
Tρf(q, αL, ξ, η).
Tρf(q, αH , ξ, η)− Tρf(q, αL, ξ, η) =
= ED
[
(f((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)δ
]− C(q) + sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ zg(αH , ξ)
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+ ∆qf(q, αH , ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(qL, αH , ξ, η))
)}
− ED
[
(f((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)δ
]
+ C(q)− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ zg(αL, ξ)
+ ∆qf(q, αL, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(q, αL, ξ, η))
)}
= ED
[
(f((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)δ
]− ED[(f((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)δ]
+ sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ zg(αH , ξ) + ∆qf(q, αH , ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(qL, αH , ξ, η))
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ zg(αL, ξ) + ∆qf(q, αL, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(q, αL, ξ, η))
)}
a≥ ED
[
(f((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)δ
]− ED[(f((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)δ]
+
{
pρ(x
∗
L)
(
x∗L + zg(αH , ξ) + ∆qf(q, αH , ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(qL, αH , ξ, η))
)}
−
{
pρ(x
∗
L)
(
x∗L + zg(αL, ξ) + ∆qf(q, αL, ξ, η) +K
∗(∆αf(q, αL, ξ, η))
)}
= ED
[
(f((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)δ
]− ED[(f((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)δ]
+ pρ(x
∗
L)
[
zg(αH , ξ)− zg(αL, ξ)
]
+ pρ(x
∗
L)
(
∆qf(q, αH , ξ, η)
+K∗(∆αf(qL, αH , ξ, η))−∆qf(q, αL, ξ, η)−K∗(∆αf(q, αL, ξ, η))
)
c≥ ED
[
(f((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)δ
]− ED[(f((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)δ]
+ pρ(x
∗
L)
(
∆qf(q, αH , ξ, η)−∆qf(q, αL, ξ, η)
+ η∗L
(
∆αf(qL, αH , ξ, η)−∆αf(q, αL, ξ, η)
))
d
= ED
[
(f((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)δ
]− ED[(f((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)δ]
+ δpρ(x
∗
L)
(
η∗L(EDf((q + 1−D)+, αH + 1, ξ + 1)− EDf((q + 1−D)+, αL + 1, ξ + 1)
)
+ (1− η∗L)
(
EDf((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1)− EDf((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1)
)
− (EDf((q −D)+, αH , ξ)− EDf((q −D)+, αL, ξ)))
e
= δ(1− pρ(x∗L))ED
[
(f((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)
]− ED[(f((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)]
+ δpρ(x
∗
L)
(
η∗L(EDf((q + 1−D)+, αH + 1, ξ + 1)− EDf((q + 1−D)+, αL + 1, ξ + 1)
)
+ (1− η∗L)
(
EDf((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1)− EDf((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1)
))
f
> 0,
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where, (a) and (b) follows from Lemma 39.4. Inequality (c) follows from monotnocity of
g(α, ξ) with α. Equalities (d) and (e) are just rearranging and expanding terms and (f)
follows from our assumption that f is increasing in α.
B.2.3 Details of Proof of Lemma 13
Let us assume if qL < qH then, νf (qH , α, ξ, η) < νf (qL, α, ξ, η). Now, consider
νTρf (qH , α, ξ, η)− νTρf (qL, α, ξ, η)
= ∆qTρf(qH , α, ξ, η) + sup
ηc
{−K(ηc) + ηc∆αTρf(qH , α, ξ, η)}+
−∆qTρf(qL, α, ξ, η)− sup
ηc
{−K(ηc) + ηc∆αTρf(qL, α, ξ, η)}
= δED
[
Tρf((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)− Tρf((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
+
+ sup
ηc
{−K(ηc) + ηcδED[Tρf((qH + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
− Tρf((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
]}
− δED
[
Tρf((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)− Tρf((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)
]
− sup
ηc
{−K(ηc) + ηcδED[Tρf((qL + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
− Tρf((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
]}
a
= δED
[
∆qf((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)−∆qf((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)]
+ δED
[
(C(qL + 1−D)+ − C(qL −D)+)− (C(qH + 1−D)+ − C(qH −D)+)
]
+ δED
[
sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)
)}]
− δED
[
sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)
)}]
+ sup terms
b≤ δED
[
∆qf((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)−∆qf((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)] + ∆C(qL)−∆C(qH)
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+ δED
[
pρ(x
∗
1)
(
νf ((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)− νf ((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
)]
− δED
[
pρ(x
∗
1)
(
νf ((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)− νf ((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)
)]
+ sup
ηc
{
−K(ηc) + ηcδED
[
∆αf((qH −D)+, α, ξ)
+ sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qH + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
)}]}
− sup
ηc
{
−K(ηc) + ηcδED
[
∆αf((qL −D)+, α, ξ)
+ sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qL + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
)}]}
c≤ δED
[
∆qf((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)−∆qf((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)] + ∆C(qL)−∆C(qH)
+ δED
[
pρ(x
∗
1)
(
νf ((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)− νf ((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
)]
− δED
[
pρ(x
∗
2)
(
νf ((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)− νf ((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)
)]
+ η∗cδED
[
sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qH + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qL + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)}
+ sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
)}]
+ δED
[
η∗c∆αf((qH −D)+, α, ξ)
]− η∗c∆αf((qL −D)+, α, ξ)]
d≤ δ(1− pρ(x∗2))ED
[
νf ((qH −D)+, α, ξ, η)− νf ((qL −D)+, α, ξ, η)]
+ ∆C(qL)−∆C(qH)
+ δ(1− η∗c )pρ(x∗1)ED
[(
νf ((qH + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
− νf ((qL + 1−D)+, α, ξ + 1, η)
]
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+ η∗dpρ(x
∗
3)δED
[(
νf ((qH + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
− νf ((qL + 1−D)+, α + 1, ξ + 1, η)
]
e≤ ∆C(qL)−∆C(qH) (B.11)
f
≤ 0, (B.12)
where, (b), (c) and (d) follows from Lemma 39.4 and (e) follows from our assumption that
νf is decreasing in q. Inequality (f) follows from the convexity of the cost function. As
Tρf → V ∗ρ , νV ∗rho(q, α, ξ) strictly decreases with queue.
Now the second part can be proved using same method. We know that V ∗ρ = TρV
∗
ρ ,
therefore
νV ∗ρ (qH , α, ξ, η)− νV ∗ρ (qL, α, ξ, η) (B.13)
= νTρV ∗ρ (qH , α, ξ, η)− νTρV ∗ρ (qL, α, ξ, η) (B.14)
a≤ ∆C(qL)−∆C(qH), (B.15)
where, inequality (a) can be obtained from (B.11) replacing f with V ∗ρ .
B.2.4 Details of Proof of Lemma 15
We will again show the preservation of the property through the Bellman function. We
assume νf (q, α, ξ, η) = zg(α, ξ) + ∆qf(q, α, ξ, η) + K
∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η)) is increasing with
α and then show νTρf (q, α, ξ, η) also increases with α. Let us assume if αL < αH then,
νf (q, αL, ξ, η) < νf (q, αH , ξ, η). Now,
νTρf (q, αL, ξ, η)− νTρf (q, αH , ξ, η)
= zg(αL, ξ) + ∆qTρf(q, αL, ξ, η) + sup
ηc
{−K(ηc) + ηc∆αTρf(q, αL, ξ, η)}
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− zg(αH , ξ)−∆qTρf(q, αH , ξ, η)− sup
ηc
{−K(ηc) + ηc∆αTρf(q, αH , ξ, η)}
= zg(αL, ξ)− zg(αH , ξ) + δED
[
Tρf((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
− Tρf((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)
]
+
+ sup
ηc
{−K(ηc) + ηcδED[Tρf((q + 1−D)+, αL + 1, ξ + 1, η)
− Tρf((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
]}
− δED
[
Tρf((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1, η)− Tρf((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)
]
− sup
ηc
{−K(ηc) + ηcδED[Tρf((q + 1−D)+, αH + 1, ξ + 1, η)
− Tρf((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1, η)
]}
a
= zg(αL, ξ)− zg(αH , ξ) + δED
[
δED′f((q + 1−D −D′)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
− δED′f((q −D −D′)+, αL, ξ, η)
]
+
− δED
[
δED′f((q + 1−D −D′)+, αH , ξ + 1, η) + δED′f((q −D −D′)+, αH , ξ, η)
]
+
+ δED
[
(C(q + 1−D)+ − C(q −D)+)− (C(q + 1−D)+ − C(q −D)+)]
+ δED
[
sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1, η))
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η))
}]
− δED
[
sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1, η))
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η))
}]
+ other terms.
b≤ zg(αL, ξ)− zg(αH , ξ) + δED
[
∆qf((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)− f((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)
]
+
+ δED
[
pρ(x
∗
1)
(
ν((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
)− (ν((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1, η))]
− δED
[
pρ(x
∗
2)
(
ν((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)− ν((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η))
)]
+ sup
ηc
{
−K(ηc) + ηcδED
[
δED′ [f((q + 1−D −D′)+, αL + 1, ξ + 1, η)
]
− δED′ [f((q + 1−D −D′)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
]
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+ sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αL + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
}]}
− sup
ηc
{
−K(ηc) + ηcδED
[
δED′ [f((q + 1−D −D′)+, αH + 1, ξ + 1, η)
]
− δED′ [f((q + 1−D −D′)+, αH , ξ + 1, η)
]
+ sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αH + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1, η)
)}]}
c≤ zg(αL, ξ)− zg(αH , ξ) + δED
[
∆qf((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)− f((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)
]
+
+ δED
[
pρ(x
∗
1)
(
ν((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
)− (ν((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1, η))]
− δED
[
pρ(x
∗
2)
(
ν((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)− ν((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η))
)]
+ sup
ηc
{
−K(ηc) + ηcδED
[
∆αf((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)
]}
+ η∗c
{
δED
[
sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αL + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
)}]}
− sup
ηc
{
−K(ηc) + ηcδED
[
∆αf((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)
]}
− η∗c
{
δED
[
sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αH + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)}
− sup
x
{
pρ(x)
(
x+ νf ((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1, η)
)}]}
d≤ δED
[
νf ((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)− νf ((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)
]
+
+ δED
[
pρ(x
∗
1)(1− η∗c )
(
νf ((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
)− νf ((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η))]
− δED
[
pρ(x
∗
2)
(
νf ((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)− νf ((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η))
)]
+ δED
[
η∗cpρ(x
∗
3)
(
νf ((q + 1−D)+, αL + 1, ξ + 1, η)
− νf ((q + 1−D)+, αH + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)]
= δED
[
(1− pρ(x∗2))νf ((q −D)+, αL, ξ, η)− νf ((q −D)+, αH , ξ, η)
]
+
+ pρ(x
∗
1)(1− ηc∗)δED
[(
νf ((q + 1−D)+, αL, ξ + 1, η)
)
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− (νf ((q + 1−D)+, αH , ξ + 1, η)
)]
+ η∗cpρ(x
∗
3)δED
[(
νf ((q + 1−D)+, αL + 1, ξ + 1, η)
− νf ((q + 1−D)+, αH + 1, ξ + 1, η)
)]
≤ 0
B.3 Proofs from Section 4.6
B.3.1 Details of Proof of Lemma 18
For the Berg’s maximum theorem to hold we need the continuity of the objective function
h(ρ, x) and compactness of the correspondence R(ρ). If we prove V ∗ρ is continuous with ρ
then joint continuity follows from the assumption that ρ(x) is a continuous function of x.
To prove continuity of V ∗ρ , consider
∥∥V ∗ρ1 − V ∗ρ2∥∥w = ∥∥Tρ1V ∗ρ1 − Tρ2V ∗ρ2∥∥w
=
∥∥Tρ1V ∗ρ1 − Tρ1V ∗ρ2 + Tρ1V ∗ρ2 − Tρ2V ∗ρ2∥∥w
≤ ∥∥Tρ1V ∗ρ1 − Tρ1V ∗ρ2∥∥w + ∥∥Tρ1V ∗ρ2 − Tρ2V ∗ρ2∥∥w
≤ α ∥∥V ∗ρ1 − V ∗ρ2∥∥w + ∥∥Tρ1V ∗ρ2 − Tρ2V ∗ρ2∥∥w
=⇒ (1− α)∥∥V ∗ρ1 − V ∗ρ2∥∥w ≤ ‖Tρ1Vρ2 − Tρ2Vρ2‖w .
Now,
‖Tρ1f − Tρ2f‖w
=
∣∣∣∣ sup
q,α,ξ,η
{
δED(f(q −D)+, α, ξ, η)− C(q) + sup
x
{
pρ1(x)(x+ zg(α, ξ)
+ ∆qf(q, α, ξ)
}
+K∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η))
− δED(f(q −D)+, α, ξ, η) + C(q)− sup
x
{
pρ2(x)(x+ zg(α, ξ)
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+ ∆qf(q, α, ξ)
}
+K∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η))
}∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ sup
q,α,ξ,η
{
pρ1(x
∗)(x∗ + zg(α, ξ) + ∆qf(q, α, ξ) +K∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η))
− pρ2(x∗)(x∗ + zg(α, ξ) + ∆qf(q, α, ξ) +K∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η))
}∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ sup
q,α,ξ,η
{(
pρ1(x
∗)− pρ2(x∗)
)
(x∗ + zg(α, ξ) + ∆qf(q, α, ξ) +K∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η))
}∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ sup
q,α,ξ,η
{(
(1− ρ1(x∗))(M−1) − (1− ρ2(x∗)(M−1))
)
(x∗ + zg(α, ξ)
+ ∆qf(q, α, ξ) +K
∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η))
}∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ sup
q,α,ξ,η
{((
ρ1(x
∗))− (ρ2(x∗)
) ∗ (M − 1)))(x∗ + zg(α, ξ)
+ ∆qf(q, α, ξ) +K
∗(∆αf(q, α, ξ, η))
}∣∣∣∣
≤ K ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖
=⇒ ‖V ∗(ρ1)− V ∗(ρ2)‖w ≤ K ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖
Hence, V ∗ρ is continuous with ρ. R(ρ) as such is not compact, but, we will prove that we
can restrict the correspondence to a compact set. The proof is exactly same as the proof
of Lemma 38. R(ρ) = [0,Mρ,q,α,ξ] is the compact correspondence. Since the conditions of
Berge’s Maximum theorem are satisfied θρ is continuous in ρ.
B.3.2 Details of Proof of Lemma 19
The queue length dynamics are given by
q =

(Q′ −D)+ with probability δ
R with probability (1− δ),
(B.16)
where, D ∼ Φ and R ∼ Ψ and
P(Q′ = q|q, α, ξ) = 1− pρ(θˆ(q, α, ξ)) (B.17)
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P(Q′ = (q + 1)|q, α, ξ) = pρ(θˆ(q, α, ξ)) (B.18)
Let Π′ be the distribution of Q′. Then the distribution of queue length Πq is the convolution
of Π′ and Φ¯, where Φ¯ is the distribution of −D.
Πq(B,α
′, ξ′|q, α, ξ) = δf(α′, ξ′)
∫ ∞
∞
Φ(B − y)Π′(y|q, α, ξ) + (1− δ)Ψ(B,α′, ξ′)
If B is a Borel null set then so will B − y and hence Πq(B) = 0.
B.3.3 Details of Proof of Lemma 21
The density of invariant distribution Πρ is computed as follows,
Πρ (Bq, Bα, Bξ, Bη) =
∑
k≥0
δk(1− δ)EΨΓk (Bq, Bα, Bξ, Bη|(q, α, ξ, η)) (B.19)
=
∑
k≥0
δk(1− δ)
∫
R+,N,N,[0,1]
Γk (Bq, Bα, Bξ, Bη|(q, α, ξ, η)) ψ(q, α, ξ, η) dqdαdξdη (B.20)
where, Γk represent the process without regeneration. Let a ∈ Lk represents complete history
till time k. This includes at each time slot, the amount of queue serviced, if the user had
won the auction, if it won did he get a positive reward. Now,
EΨ
[
Γk (Bq, Bα, Bξ, Bη|(q, α, ξ, η))
]
= EΨ
[ ∑
a∈Lk
Γk (ak = a, ηk ∈ Bη|(q, α, ξ, η)) I
{
Fk
(
(q, α, ξ), a
) ∈ Bq ×Bα ×Bξ} ]
=
∑
a∈Lk
EΨ
[
Γk (ak = a, ηk ∈ Bη|(q, α, ξ, η)) I
{
Fk
(
(q, α, ξ), a
) ∈ Bq ×Bα ×Bξ} ]
=
∑
a∈Lk
∫
R+,N,N,[0,1]
[
ψ(q, α, ξ, η)Γk (ak = a, ηk ∈ Bη|(q, α, ξ, η))
I
{
Fk
(
(q, α, ξ), a
) ∈ Bq ×Bα ×Bξ} ]dqdαdξdη
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As ηk doesn’t change before regeneration, η ∈ Bη. Let u = Fk((q, α, ξ), a) and (q, α, ξ) =
G(u, a)
=
∑
a∈Lk
∫
R+,N,N,[0,1]
ψ(Gk(u, a), η)
[
Γk (ak = a|(Gt(u, a), η))
I {η ∈ Bη; u ∈ Bq ×Bα ×Bξ}
]
Jk(u, a)dηdu
=
∑
a∈Lk
∫
Bq×Bα×Bξ×Bη
ψ(Gk(u, a), η)
[
Γk (ak = a|(Gk(u, a), η))
]
Jk(u, a)dηdu
=
∫
Bq×Bα×Bξ×Bη
∑
a∈Lk
ψ(Gk(u, a), η)
[
Γk (ak = a|(Gk(u, a), η))
]
Jk(u, a)dηdu
Therefore the density is given by
piρ(q, α, ξ, η)
=
∑
k≥1
δk(1− δ)
∑
a∈Lk
ψ(Gk((q, α, ξ), a), η)
[
Γk (ak = a|(Gk((q, α, ξ), a), η))
]
Jk((q, α, ξ), a)
B.3.4 Details of Proof of Lemma 22
By Portmanteau theorem, it is enough to show that for any open set (B,α, ξ, B′),
lim infn→∞Πρn(B,α, ξ, B
′) ≥ Πρ(B,α, ξ). We have
lim inf
n→∞
Πρn(B,α, ξ, B
′) = lim inf
n→∞
∑
k≥0
δk(1− δ)EΨΓkρn ((B,α, ξ, B′)|(q0, α0, ξ0, η0))
≥
∑
k≥0
δk(1− δ)EΨ
[
lim inf
n→∞
Γkρn ((B,α, ξ, B
′)|(q0, α0, ξ0, η0))
]
≥
∑
k≥0
δk(1− δ)EΨ
[
Γkρ ((B,α, ξ, B
′)|(q0, α0, ξ0, η0))
]
= Πρ(B,α, ξ)
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B.3.5 Details of Proof of Lemma 23
First we will prove that γ(x) is continuous. From 14 the optimal bid is strictly increasing
in queue size for a given α and ψ. Therefore, θ−1ρ,z [−z, x] will at most have a countable number
of states whose measure is 0. Hence, γ(x) will not have any jumps in this region and is hence
continuous.
Now we will show that γ has a finite mean. To prove this we need to prove that expected
bid under ρ is bounded above by a constant that is independent of ρ. We define a new
Markov random process Q˜k with the probability transition matrix
P
(
Q˜k+1 ∈ B,αk+1 = α, ξk+1 = ξ, ηk+1 ∈ B′|qk = q0, αk = α0, ξk = ξ0, Xk = x, ηk = η0
)
= δI(q0+1)∈B,α=ξ0+1,ξ=ξ0+1) + (1− δ)Ψ(B,α, ξ, B′).
This process will be equal to previous process if the user always wins, with out any departures
and has the highest reputation. Let Π˜ be the steady state distribution. The steady state
can be written as
Π˜(B,α, ξ, η) =
∑
k≥0
δk(1− δ)EΨ
[
Γkρ,θ ((B,α, ξ, B
′)|(State))
]
(B.21)
=
∑
k≥0
δk(1− δ)EΨ
[(
I(q+k)∈B,α=ξ+k,ξ=ξ+k)|State
)]
(B.22)
Since this processes has always higher queue length and reputation values than the original
process it can be shown that this stochastically dominates the original process.
Now consider
EΠρ(θˆρ(q, α, ξ)) ≤ EΠ˜(θˆρ(q, α, ξ)) (B.23)
≤
∑
k≥0
δk(1− δ)T ≤ T (B.24)
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Therefore γ has a finite mean and hence γ ∈ P .
B.3.6 Details of Proof of Lemma 26
Since γ(x) ∈ F(P), there exists a ρ ∈ P such that γ(x) = (F(ρ))(x). This implies
γ(x) = Πρ(θ
∗−1
ρ,z ([−z, x])) (B.25)
=
∫ 1
η=0
∫ ∞
α=1
∫ ∞
ξ=1
∫ ∞
q=0
piρ(q, α, ξ, η)I
[
θ∗ρ,z(q, α, ξ, η) ≤ x
]
dqdαdξdη (B.26)
Let
W (x, α, ξ, η) =
∫ ∞
q=0
piρ(q, α, ξ, η)I
[
θ∗ρ(q, α, ξ, η) ≤ x
]
dq.
Then,
γ(x) =
∫ 1
η=0
∫ ∞
α=1
∫ ∞
ξ=1
W (x, α, ξ, η) dαdξdη
By using reverse Fatou lemma we can show that,
γ′+(x) ≤
∫ 1
η=0
∫ ∞
α=1
∫ ∞
ξ=1
W ′+(x, α, ξ, η) dαdξdη
Where,
W ′+(x, α, ξ, η) = lim sup
y→x
W (y, α, ξ, η)−W (x, α, ξ, η)
y − x
= lim sup
y→x
∫∞
q=0
piρ(q, α, ξ, η)I
[
θ∗ρ(q, α, ξ, η) ≤ y
]
dq − ∫∞
q=0
piρ(q, α, ξ, η)I
[
θ∗ρ(q, α, ξ, η) ≤ x
]
dq
y − x
= lim sup
y→x
∫∞
q=m(y,α,ξ,η)
piρ(q, α, ξ, η) dq.−
∫∞
q=m(x,α,ξ,η)
piρ(q, α, ξ, η) dq.
y − x
= lim sup
y→x
∫ m(x,α,ξ,η)
q=m(y,α,ξ,η)
piρ(q, α, ξ, η) dq..
y − x
≤ − lim sup
y→x
m(y, α, ξ, η)−m(x, α, ξ, η)
y − x piρ(m(y, α, ξ, η), α, β, η)
= −m′+(x, α, ξ, η) piρ(m(x, α, ξ, η), α, β, η).
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Therefore,
γ′+(x) ≤ −
∫ 1
η=0
∫ ∞
α=1
∫ ∞
ξ=1
m′+(x, α, ξ, η) piρ(m(x, α, ξ, η), α, ξ, η) dαdξdη. (B.27)
Now we will bound m′() by dividing into two cases m > 1 and m ≤ 1.
Case 1: m > 1
− 1
m′+(x, α, ξ, η)
= − lim inf
y→x
y − x
m(y, α, ξ, η)−m(x, α, ξ, η)
≥ δED
[
(C ′(m(x, α, ξ, η) + 1−D))− C ′((m(x, α, ξ, η)−D)+)]
= δED
[
(C ′(m(x, α, ξ, η) + 1−D))− C ′((m(x, α, ξ, η)−D))
(m+ 1−D)− (m−D)
]
= δED [C ′′(y)]
≥ Kδ
Case 2: m ≤ 1
− 1
m′+(x, α, ξ, η)
= − lim inf
y→x
y − x
m(y, α, ξ, η)−m(x, α, ξ, η)
≥ δED
[
(C ′(m(x, α, ξ, η) + 1−D))− C ′((m(x, α, ξ, η)−D)+)]
= δ
∫ m
0
[
(C ′(m(.) + 1− d))− C ′((m(.)− d))
(m+ 1−D)− (m−D) fD(d)
]
+ δ
∫ 1
m
(C ′(m(.) + 1− d))− C ′(0)fD(d)
= δ
∫ m
0
C ′′(y1)fD(d) + δ
∫ 1
m
C ′′(y2)(m+ 1− d)fD(d)
≥ δKFD(m) + δ
∫ 1
m
K(m+ 1− d)fD(d)
= δK
(
FD(m) + (m+ 1− d)FD(d)|1m +
∫ 1
m
FD(d)
)
= δK
(
FD(m) + (m)− FD(m) +
∫ 1
m
FD(d)
)
= δK
(
m+
∫ 1
m
FD(d)
)
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≥ δK
There fore, −m′(x, α, ξ, η) ≤ K = 1
δK
.
B.4 Proofs from Section 4.7
B.4.1 Details of Proof of Lemma 29
g(α, α + β, µ) =
∫
η
η Binom(α, β, η)dµ(η)∫
η
Binom(α, β, η)dµ(η)
Let u(x) be the pdf of µ(x), then
g(α, α + β, µ) =
∫ 1
0
(
α+β
α
)
η ηα(1− η)βu(η)dη∫
η
(
α+β
α
)
ηα(1− η)βu(η)dη
=
∫ 1
0
ηηα(1− η)βu(η)dη∫
η
ηα(1− η)βu(η)dη
Now,
g(α + 1, α + 1 + β, µ)
g(α, α + β, µ)
=
∫ 1
0 η
2 ηα(1−η)βu(η)dη∫
η η η
α(1−η)βu(η)dη∫ 1
0 η η
α(1−η)βu(η)dη∫
η η
α(1−η)βu(η)dη
(B.28)
=
( ∫ 1
0
η2ηα(1− η)βu(η)dη
)( ∫ 1
0
ηα(1− η)βu(η)dη
)
( ∫ 1
0
η ηα(1− η)βu(η)dη
)2 (B.29)
Let ρ(η) = η
α(1−η)βu(η)∫ 1
0 η
α(1−η)βu(η)dη =⇒
g(α+1,α+1+β,µ)
g(α,α+β,µ)
= Eρ[η
2](
Eρ[η]
)2 ≥ 1. The inequality is due to
applying Jensen’s inequality applying to f(x) = x2 .
Therefore, g(α + 1, α + 1 + β, µ) ≥ g(α, α + β, µ). The second part can be proved by
change of variables 1− η → η′ and using the first property.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 5
C.1 Auxiliary Results
Lemma 40. For each state x, the fraction of peers with least popular chunk is upper bounded
by m−1
m
.
Proof. Any peer in the system can have at most m − 1 pieces, or else it would leave the
system. The result follows from bounding the total number of pieces in the system as
mpi|x| ≤
∑
i∈[m]
pii|x| =
∑
S([m]:S 6=∅
|S|xS ≤ (m− 1)|x|.
Recall pi and pi respectively denote the fraction of peers that have the most and least
popular chunks. When all chunks are equally popular, then pi = pi = pij for each chunk j.
When the set of most popular chunks I(x) ( [m], the least popular chunk is denoted by
j /∈ I(x), and pi = pij. In this case, the least popular chunks are possessed by at least one
less peer than the corresponding number for other chunks. That is, when pii > pi, we have
pii|x| − pi|x| > 1. Specifically, 2(pi − pi)|x| − 1 > 1.
Lemma 41. Let K1 > 0, K2 < 2 be constants. For each  > 0 there exists an N(K1, K2, ) ∈
R+, such that if pi|x| ≥ N , then for I(x) ( [m], we have
C1λ−K1
∑
j /∈I(x)
Rj(1− pij)(2(pi − pij)|x| −K2) < −.
Proof. Lower bounding the summation over [m]\ I(x) by a single term corresponding to the
least popular chunk j, and lower bounding 1−pi by 1
m
from Lemma 40, we can upper bound
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the LHS of the above equation by
C1λ− K1
m
Rj(2(pi − pij)|x| −K2).
To upper bound the above equation, we define η as the ratio of number of peers with the
least and the most popular chunks. That is, pi = ηpi and η ∈
[
0, 1− 1
pi|x|
]
, and we can write
Rj(2(pi − pij)|x| −K2) = (U + ηpiµ|x|)(2pi(1− η)|x| −K2)
= −K2U + 2Upi|x|(1− η)−K2ηpi|x|µ+ 2pi2|x|2µη(1− η).
Let us denote the above quadratic expression in η by g(η). We can check that g′′(η) =
−4pi2|x|2µ < 0. Hence, the function g(η) is strictly concave and quadratic in η, with a
unique maximum. This function attains minimum at the boundary values of η, and we can
lower bound g(η) as
g(η) ≥ min{g(η) : η ∈ [0, 1− 1
pi|x| ]} = g(0) ∧ g(1−
1
pi|x|)
=
K1
m
[U(2pi|x| −K2) ∧ (2−K2)(U + µ(pi|x| − 1)] .
The result follows since C1λ− K1m g(η) < − if pi|x| > N , where we can choose N to be
max
{
1
2
(
C1λ+ 
K1
m
U
+K2
)
,
(
C1λ+ 
K1
m
(2−K2)µ
− U
µ
+ 1
)}
.
Corollary 4. Let K1 > 0, K2 < 2 be constants, pi(x) ≥ δ, and I(x) ( [m]. Then, for each
 > 0, we can find an L such that when |x| > L,
C1λ−K1
∑
j /∈I(x)
Rj(1− pij)(2(pi − pij)|x| −K2) < −.
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Proof. Fix  > 0, we choose the N from Lemma 41 and L = N
δ
. Then pi|x| ≥ N , and the
inequality holds.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 17
For any δ ∈ (0, 1), we can partition the state space into following three regions,
R1 = {pi ≥ δ},R2 = Rc1 ∩ {pi|x| ≥
M
m
}, and
R3 = Rc1 ∩ {pi|x| <
M
m
}.
For each i ∈ [3], we can further subdivide each region Ri into
Ri1 = {x ∈ Ri, I(x) ( [m]}, Ri2 = {x ∈ Ri, I(x) = [m]}.
All these regions have countable number of states. We will prove that in each region Rij
where i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {1, 2}, the mean drift QV (x) < − for all states x ∈ Rij \ Fij for
some finite set Fij dependent on . We fix  > 0, and choose N(K1, K2, ) from Lemma 41.
Lemma 42. For states in the region R1, the total number of chunks is lower bounded by
δ|x|.
Proof. The total number of chunks in the system r is lower bounded by the number of most
popular chunk, i.e.
r =
∑
i∈[m]
pii|x| ≥ pi|x|.
The result follows since pi ≥ δ in the region R1.
Lemma 43. For states in the region R2∪R3, the fraction of peers γj with the set of chunks
{j}c is upper bounded by δ.
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Proof. We can upper bound the number of peers with the set of chunks {j}c as
x{j}c ≤
∑
S:i∈S,i6=j
xS = |x|pii1{i 6=j} ≤ |x|pi.
The result follows since pi < δ in region R2 ∪R3.
Region R11: For this region, we choose N11 , N( 1m , 1, ) from Lemma 41, to define the
finite set
F11 , {δ|x| ≤ (M +m− 1) ∨N11}.
From Lemma 42, it follows that for the states x ∈ R11 ∩ F c11, the indicator corresponding to
the event {M +m− 1 > r} is zero in the mean drift of (5.2). Therefore, Corollary 4 implies
that the mean drift in (5.2) is upper bounded by −.
Region R12: For this region, we choose C1 > (m− 1) and
N12 ,
m(C1λ+ )
µδ(C1 −m+ 1) ,
to define the finite set F12 , {δ|x| ≤ (M +m− 1) ∨N12}. Let x ∈ R12∩F c12. In this region,
the indicator corresponding to the event {M +m− 1 > r} is zero in the mean drift of (5.3).
By choosing a lower bound on common contact rate R ≥ µpi|x|, complement of the frequency
1 − pi ≥ 1
m
from Lemma 40, and on the frequency pi ≥ δ since x ∈ R1, we can bound the
mean drift in equation (5.3) by −.
Region R21: We can upper bound the fraction of peers γj < δ by Lemma 43, and
upper bound 1 < m(1− pij) from Lemma 40. Thus, we can upper bound
γjC2m(m− 1)1{M+m−1>r} ≤ δC2(1− pij)m2(m− 1).
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Hence, we can upper bound the mean drift in (5.2) with
C1λ−
∑
j /∈I(x)
Rj(1− pij)
m
(
2(pi − pij)|x| − 1− δC2m2(m− 1)
)
.
When δC2m
2(m− 1) < 1, we can choose from Lemma 41
N21 , N
(
1
m
, δC2m
2(m− 1) + 1, 
)
.
For each x ∈ R21, pi|x| ≥ Mm , and hence by selecting Mm > N12, we ensure that the mean drift
in (5.2) is bounded above by − in this region.
Region R22: In this region, pi|x| ≥ Mm , and hence the total number of chunks r =∑
i pii|x| ≥ M . We again choose C1 > m − 1 and bound the common contact rate R =
U + piµ|x| ≥ M
m
µ. We also use the upper bound for fraction of peers γj < δ from Lemma 43,
and the lower bound 1 − pi ≥ 1
m
from Lemma 40, to upper bound the mean drift from
equation (5.3) with
C1λ− M
m2
µ
(
C1 −m+ 1− δC2m2(m− 1)
)
.
Hence, the mean drift for all states x ∈ R22 is bounded above by −, if δC2m2(m − 1) <
C1 −m+ 1 and
M
m
> N22 ,
(
C1λ+ 
)
m
µ (C1 −m+ 1− δC2m2(m− 1)) .
Region R31: In this region, mpi|x| < M , and hence the total number of chunks
r =
∑
i pii|x| ≤ mpi|x| < M . Therefore both the indicator functions associated with the
events {M > r} and {M +m− 1 > r} equal unity in the equation (5.2). Recall that γj < δ
by Lemma 43, 1−pi > 1
m
by Lemma 40, Rj ≥ U , and 2(pi−pi)|x| − 1 > 0 for state such that
157
I(x) ( [m]. Summarizing all these results, and lower bounding the summation over Ic(x)
by the least popular term, we can upper bound the mean drift with
C1λ− C2U
m
(
1
m
− δ(m(m− 1) + 1)
)
.
By choosing δ < 1
2m(m(m−1)+1) and C2 =
2m2(C1λ+)
U
we can bound the mean drift from state
x ∈ R31 with −.
Region R32: Similar to region R31 both the indicator functions in equation (5.2) will
be equal to unity. In this region, pi = pi. Using the bounds γj < δ, 1 − pi > 1m , R ≥ U , and
C1 > m− 1, we can upper bound the mean drift in (5.3) for x ∈ R32 with
C1λ− UC2
(
1
m
− δ(m(m− 1) + 1)
)
By choosing δ < 2m−1
2m2(m(m−1)+1) and C2 =
2m2(C1λ+)
U
we can bound the drift with −.
C.2.1 Choosing Parameters:
Following choice of C1, C2,M satisfy all the constraints,
C1 > m− 1, C2 = 2m
2(C1λ+ )
U
, M > mmax {N21, N22} ,
where m2(m− 1)δ equals
min
{
m− 1
2
m+ 1
m−1
,
m
2
m+ 1
m−1
,
1
C2
,
C1 −m+ 1
C2
}
.
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